Nikolas Kozloff

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With U.S. saber rattling towards Venezuela now at its height, the Pentagon has decided to reactivate the Navy's fourth fleet in the Caribbean, Central and South America. It's a bold move, and has already stirred controversy within the wider region.  The fleet, which will start patrolling in July, will be based at the Mayport Naval Station in Jacksonville, Florida and will answer to the U.S. Southern Command in Miami. Rear Admiral Joseph Keran, current commander of the Naval Special Warfare Command, will oversee operations. About 11 vessels are currently under the Southern Command, a number that could increase in future. The Navy plans to assign a nuclear-powered air craft carrier, USS George Washington, to the force.

It's difficult to see how the revival of the Fourth Fleet is warranted at the present time. The move has only served to further antagonize Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, already rattled by a U.S. navy plane's violation of Venezuelan airspace over the weekend. In the long-term, the Pentagon's saber rattling may encourage South American militaries to assert great independence from Washington, a trend which is already well under way as I discuss in my new book, Revolution! South America and the Rise of the New Left (Palgrave-Macmillan).

 

Reacting angrily to the Navy's announcement, Chávez said: ``They don't scare us in the least.'' Chávez remarked that ``along with Brazil we're studying the creation of a South American Defense Council'' which would defend South America from foreign intervention. "If a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exists," the Venezuelan leader postulated, "why can't a SATO exist, a South Atlantic Treaty Organization?"

 

Though the resuscitation of the Fourth Fleet has led many to believe that the U.S. is pursuing a course of gunboat diplomacy in the region, there was a time when the force arguably served a real need. What is the history of the Fourth Fleet in Venezuelan waters?

 

Venezuela in World War II

 

On the eve of the Second World War, Venezuela was the world's leading oil exporter and during the conflict the oil rich Maracaibo fields, located in the westernmost Venezuelan state of Zulia, were considered a crucial resource for both the axis and allied powers.

 

British and American oil subsidiaries of Royal Dutch Shell, Standard Oil and Gulf had in fact long operated in the Maracaibo Basin prior to the outbreak of European hostilities.  Transportation of crude from Jersey Standard's producing fields in Lake Maracaibo region was carried out through use of specially constructed shallow draft tankers. A refinery owned by Royal Dutch Shell located on the island of Aruba, which processed Maracaibo crude, was strategically important as it supplied products not only to Britain but also to France.

 

In 1940, Britain received fully 40 percent of her total oil imports from Venezuela, and during the first years of the war that total jumped to as high as 80 percent. Venezuelan oil also represented a vital commodity for the Nazis and the ability of the German state to wage war in Europe. As late as 1938, oil produced from Aruba, Curacao and Venezuela accounted for 44 percent of German oil imports. Germany did not buy oil directly from Venezuela but from U.S. and British-Dutch oil companies which shipped Venezuelan crude to refineries in Aruba and Curacao and then sold the final product in Europe. Venezuelan-German trade remained at normal levels but ended abruptly in September 1939 with the beginning of the British naval blockade of Germany.

 

By 1940, with Britain increasingly isolated as the result of German attack and prior to the entrance of the U.S. into the war, Venezuelan sentiment was bitterly anti-German. Meanwhile Venezuela moved into the U.S. orbit and became a chief recipient of American economic aid. U.S. military officials preferred that Venezuela publicly stay neutral in an effort to preempt any German moves to shell Venezuela's coast.

 

Venezuelan neutrality however was a mere legal fiction: in reality, the South American nation had granted U.S. ships and airplanes special access to ports and airstrips. Two days after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, Venezuela declared its solidarity with the United States and on December 31, 1941 the Andean nation severed relations with the Axis powers.

 

Operation "Roll of Drums"

 

It wasn't long before the Venezuelan government's decision to sell oil to the allies resulted in Nazi counter measures. On December 12, 1941 Hitler met with his naval advisers and approved PAUKENSCHLAG or "ROLL OF DRUMS" a U-boat operation in Western Atlantic/Caribbean waters. In February, 1942 German submarines plied the Caribbean, sinking 25 tankers in one month.

 

The Nazis were chiefly concerned with the Dutch islands of Curacao and Aruba, Dutch colonies where U.S. forces had set up defensive fortifications in order to protect refineries processing Venezuelan crude from Maracaibo (with an estimated crude capacity of 480,000 barrels a day, the Aruba refinery, owned by Standard Oil of New Jersey, and the Curacao refinery, owned by Royal Dutch Shell, outranked Abadan in Iran with 250,000 barrels; the Baku complex in the U.S.S.R. with about 230,000 barrels; and the largest plants in the United States at Baytown, Port Arthur, Bayonne, Baton Rouge, and Whiting with over 100,000 barrels each).

 

On 15 February 1942, a convoy of oil tankers and ships left the Maracaibo Bar. The first ships in line were the 'Monagas,' of the Mene Grande Oil Company, followed by the 'Tia Juana' and 'Pedernales' both belonging to the Lago Petroleum Corporation. These tankers were followed by the 'Rafaela' belonging to Shell, and the 'San Nicolas'and 'Orangestad,' belonging to Lago Oil and Transport Co, based in Aruba. A number of other tankers joined the column.

 

German U-Boat Attack and Creation of the U.S. Fourth Fleet

 

Suddenly a German U-boat torpedoed the 'Monagas' which sank immediately. The tankers 'Tia Juana,' 'Pedernales,' 'Rafaela,' 'San Nicolas,' and 'Orangestad' were also hit and sustained casualties. On the same day, the oil refinery on Aruba was attacked by German submarine shellfire. The political fallout from the attack was predictable: soon, angry street protesters hit the streets of Caracas, denouncing German aggression.

 

In response to stepped up German escalation in the Caribbean, the U.S. Navy created the Fourth Fleet to hunt submarines in the South Atlantic. The U.S. moves came none too soon: as the naval war raged in the Caribbean, Venezuela suffered tremendous economic losses. As a result of the lost tankers, production in the Lake Maracaibo Basin had to be cut back by nearly 100,000 tons of crude daily. By July 1942 the situation was still dire, with tankers operating at only one-third their average capacity of 30,000 barrels.

 

German attacks on the Aruba refinery marked the beginning of the Battle of the Caribbean. It wasn't until August, 1943 that the Fourth Fleet was able to turn the tables on the submarine menace in Venezuelan waters. In 1950, with German U-boats now long gone, the U.S. Navy disbanded the fleet.

 

Reviving the Fourth Fleet

 

The Navy claims that it needs to resuscitate the Fourth Fleet now to combat terrorism, to keep the economic sea lanes of communication free and open, to counter illicit trafficking and to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

 

However, the move comes at a particularly sensitive moment within the region. U.S. ally Colombia launched a deadly raid across the Ecuadoran border in March, killing 16 members of the FARC guerilla insurgency including the organization's number two, Raúl Reyes. Last weekend, Chávez accused Colombia of launching a cross-border incursion, while the Pentagon routinely lambastes Venezuela for its arms buildup including acquisition of high performance fighter aircraft, attack helicopters and diesel submarines.

