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Venezuela's War of Religion

In a move that is surely bound to alienate the United States yet further, Chavez decided to expel an American missionary group, the New Tribes Mission. What was merely a war of words has seemingly escalated into a religious battle. Or has it? What is truly behind Chavez's decision to expel New Tribes and where is the conflict likely to lead?

 

Reportedly, hyperactive Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez has cut down on his espresso intake, from a full 26 cups a day to 16.  Judging from his actions, however, you'd never know that "Hurricane Hugo" has slowed down.  In a move that is surely bound to alienate the United States yet further, Chavez decided to expel an American missionary group, the New Tribes Mission, on October 12th.  In an inflammatory speech, Chavez proclaimed that New Tribes constituted a "true imperialist invasion" and was working with the CIA.  Remarking that he didn't "give a damn," what people thought about his decision in Venezuela or "other imperialist countries," Chavez said the missionary group would shortly have to abandon its jungle bases.  The decision comes in the wake of a long and simmering war of words between Chavez and Reverend Pat Robertson, who called for the Venezuelan president's assassination on his TV Show "The 700 Club" back in August.  In response, Chavez blasted Robertson as "a terrorist," and said his government was interested in pursuing extradition of the U.S. minister.  Now, however, what was merely a war of words has seemingly escalated into a religious battle.  Or has it?  What is truly behind Chavez's decision to expel New Tribes and where is the conflict likely to lead?

 

New Tribes: A State Within A State?

 

Though Chavez's move was certainly dramatic, it is not as if the issue of New Tribes is a novel one in Venezuela.  For years, accusations have swirled that the evangelical outfit was involved in espionage and committed ethnocide while carrying out its missionary work amongst indigenous peoples.  However, the missionaries were able to count on high-level support from the corrupt two party system, the Venezuelan Evangelical Council, as well as the U.S. Embassy in Caracas.  Though Congress and the military launched separate investigations, high-level action was never taken.  In August 1981, José Vicente Rangel, then a deputy in Congress, requested that the investigation into New Tribes be reopened.  Rangel, a long time fixture of Venezuelan politics, had unsuccessfully run for president twice on the MAS (Movement Towards Socialism) ticket, in 1973 and 1978.  An aggressive opponent of U.S.-backed military regimes in Venezuela, Rangel was particularly incensed by the case of New Tribes.  Though the Ministry of Justice and Interior Relations ultimately heeded Rangel's calls and carried out another investigation, the results were never made public.  Despite the investigations and media attention, no missionary was ever put in jail (for a more complete accounting of New Tribes and their long and tangled history in Venezuela, see my report for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, "Evangelical Protestants in Venezuela: Robertson Only The Latest Controversy in a Long and Bizarre History").

 

Initially, Chavez is Partial to New Tribes

 

The tide however was beginning to turn.  In 1999, after Hugo Chávez was elected president, he named Rangel as Minister of External Relations. The veteran politician went on to serve as Minister of Defense under Chávez and later as his vice president.  Increasingly, New Tribes was becoming more vulnerable and isolated in Venezuela.  Formerly, the missionaries could count on the support of many members of the traditional two party system.  But those parties, by the time of Chavez's rise to prominence, had fallen into disgrace.  What is more, while New Tribes had earlier lobbied the U.S. Embassy in Caracas to protect its interests, American diplomats now had little sway over Chavez.  Indeed, by April 2002 relations had sunk to a new low, with Chavez accusing the CIA of having helped to force his ouster in an attempted coup d'état.

 

On the other hand, until the controversy with Pat Robertson erupted in August, Chavez's relations with evangelical groups had been smooth.  In fact, Chávez was initially somewhat partial to Protestants and evangelical groups.  Before Chávez came to power in 1999, Christian radio and TV were outlawed, a policy reversed by Chávez.  Even Robertson was allowed to broadcast his show 700 Club to Venezuela over TV station Televen.  Though Venezuelan officials declared that they had grown suspicious of U.S. evangelical organizations before Pat Robertson's remarks, the record suggests that the government did not view New Tribes as a threat.  Indeed, the missionary group was allowed to continue its work in Venezuela, with over 160 missionaries operating within the country.  New Tribes worked with 12 indigenous groups in Amazonas and several other states.  According to Venezuelan officials, the missionaries had 29 landing strips within the country.

 

Robertson's Fatwa Results in New Tribes Expulsion

 

The situation shifted drastically however when Pat Robertson put out his fatwa on Chavez's head.  Robertson, a former presidential candidate in 1988, said that the U.S. government should kill Chavez to protect American petroleum interests and because the Venezuelan president "has destroyed the Venezuelan economy, and he's going to make that a launching pad for communist infiltration and Muslim extremism all over the continent."  Though Robertson later apologized, the Venezuelan government was alarmed and suspended missionary visas.  Shortly after, Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel, a politician who has had a long and combative history dealing with U.S. evangelical groups, remarked that Venezuela was weighing court action against Robertson.  The indefatigable Robertson, forgetting about his earlier apology, continued his tirade.  Appearing on CNN he remarked that Chavez was "negotiating with the Iranians to get nuclear material.  And he also sent $1.2 million in cash to Osama bin Laden right after 9/11."  The preacher offered no evidence to support his startling accusations.  Venezuelan officials dismissed Robertson's remarks as totally false and "crazy."

 

Robertson's attack alarmed David Zelenak, Director of the Resource Department for New Tribes.  Speaking to me over