 

Unlike the Second World War, when many South Americans welcomed the Fourth Fleet in Caribbean waters, some view the current U.S. naval presence as a veiled threat directed at the region's new Pink Tide countries. In an interview with Cuban television, Bolivian President Evo Morales remarked that the U.S. naval force constituted "the Fourth Fleet of intervention."

Cuba's former leader Fidel Castro has asked why the U.S. has sought to revive the Fourth Fleet at this precise moment. Writing in the Cuban newspaper Granma, Castro suggested that the move constituted a return to U.S. gunboat diplomacy. Castro, whose island nation confronted a U.S. naval blockade during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, remarked "The aircraft carriers and nuclear bombs that threaten our countries are used to sow terror and death, but not to combat terrorism and illegal activities."

An image flashes across the screen of pretty young women. They’re dressed in red T-shirts, wave a red flag, and run towards the camera. A voice intones, “Let us all participate in the great party of hope! Change is coming!” The image then shifts to a dapper young man with glasses who is thronged by enthusiastic crowds.

Meet Mauricio Funes, bane of the U.S. foreign policy establishment and the likely next President of El Salvador as of March, 2009. Funes’ party, the FMLN (or Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front), is running television ads such as these in an effort to appeal to the young generation and roll back the political right which has dominated the country’s politics for decades.

Funes is a former commentator for CNN International and for years had a popular daily show called The Interview with Mauricio Funes which wasbroadcast on national television. Well known amongst his compatriots, he is arguably El Salvador’s most respected journalist. A frequent critic of government abuses, Funes quickly developed a reputation as a political crusader.

As the so-called “Pink Tide” sweeps through South America 2009 is fast sizing up as a momentous political year for El Salvador, a Massachusetts sized nation of some six 6 million people. Like Barack Obama, Funes is poised, youthful and inspiring. He even has a similar campaign slogan: “Cambio” or “Change.” Like the presumptive nominee of the Democratic Party, Funes is already drawing large crowds. He is currently leading in public opinion surveys against his main political rivals.

The U.S. left doesn’t know much about Funes, but that’s hardly surprising given the political trends of the past fifteen years. During the 1980s, in the midst of the country’s civil war, the FMLN was a cause célèbre for the U.S. left. But once the U.S.-backed counter-insurgency war ended and FMLN guerrillas demobilized and formed their own political party, radicals focused their attention elsewhere. El Salvador dropped off the media horizon.

The small Central American nation is about to leap back into the headlines, however.

A victory for the FMLN would further embolden Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and continue Central America’s drift towards the center left, already underway with the return of Daniel Ortega of the Sandinista Party in Nicaragua and the election of Álvaro Colom Caballeros in Guatemala. If a solid pro-Chávez column of smaller nations emerges in the region this could prove to be a difficult pill for Washington to swallow.

ARENA: “The Reds Will Die”

When you consider just how entrenched the right wing has become in El Salvador, Funes’ political rise is even more remarkable.

Ever since 1992, the year El Salvador’s horrific civil war ended, ARENA (or Nationalist Republican Alliance) has reigned supreme in election after election. The party was founded by right wing death squad leader Roberto D’Aubuisson, held to be one of the intellectual authors behind the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in 1980. Many see ARENA, whose party colors are red, white and blue, as modeled on the U.S. Republican party but with even stronger nationalist overtones.

The hymn of the party touts El Salvador as the tomb where “the Reds will die.”

By the early 1990s, with the international left now ignoring the political story in El Salvador, ARENA consolidated its control through the ballot box.

Remaking the Party

Fearing relatiation from Washington, Funes has bent over backwards to placate the U.S. He has, for example, met with State Department officials as well as members of Congress and reassured them that he is no radical.

Meanwhile, Funes has declared that El Salvador should not scrap use of the dollar by returning to its previous currency, the colón. Funes says that "dollarization" and the adoption of the Central American Free Trade Agreement in 2006 have had negative effects, such as inflation and unfavorable competition for small-scale farmers, but that it is too late to scrap these policies.

The former media commentator seeks to remake the FMLN into a pragmatic political party. At rallies, he doesn't sing the party's anthem or wear the traditional red colours, preferring to campaign in a crisp white guayabera shirt. It’s a symbolic move designed to contrast himself with many in the party who still wear fatigues and brandish pictures of Che Guevara and Soviet flags at campaign rallies.

ARENA President Antonio Saca, whose term ends next year, has questioned the FMLN's supposed moderation. "If it flies like a duck, swims like a duck and eats like a duck, it's a duck. The FMLN is a communist party. Its ideas haven't changed," he has remarked.

Demonizing Funes by Linking Him to Chávez

Despite such dismissive rhetoric, ARENA is fearful that Funes may not go down to electoral defeat like his FMLN predecessors. Facing a possible debacle in March, the Salvadoran right and Washington have gone into overdrive, trying to tarnish Funes by linking him to Hugo Chávez of Venezuela. ARENA in fact has accused Funes of being a “little Chávez.”

Earlier this year, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell warned Congress that he expected Chávez to provide "generous campaign funding" to Funes. Similar U.S. national security reports, later exposed as false and comprised of politically-manipulated intelligence, were used by the Bush White House to justify its preemptive war against Iraq in 2003.

Nevertheless, ARENA President Antonio Saca pounced on the report, remarking that this act of “interference” would be “unacceptable.” He even ordered an investigation into the matter and, in another high profile move, recalled El Salvador's diplomatic envoy from Caracas.

On the other hand, Saca apparently views electoral intervention by the United States government as not only acceptable, but welcomed. In a November 2007 press conference with President Bush, Saca stated that the U.S. "can help out a lot in preventing citizen support for certain proposals in the upcoming elections."

Funes has denied any links to the Venezuelan government, and Chávez has scoffed at McConnell’s accusations. The Venezuelan leader said the FMLN needed no extra financial support as it was a "solid" and "well-organized" party with popular backing. Chávez described the “gringo” allegations as just another U.S. attempt to discredit him and cause divisions in the region. "It's a lie,” Chávez said. “We don’t need to do that, and they don’t need it.”

History Repeating Itself

It’s not the first time that Bush and the Salvadoran right have played the Chávez card.

During the 2004 presidential election in El Salvador, the Bush administration was nervous the left might win as Schafik Handal, the FMLN candidate, opposed the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and was threatening to withdraw El Salvador's troops from Iraq. As payback for U.S. support for the counter-insurgency war of the 1980s, ARENA sent 381 soldiers to Iraq in the early stages of the war. Salvadoran troops generally refrained from front-line fighting and were instead delegated to humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.

In March, 2003 Special White House Assistant Otto Reich, an implacable Chávez foe who met with Dictator-For-a-Day Pedro Carmona in the run-up to the 2002 coup in Venezuela, declared that the United States would reevaluate its relationship with "an El Salvador led by a person who is an admirer of Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez." The red-baiting tactics instilled fear in the Salvadoran electorate, which no doubt worried about a return to combative relations with the United States. Handal went down to crushing defeat, winning just 38% of the vote to ARENA candidate Saca’s 58%.

Entrenched Trade Relationship

With a more charismatic, media-savvy candidate at the helm, 2009 could be different for the FMLN. But if Funes were to actually win, what might be the future of Salvadoran-U.S. relations?

The FMLN leader would find it difficult, if not impossible, to take an antagonistic position towards the United States. The young politician would enter office with El Salvador’s trade relations with the United States already well established: in 2006 the two countries signed a free trade agreement providing El Salvador with preferential access to U.S. markets.

El Salvador exports everything from textiles to apparel to shoes and processed foods to the United States, and Funes certainly wouldn’t want to jeopardize such a vital trade relationship. Indeed, right now the U.S. is El Salvador’s most important market, purchasing 57.1% of the Central American nation’s goods. El Salvador in turn receives more than 40% of its imports from the U.S.

The Iraq-El Salvador Connection

Nevertheless, Funes may take some punitive measures against Washington. He has stated for example that one of his first decisions as President would be to withdraw Salvadoran troops from Iraq. ARENA is now paying a high political price for its loyalty to Washington: polls have shown that a majority of the Salvadoran people oppose their country’s troop presence in the Middle East.

While other Central American countries such as Nicaragua and Honduras have long since withdrawn their forces, El Salvador is holding firm and is currently the only Latin American country with forces still deployed in Iraq. ARENA’s position is that Salvadoran forces will continue their service in Iraq until they “finish what [they have] started.”

Were the Salvadoran troops to leave, such a development would prove insignificant from a military point of view. However, Funes would succeed in making a symbolic and political point: that El Salvador is no longer Washington’s lackey in Central America.

Chávez and FMLN: Furthering Ties through Oil

In another worrying development for Washington, Funes has said that he would seek friendly ties to Venezuela. For the two Latin American nations, oil might prove to be highly instrumental in solidifying ties. Recently, Chávez has undertaken an alliance with Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega by agreeing to supply the Central American nation with discounted oil. El Salvador is not an oil producer and a Funes administration would no doubt welcome any Venezuelan assistance to meet its energy needs.

Indeed, the FMLN has been steadily building up its relationship with the Chávez government over the last several years. At the local level FMLN mayors set up ENEPASA, a joint venture energy company which signed an energy deal with Venezuela in 2006. The initiative is designed to provide less expensive fuel to El Salvador’s drivers.

Clearly there was more to the deal than just providing cheap gas.

The FMLN seeks to rebuff ARENA President Saca and his neo-liberal economic approach by laying the groundwork for closer integration through ALBA, the Bolivarian Alternative to the Americas. The plan, initiated by Chávez several years ago, seeks to counteract the corporately driven U.S. Free Trade Area of the Americas and promote barter trade and solidarity amongst left wing Latin American countries.

When FMLN mayors signed the agreement in Caracas, Chávez suggested that money the Salvadoran municipalities saved on energy could be used to subsidize public transport and food prices. Under the terms of the agreement, cities pay 60% of their fuel bill within 90 days. The rest may be paid in barter for agricultural and other locally made products or in cash over a 25-year period.

Chávez used the moment to criticize U.S. trade deals like the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). "They're making deals with the devil, the devil himself," Chávez said, in one of his typical rhetorical flourishes.

Over the past two years, Venezuela has exported thousands of barrels of diesel to El Salvador under the new deal. The oil is sold by gas stations bearing a special non-corporate, “white flag” emblem.

The Legacy of Neo-Liberalism: Organized Crime and Maquiladoras

There is little doubt that under a Funes administration, much of the energy integration with Venezuela would continue. But how likely is a Pink Tide sweep in Central America in the first place and a decisive FMLN win in 2009?

Judging from recent political trends, ARENA’s political monopoly is jeopardized. The Salvadoran people are tired of the right’s relentless charge towards neo-liberal policies including privatization and shredding of labor protections for public sector workers. In particular, ARENA’s recent attempt to privatize the health care system proved deeply unpopular and was beaten back by the likes of doctors and nurses supported by the FMLN.

Poverty is soaring and organized crime has reached epidemic proportions in the country. In response, the police and military have allegedly organized vigilante groups that orchestrate “social cleansing” of criminals. In a move to further emulate the Republican Party in the U.S., ARENA instituted draconian anti-terror legislation based on the USA Patriot Act in 2006. ARENA uses the anti-terror legislation to pick up and jail political activists who protest unpopular government moves such as the privatization of water resources.

The agricultural sector meanwhile has been flooded by cheap goods from the U.S. and hasn’t been able to compete; in desperation cooperative farmers have been selling off the land and sending their children to the U.S. to look for work. Remittances from Salvadorans working in the United States are an important source of income for many families and total almost $4 billion a year. According to the United Nations Development Agency, an estimated 22.3% of families receive such remittances.

For those who don’t receive money from their loved ones abroad in the U.S., one of the few options left is to seek work in the maquiladora sweat shops. These dismal sewing factories employ hundreds of thousands of workers and pay laborers a scant 80 cents an hour. Employees have been exposed to horrible conditions such as unhealthy air and water, large amounts of forced overtime and frequent dismissals for those who get the wrong idea and support labor unions.

The Road to 2009

Because of ARENA’s pursuit of such unpopular policies, the stage seems set for a big left win in March.

What might we expect from a Funes administration? Though Funes has distanced himself somewhat from the party rank and file, there is a great ideological affinity between Venezuela and the FMLN. Funes would probably seek to put a break on the neo-liberal policies of the past, and has said that he supports the notion of government-funded social programs like those backed by Chávez and his allies.

"Up until now, I haven't been the hunter being hunted," political novice Funes has said. "But if I myself say that public figures need to be scrutinized, how can I reject that same scrutiny?"

Expect more than mere scrutiny in the following months.

Having fought for twelve long years to defeat the FMLN militarily, Washington is not about to give up now. Count on ARENA and its U.S. patrons in the White House to launch an all out red-baiting assault to prevent the FMLN from coming to power through the ballot box and thereby halting the further spread of the Pink Tide which is sweeping through Central America.

The recent election of former Bishop Fernando Lugo as President of Paraguay poses a sticky dilemma for the Vatican and underscores the hostile political environment facing incoming Pope Benedict XVI in South America. Lugo, who was known to his constituents as the "Bishop of the Poor" for his support of landless peasants, advocates so-called Liberation Theology, a school of thought which took shape in Latin America in the 1960s.

 

Recognizing the pressing need for social justice, Liberation Theology was minted by Pope John XXIII to challenge the Church to defend the oppressed and the poor. Since its emergence, Liberation Theology has consistently mixed politics and religion. Its adherents have often been active in labor unions and left-wing political parties. Followers of Liberation Theology take inspiration from fallen martyrs like Archbishop Oscar Romero of El Salvador and Dorothy Mae Stang, an American-born nun who was murdered by ranching interests in Brazil.

 

Romero, an outspoken voice for social change, was gunned down in 1980 by a right wing death squad during a Mass in the chapel of San Salvador's Divine Providence hospital. Stang, an advocate of the poor and the environment, was shot to death in the Brazilian Amazon in February 2005; her assailants were later linked to a powerful local landlord.

 

Joseph Ratzinger: Doctrinal Czar

 

During the 1980s and 1990s Benedict, then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, acted as John Paul II's doctrinal czar. At the time, John Paul was in the midst of a fierce battle to silence prominent Church liberals. "This conception of Christ as a political figure, a revolutionary, as the subversive of Nazareth," the Pontiff once said, "does not tally with the church's catechism."

In 1983 the Pope wagged his finger at Sandinista government minister and Nicaraguan priest, Ernesto Cardenal on a trip to Managua, warning the latter to "straighten out the situation in your church." Cardenal was one of the most prominent Liberation Theologians of the Sandinista era.

 

Originally a liberal reformer, Ratzinger changed his tune once he became an integrant in the Vatican hierarchy. As prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, the Vatican's doctrinal watchdog agency, Cardinal Ratzinger warned against the temptation to view Christianity in an exclusively political light. Liberation Theology, he once said, was dangerous as it fused "the Bible's view of history with Marxist dialectics."

 

Calling Liberation Theology a "singular heresy," Ratzinger went on the offensive. He blasted the new movement as a "fundamental threat" to the church and prohibited some of its leading proponents from speaking publicly. In an effort to clean house, Ratzinger even summoned outspoken priests to Rome and censured them on grounds that they were abandoning the church's spiritual role for inappropriate socioeconomic activism.

 

As Pope, Ratzinger has not sought to hide his lack of esteem for Liberation Theology. During a recent trip to Brazil, he was pressed by reporters to comment on Oscar Romero's tragic murder in El Salvador. The Pope complained that Romero's cause had been hijacked by supporters of liberation theology. Commenting on a new book about the slain archbishop, the Pope said that Romero should not be seen simply as a political figure. Hoping to avoid any meaningful political discussion on the matter, Benedict said "He was killed during the consecration of the Eucharist. Therefore, his death is testimony of the faith."

 

How to Handle Lugo?

 

Despite his best efforts however, Benedict has not been able to impede the rise of the Bishop of the Poor in Paraguay. Lugo has had long time differences with the Vatican, which could now create some political friction between Paraguay and the Papal See. When Lugo left the priesthood to pursue politics, the Vatican refused to accept his resignation, arguing that the Bishop already made a "lifetime commitment." Defying the Pope, Lugo formed the center left Patriotic Alliance, which brought together leftist unions, indigenous people and poor farmers.

When Lugo announced his intention to run in what turned out to be his victorious presidential race, the Vatican sent him a letter declaring that the Holy See had "learned with surprise" that some political parties "have the intention of presenting him as a candidate in the coming Presidential election in Paraguay." It added: "The acceptance of that offer would be clearly against the serious responsibility of a bishop … Canon Law prohibits priests from participating in political parties or labor unions." The letter asked Lugo "in the name of Jesus Christ" to "seriously reflect on his behavior".

 

Lugo replied tartly, "The Pope can either accept my decision or punish me. But I am in politics already." Hardly amused, the Vatican suspended Lugo from his duties "a divinis," meaning that he could no longer say Mass or carry out other priestly functions such as administering the sacraments. This was enough to enable Lugo to stand in the Presidential elections, but his victory now presents the Vatican with a dilemma over whether to "reduce him to lay status." Vatican officials said it was up to the Pope to decide, and that Benedict would "take time to study the situation".

 

Brazilian Challenge

 

Though Benedict has long opposed Liberation Theology, it's unclear what he might do at this point to halt its spread. Unlike the 1980s when South America was in the midst of right-wing military rule, the region has now undergone a decided shift to the left which is confounding the Papacy.

 

In Brazil, the world's most populous Roman Catholic nation, some 80,000 "base communities," as the grass-roots building blocks of liberation theology are called, are flourishing. What's more, nearly one million "Bible circles" meet regularly to read and discuss scripture from the viewpoint of the theology of liberation.

 

Liberation Theology advocates have strong links to the labor movement which helped propel the current regime into power; this history turned President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva into being a long time ally. The movement has been particularly strong in poorer areas of the country such as the Amazon, the hinterlands of northeast Brazil and the outskirts of large urban centers like São Paulo, which has a population of 20 million people.

 

In the latter city, the followers of liberation theology prominently display their politics. For example, during last year's May Day celebration, liberation theologists draped a wooden cross with black banners labeled "imperialism" and "privatization" and applauded when the homily criticized the government's "neoliberal" economic policies, the kind backed by Washington.

 

Chávez and Pope Benedict

 

Try as he might, Benedict has been unable to halt the re-emergence of Liberation Theology, and Paraguay and Brazil are just the tip of the iceberg. For years Venezuela has been a religious battleground, with President Chávez pursuing a combative relationship with the Catholic Church. Unlike some other Latin American countries which had a stronger liberation theology movement, the Venezuelan Church never had a leftist tendency except among diocesan priests.

 

A clash between the government and the Church was probably inevitable, and shortly after taking office Chávez started to chastise Venezuelan bishops, accusing them of complicity with the corrupt administrations that preceded his rule. The Venezuelan leader accused the Vatican's former representative in Venezuela, Cardinal Rosalio Castillo Lara, of allying himself with the country's "rancid oligarchy." Memorably, Chávez suggested that priests such as Castillo Lara ought to subject themselves to an exorcism because "the devil has snuck into their clerical robes." Incensed, the cardinal compared Chávez to Italian dictator Benito Mussolini.

 

During the April 2002 coup, prominent Catholics such as Cardinal Ignacio Velasco sided with the opposition against the president. Velasco was even accused of offering his residence as a meeting place for the coup plotters. What is more, he signed the "Carmona decree" that swept away Venezuela's democratic institutions. Senior Catholic bishops themselves attended the inauguration ceremony for Pedro Carmona, Venezuela's Dictator-For-a-Day.

 

But when Chávez was able to quickly overturn the coup and return to power, the hard line Church establishment was humiliated. Relishing his triumph Chávez launched a rhetorical broadside on the Vatican, calling on the Pope to apologize, on behalf of the Catholic Church, for the "holocaust" of the indigenous peoples of Latin America during the colonial era, and for the imposition of Christianity. The Pope, who is close to Castillo Lara, is reportedly anti-Chávez but has met with the Venezuelan leader at the Vatican.

 

Hoping to neutralize the power of the Catholic Church, Chávez frequently quotes from the Bible. Puckishly, he also tells his supporters in his public addresses that Christ was an anti-imperialist. Even as Chávez spars with the Church, Protestants have provided a key pillar of the president's political support. Over the last few years, Chávez has done his utmost to cultivate the support of Protestants, which make up 29% of the population. He even declared that he was no longer a Catholic, but a member of the Christian Evangelical Council.

 

In The Andes, Pope Faces Hostile Political Environment

 

In the Andes, the situation is not much more promising for Pope Benedict.
Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa is a Catholic Socialist and has called for a "new Catholicism" in the 21st century which would challenge globalized capitalism. The President has said that his real education came from working as a lay Salesian missionary in the mid-1980s in the largely indigenous province of Cotopaxi. During his speeches, Correa invokes the words of Leonidas Proaño, probably Ecuador's most famous liberation theologian.

Bolivia's Evo Morales has never been a fan of ecclesiastical authority and has said that Catholic bishops "historically damaged the country" by functioning as "an instrument of the oligarchs." What's more, Morales tapped Rafael Puente Calvo, an ex-Jesuit and a staunch liberation theologian, to be his Deputy Minister of the Interior.

 

In Paraguay, Brazil, Venezuela, and up and down the Andes Pope Benedict faces a very changed political climate from the 1980s. A new generation of leaders, allied to the Pope's ideological foes, has to be making life difficult for the conservative church hierarchy. If he wants the Vatican to maintain its influence in the region, Pope Benedict is going to have to be creative, diplomatic and extremely cautious in his regional initiatives.

The tiny, land locked nation of Paraguay has not been blessed with political good fortune. For decades, anti-Communist General Alfredo Stroessner, who “disappeared” and tortured thousands of dissidents, ruled over this country of some 7 million people. Stroessner was dislodged by his military subordinates in 1989 and later died in exile in Brazil at the age of 93.

However, the Colorado Party, which backed Stroessner during his 35-year dictatorship, maintained a tight lock on political power while enriching itself and the wealthy at the expense of ordinary Paraguayans. Under Colarado rule, Paraguay became renowned as a haven for fugitive Nazis, smugglers and drug traffickers.

For years, the U.S. backed repressive military rule in Paraguay in an effort to keep a lid on progressive social change. For Washington, Stroessner, a strong anti-communist, could do no wrong. A willing U.S. ally during the Cold War, Stroessner supported Lyndon Johnson’s invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 and even offered to help send troops to Vietnam.

Even in Paraguay’s darkest hours, while Stroessner harbored Nazi war criminals, crushed non communist peaceful opposition and persecuted the indigenous population (including forcibly assimilating the Ache population, a policy which ended in bloodshed, sexual slavery and servitude), the U.S. continued to back the General. It wasn’t until the late 1970s, with the arrival of Jimmy Carter in the White House, that the U.S. withdrew its support.

From Dictatorship to Kleptocracy

Despite the passing of Stroessner, most Paraguayans are even worse off today than under the dictatorship. Encouraged by Washington, Paraguay instituted a program of neo-liberal economic reform and privatization which thrust tens of thousands out of work. Paraguayan exiles once fled their country for political reasons. But today, it’s economic misery which has driven many Paraguayans to travel abroad. Currently some two million people live abroad in Argentina, Spain, and the United States.

The legacy of corrupt Colorado rule is evident for all to see. Currently, almost 50 percent of the country’s population lives on less than $2 a day and 38 percent of the citizenry is either unemployed or under-employed. In 2007, GDP per capita stood at roughly $4,000 while 32% of the population lived below the poverty line.

Land ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few large companies which are resorting to more and more soya farming. Amidst the concentration in land ownership, hundreds of thousands of landless farmers have been pushed to the cities by hunger.

The Power of Liberation Theology

On the other hand, today’s presidential election, which has brought Fernando Lugo to power, stands to shake up Paraguay’s politics and could even exert an impact upon the course of wider hemispheric integration. In light of the fact that Lugo has never held any elective office, his ouster of the Colorado Party is truly remarkable. When you consider that kleptocratic Colorado had managed to hold on to power for more than sixty years, Lugo’s accomplishment is even more striking.

Like his counterpart Rafael Correa in Ecuador, who once taught math to poor Indians while working with the Catholic Salesian Order, Lugo also comes from a religious background. Born into a middle-class family of political activists, his three brothers and uncle were forced into exile under the Stroessner dictatorship. In 1977 he was ordained a priest and enjoyed stints as a schoolteacher and missionary.

The following year Lugo left for Ecuador where he lived with indigenous communities and peasants. The young priest became a believer in so-called Liberation Theology, a school of thought which took shape in Latin America in the 1960s. Recognizing the pressing need for social justice, Liberation Theology challenged the Church to defend the oppressed and the poor.

Falling Afoul of Stroessner

Returning to Paraguay in the early 1980s, Lugo became a rural bishop known for both his political activism and conciliatory skills. It wasn’t long before he ran afoul of Stroessner’s military intelligence. Concerned for his own well being, he departed for Rome to study social science.

Five years later however he was back in Paraguay. This time he was chosen bishop of San Pedro, a diocese which lay in the poorest area of the country. The bishop learned Guaraní, an indigenous language spoken by peasants and urban poor who make up the majority of the Paraguayan population.

Working amongst the flock in San Pedro, Lugo began to take up the cause of landless peasants and earned a reputation as “the bishop of the poor.” Lugo’s advocacy, however, landed him in trouble with local landowners who accused him of protecting guerrilla fighters and supporting kidnappers.

The Road to the Presidency

In 2004, incensed by the social injustice that he witnessed all around him, Lugo resigned his position in the Church to pursue his political ambitions. Shortly afterwards he was the main speaker at a huge anti-Colorado demonstration in Asunción. Unionized workers, as well as leftist and indigenous organizations, began to rally behind Lugo. The ex-Bishop helped to form the Patriotic Front for Change, a grouping of some 20 Indian, farm peasant and union organizations.

Lugo is the first former Bishop to be elected president of a country (the Vatican refused to accept his resignation as Bishop, but experts believe that the church will grudgingly accept a Lugo Presidency rather than break off diplomatic relations with Paraguay) and frequently invoked the Bible while on the campaign trail. During one rally outside Asunción, he told 2,000 Indian peasants that he felt like a "Paraguayan David fighting the monstrous Goliath." The disenfranchised majority in Paraguay views Lugo as “The Bishop of the Poor.”

The former Bishop, heavyset, bespectacled and sporting a salt-and-pepper beard and priestly sandals, focused on social inequality during his campaign, questioning why “there are so many differences between the 500 families who live with a first-world standard of living while the great majority live in a poverty that borders on misery.” Lugo, who says that he has some affinity with socialism, wants to institute land reform and to re-establish Paraguay’s energy sovereignty.

As a politician and orator, Lugo would seem to differ somewhat from firebrand Hugo Chávez or Rafael Correa of Ecuador. The former Bishop stresses cooperation and dialogue rather than confrontation and a cult of personality. He reportedly has an uncanny ability to bring people together who don’t trust one another.

Lugo and Chávez

During a recent trip to Washington, Lugo assured the State Department that he was not like Hugo Chávez because he, unlike the Venezuelan leader, was a religious man. The future Paraguayan President remarked, “I am not of the left, nor of the right. I’m in the middle as a candidate sought by my people.”

The Paraguayan moreover criticized Chávez’s decision not to renew the broadcast license of Radio Caracas Television, a station which served as a hotbed of the Venezuelan opposition. In an interview, Lugo remarked that in Venezuela, there were “elements conspiring to attack the strengthening of public freedoms.” Under Chávez, Lugo added, Venezuela had pursued a political model which was “dangerous for a real democracy,” and “totally at the service of one person.”

On the campaign trail, Lugo was dogged by relentless accusations that he was receiving money from Chávez, a charge he has vehemently denied. "It’s part of a dirty campaign against me. None of this is true", he insisted.

Despite his close affinity with Paraguay’s Guaraní Indians, Lugo has likewise sought to distance himself from Bolivia’s indigenous President Evo Morales. “Individual leaders,” he has said, “can cause polarization, as I believe is happening in Bolivia. I don’t believe in creating a polarized society.” “I will not be a Paraguayan Morales,” he adds. “Paraguay will have to pursue its own political destiny.”

On the other hand, some of Lugo’s other comments may have raised eyebrows in Washington. He has praised the Venezuelan “experiment” for its positive social accomplishments, as well as “the better distribution of wealth for the benefit of the poor majority.” Furthermore, Lugo supports Chávez’s land reform program and calls the Venezuelan leader’s 21st-century socialism “interesting,” and “very stimulating.”

Lugo believes the U.S. should keep its distance from the political transformation now sweeping through South America. "I don’t think the United States has any choice but to accept these changes," he has said.

Lugo’s Paraguay: What Impact on South American Integration?

Hoping to undercut Chávez and his appeal, the U.S. has sought to cut free trade deals with individual South American countries. Unfortunately for Washington, Lugo has already stated that he has no intention of signing on to such an agreement as President. Historically, Paraguay has not played a very significant role in regional affairs. In the midst of South America’s Pink Tide and shift towards the left however, the country has taken on new geopolitical importance.

In an era of reduced U.S. influence, it’s now Brazil and Venezuela that are vying for the allegiance of smaller countries like Paraguay. Traditionally, Paraguay has formed part of Brazil’s geopolitical orbit but the relationship has recently come under strain.

Some of the friction has to do with Mercosur, a South American trade bloc. Paraguay has been a long time member of the group, while Brazil constitutues the most important economic hub. However, Paraguayans have been chafing under Brazilian influence. They charge that Brazil has bullied them by slapping crippling export restrictions upon Paraguay. As a result, Paraguay’s trade deficit has skyrocketed.

Lugo has said that he would keep Paraguay within Mercosur, but he sees the bloc as “inadequate” because it lacks a firm commitment to social and economic equity. Mercosur is unfair, he adds, because Brazil has registered greater economic growth than smaller countries.

Though the debate may sound Byzantine or obscure, it strikes at the heart of dramatic geopolitical currents shaping South America today. At stake is nothing less than the contours of future hemispheric integration and the social and economic future for millions of the region’s poor.

Venezuela’s Chávez says that Mercosur is a backward and ossified model for economic development. However, he has sought to bring Venezuela into Mercosur and hopes to subvert the bloc from within, presumably by shifting the entity’s focus from free trade to more equitable, reciprocal trade. However, Venezuela’s bid to join Mercosur has still not been ratified by Brazil, a country which has a more market-based vision of the future than the avowedly socialist Chávez.

Paraguay too has failed up until now to ratify Venezuela’s bid. Lugo has been coy about his intentions towards the issue, but he could play a key role now in helping Venezuela join the trade bloc. With a left of center government in power in Asunción, the center of political gravity within Mercosur could tilt a little towards Chávez.

The Politics of Hydro-Power

In other key respects, a Lugo presidency could shift geopolitical momentum away from Brazil and towards Venezuela. One issue which has rankled relations between tiny Paraguay and Brazil has been hydropower. To the chagrin of Brasilia, Lugo seems determined to follow in the footsteps of Hugo Chávez by pursuing a policy of resource nationalism.

Under Stroessner, Paraguay built the largest hydroelectric power plant in the world located in Itaipu. Though Itaipu, as well as the subsequently built Yacyretá Dam displaced tens of thousands of Paraguayans from their homes without any restitution, it greatly increased economic growth.

Itaipu, which is operated jointly with Brazil, is now at the center of a political firestorm in Paraguay. The dam is hugely important within the region, providing a full 20% of Brazil’s electrical power. But Lugo has declared that the contract agreed to between his country and Brazil is unfair. Currently, Paraguay is obliged to sell Brazil its surplus electricity from Itaipu at prices far below those set by the market. Lugo wants Brazil to pay more.

The Paraguayan President also wants a greater energy surplus from the dam. Currently Paraguay uses much less than half the energy from the dam while Brazil takes the rest. Paraguay would like to trade more energy so as to generate much needed income. To the dismay of President Lula in Brasilia, Lugo has said that he would like to alter the current energy accord. Such a move however would surely result in a great shortage of energy distribution to the Brazilian south and southeast.

When he talks about hydropower, Lugo strikes a nationalist chord: under his leadership, the President elect has said, Paraguay won’t “fall into submission to any other bigger country.” Lugo says that he is even prepared to take Brazil to the World Court in The Hague if necessary.

Paraguay, which historically has not had much of a political voice on the South American stage, now has a unique opportunity to tip the geopolitical scale towards Venezuela. Up until recently the international media ignored Paraguay. That could change now however with the rise of the country’s new Bishop President.

When you can’t stamp out progressive social change, the next step is to try to desperately derail it or otherwise water it down. That’s exactly the kind of strategy being pursued right now by the likes of Condoleezza Rice, who recently concluded a South American tour designed to ostracize the bad countries, namely Venezuela, Bolivia, and increasingly Argentina, and to cultivate ties with the good countries such as Brazil and Chile.

Rice and her colleagues are alarmed because, notwithstanding their ideological differences, South American nations appear to be moving towards extensive political and economic integration. The only question now is which economic development model will predominate within the region and what the eventual complexion of integration will look like.

The vehicle for closer integration could well be Mercosur, a trading bloc of South American countries. At present the bloc’s members include Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Venezuela is in the process of joining the bloc, and a number of countries including Bolivia and Chile are associate members. Mercosur nations have declared their intention of forming a South American Community of Nations modeled after the European Union.

The bloc is beginning to take on political projects rather than pursuing strictly economic objectives. For example, Mercosur now has a European Union-styled regional parliament in Montevideo, and many Uruguayans hope their capital might evolve into the "Brussels of South America." In a repudiation of Washington’s diktat, Mercosur nations openly debated what the future of free trade should be in South America during a heady 2007 summit.

In line with his usual penchant for over the top rhetorical flourishes, Hugo Chávez of Venezuela stressed the need for Mercosur to be "decontaminated" from the ravages of neo-liberal economics. Mercosur, noted the Venezuelan leader, was an "outdated mechanism and is leaking like a sieve." The trade bloc, Chávez added, was "founded in the context of a free- market economic model and offers integration for the élites, for business, for transnational companies, not integration for the peoples." Such remarks have riled the Bush White House which has come to distrust Mercosur, an entity which has acted to block the corporate-friendly Free Trade Area of the Americas.

Having woken up to the fact that its free trade and neo-liberal agenda for the region lies in tatters, and that wielding a Big Stick to defang its enemies cannot work politically in the present milieu, the Bush White House is now pursuing stealthy diplomacy. Rice’s strategy is to divide and rule, to contain radical social change and to steer it within acceptable boundaries.

These are important geopolitical developments which have largely fallen beneath the media radar screen. It’s a deficiency I seek to rectify in my new book, Revolution! South America and The Rise of The New Left (just released with Palgrave-Macmillan), based on extensive interviews with activists, intellectuals, political experts, and government officials in six countries throughout the region.

Venezuela and Brazil: Their Differing Visions for the Future

Officially, Venezuela and Brazil are close allies and are not vying for regional political control. But waning U.S. prestige has led to something of a power vacuum and the two countries are now pushing very different economic agendas. On the one hand, Brazil seeks to create economic opportunities for itself which in turn might offer advantages for smaller South American countries. Within President Lula’s scheme, these smaller nations would buy Brazilian goods and supply Brazil with energy resources. With Brazil as the hub of a southern bloc of countries, the region would head towards a more equitable development model mitigating the savage effects of globalization. Lula’s model is market-friendly though not explicitly "neo-liberal;" it is predicated upon government support for domestic companies which are intent on exploiting regional and global opportunities.

Lula’s agenda stands in contrast to that of Hugo Chávez who has overseen an avowedly socialist and strong statist approach to the economy. Rhetorically, Chávez rails against the market and globalization, thus sparking fear in Brazil that the Venezuelan leader will scare off investors from flocking to the region. Chávez would like to see a more "un-savage" version of globalization spread forth from Venezuela into neighboring countries.

In order to advance Venezuelan interests, Chávez provides development assistance and oil at discount prices to sympathetic regimes in the hemisphere. He has sought to bring Venezuela into Mercosur and hopes to subvert the bloc from within, presumably by shifting the entity’s focus from free trade to more equitable, reciprocal trade. Simultaneously however he has hedged his bets by promoting the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (known by its Spanish acronym ALBA), a scheme based on solidarity and barter trade outside of the usual corporate strictures.

Driving a Wedge between Brazil and Venezuela

Rice is trying to exploit these differences and to effectively drive a wedge through South America’s incipient left bloc. "Brazil has a president from the left. He’s one of America’s closest friends and partners in the region and on the globe. I will go on to Chile, another country where the president is from the left and again, we have excellent relations with Chile," the Secretary of State remarked in an interview with Brazil’s Globo TV.

Now that South America is headed on a new trajectory which is more independent of Washington, Rice hopes that the "responsible" left as exemplified by Brazil’s Lula and Chile’s Bachelet will steer the region away from the likes of Venezuela’s Chávez and Bolivian President Morales. "This is not about where you are on the ideological spectrum," she said. "It’s a question of: Do you respect democratic values and democratic institutions; are you working for the good of your people; are you working for the good of your neighbors. Those are the issues that are important to the United States, but it’s certainly not a matter of whether you come from the left or from the right."

Rice then urged nations such as Venezuela to meet their United Nations obligations by keeping terrorists out of their territories. In sounding the alarm, Rice was merely parroting her boss who had earlier remarked that Venezuela’s response to the recent border crisis in Colombia and Ecuador was "the latest step in a disturbing pattern of provocative behavior by the regime in Caracas." (In March, Chávez and Ecuador’s president, Rafael Correa, ordered troops to their Colombian borders and withdrew their ambassadors from Bogotá after Colombia killed a top rebel leader, Raúl Reyes, on Ecuadorean soil. During the raid, Colombia obtained computer hard drives that U.S. officials claim show the Venezuelan government may have had dealings with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, which the U.S. labels a terrorist group). When she was asked whether the U.S. was considering designating Venezuela a state sponsor of terror, Rice declared: "We will watch the situation and act accordingly."

From Bio Fuels to Free Trade

In the fight for geopolitical influence, energy politics looms large: that’s why the issue of bio fuels was at the top of Rice’s agenda during her Brazilian trip. In recent years, Brazil has become an energy giant by producing ethanol, a fuel made from sugar cane, which is even more environmentally destructive than oil in certain respects. It’s all part of Lula’s bid to rival Chávez, who has used oil for diplomatic and political advantage in the region.

In Brasilia, Rice discussed progress on an initiative launched by Bush last year to develop ethanol industries. At a press conference, she surprised the audience by seemingly becoming a born again environmentalist. Putting bio fuels on the map, she remarked, was "a way to deal with the terrible problems that we face in energy supply and climate change."

Brazil would like to become a more important political player on the world stage, and Rice was careful to bring up the issue of United Nations Security Council reform. The South American giant has long hoped to obtain a permanent seat, and the Secretary of State offered the carrot of possible U.S. backing for the move.

In Chile, Rice sought to revive a long-standing, but largely dormant, strategic partnership between Chile and the U.S. state of California. State Department officials argue that both have complimentary economies; spokesman Sean McCormack said that a centerpiece of Rice’s visit was a proposed educational exchange program. For Rice it was important to visit Chile, a country with which the United States has a free trade agreement: the Bush White House hopes the accord will serve as a model for other free trade initiatives in the region, including a pending deal with Colombia.

Snubbing Argentina by Refusing To Set Foot in the Country

What is truly startling to consider is that Rice altogether skipped Argentina during her tour. That’s a monumental diplomatic snub of a major country within the region. What’s it all about?

Relations between the United States and Argentina have been plummeting ever since Bush’s first term. Argentina still blames the American-controlled International Monetary Fund for its financial collapse in late 2001 (Argentina was forced to default on billions of dollars in debt to the IMF).

In 2003 incoming President Néstor Kirchner played on anti-American sentiment as a means of consolidating leftist constituencies, while simultaneously becoming a key Chávez ally. When I was in Buenos Aires researching my book, I was truly amazed at the extent of the growing Venezuelan-Argentine alliance. The two nations now barter and trade everything from cattle, to oil, to agricultural products and ships.

In 2005, things got worse when, right in front of Bush, Kirchner criticized the neo-liberal policies of the 1990s that the United States sponsored. Kirchner delivered his riposte at a meeting of Latin American leaders in Mar del Plata. The Argentine president did little to stop anti-American protests, leading Bush to leave the summit feeling totally humiliated. In an effort to avoid further embarrassment, Bush avoided Argentina altogether during his South America tour last year, preferring instead to pay his respects to Brazil and Uruguay.

The White House hoped that things might turn around with last year’s election of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the former president’s wife. But then relations took a further nose dive when American prosecutors in Miami named four Venezuelans and one Uruguayan in connection with a plot to cover up $800,000 found in a suitcase at a Buenos Aires airport allegedly meant as a secret campaign contribution from Venezuela’s government to Kirchner. The new Argentine president lashed out at the U.S., calling the investigation "garbage operations." Kirchner argued that the investigation was politically motivated and designed to drive a wedge between Argentina and Venezuela.

In retaliation, Kirchner restricted the diplomatic access of the American ambassador in Argentina, Anthony Wayne. Rubbing Bush’s face in the mud yet further, Kirchner has cultivated even greater ties to Chávez: the Argentine leader has continued to sell more consumer products to Venezuela as well as some $4 billion in Argentine bonds to help refinance the country’s debt. What’s more, energy-strapped Argentina will be the proud recipient of more than 10 million barrels of Venezuelan fuel oil and diesel per year.

What’s behind Argentina’s geopolitical maneuvers and what do the Kirchners want from Venezuela? Argentina seems to be playing a rather Byzantine game in an effort to offset Brazil’s big footprint in the Southern Cone. The Brazilians have always seen Mercosur and the Southern Cone as their backyard which offends Argentina’s sense of national pride. When Néstor Kirchner and now Cristina further ties to Venezuela, it’s a way of poking the eye of their northern neighbor.

To an extent, the growing rapprochement is also based on shared ideological affinity. Indeed, Néstor Kirchner once stressed that Mercosur needed to transcend its mere emphasis on economic growth. "We are not interested only in economic integration," he remarked. "We are not interested in a region of the world where integration is full of poverty, exclusion and unemployment."

Chávez to Brazilian Senate: "You’re Parrots"

For Chávez, the advantages of Argentine friendship are eminently clear. By securing important support from his ally to the south, Chávez makes it easier for Venezuela to join Mercosur and hopefully overcome Brazilian skittishness. That support has become more and more critical as Venezuela’s bid to join Mercosur has been held up and stalled. Though Argentina and Uruguay have ratified Venezuela’s bid, Paraguay and Brazil have still not agreed.

In Brazil, the biggest thorn in Chávez’s side has been the Senate, which was outraged by Venezuela’s refusal to renew Radio Caracas Televisión’s broadcast license; the station was a hotbed of opposition sentiment. Characteristically, Chávez flew off the handle and accused the Brazilian Senate of being subservient to the United States. In a move which hardly ingratiated himself amongst the Brazilian elite, Chávez said that the Senators were "puppets of the (U.S.) empire" and "oligarchs" more interested "in their pockets than the people." Memorably, the Venezuelan leader said that the Senate was a "parrot that just mimics Washington." Meanwhile, a Venezuelan negotiator remarked that the United States did not want "the strong bloc of the present Mercosur plus Venezuela leading the way to South American unity."

Chávez’s outburst led the leader of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party in the Senate, Arthur Virgílio, to declare that his colleagues would try to prevent Venezuela’s entry into Mercosur. Both the Social Democracy Party and the Democrat Party declared that Venezuela could not be admitted to Mercosur because it was "a country that cannot respect disagreement in a civil fashion." President Lula himself told Venezuela to mind its own business. In anger, Chávez issued an ultimatum, saying that Venezuela would withdraw its application to join Mercosur unless its bid was approved within three months. "We won’t wait any longer than that. The Brazilian and Paraguayan Congresses have no reason not to approve our entry: no political, legal, economic or moral reasons," Chávez said. Incensed, Brazilian government officials retorted that they would not accept deadlines from anyone.

Contours of Further Integration Unclear

Despite such incendiary tit-for-tats, some experts believe that integration will eventually occur, even though it may take 30 or 40 years to complete the process. While in São Paulo researching my book I caught up with Valter Pomar, Secretary of International Relations with Brazil’s Workers’ Party. Regional integration, he said, would have a significant geopolitical impact because it "would take place within the context of a rising left movement. That is important, because the European Union was pushed for and created under conservative governments."

Perhaps, but what will be the precise contours of economic and political integration? For the time being, the future is still plenty murky. Even if Venezuela becomes a member of Mercosur, the trade bloc faces daunting economic and political pressures which are far too complicated and arcane to even enumerate here. With Mercosur, and implicitly the South American Community of Nations future in some doubt, Chávez has turned his attention elsewhere.

By far the most enlightened and socially progressive initiative guiding South American integration today, Venezuela’s ALBA is designed to serve as a counterweight to free trade blocs. In particular, growing integration between Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia has led to important developments in health care which have benefited millions. On the other hand, ALBA has had little effect on the overall volume of trade between member nations. It’s difficult to see how particular South American nations, for example Brazil or Chile, would ever accept ALBA as a viable economic model. Meanwhile, Chávez’s plans to transform ALBA into some kind of a military alliance have foundered and gone nowhere as I have previously explained (see "`We Will Respond Jointly,’ Hugo Chávez’s Anti-Imperialist Army," February 16/17, 2008).

Such lack of political clarity has given the White House a slight opening. Though the Bush administration is reviled throughout the region and Washington cannot hope to turn back the rising pink tide of progressive regimes, Rice believes she can mitigate Venezuelan influence by cutting bilateral energy and trade deals with individual South American countries. As long as Brazil and Venezuela play out their big power rivalry, smaller countries may choose to either wait on the sidelines or secure advantages from either Lula or Chávez based on their particular needs at any given time.

Despite his constant rhetorical outbursts directed at the likes of parrots within the Brazilian Senate, Chávez has expressed regret at the lack of overall diplomatic progress. If they are ever to achieve meaningful integration, the big powers of Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil must find a way to resolve their differences. Up to now, all three have been engaged in a precarious geopolitical dance, an irony not lost on Chávez himself. Recently the Venezuelan leader remarked, "Neither Venezuela alone, nor Brazil alone, nor Argentina alone can become a world power. We can only achieve that together."

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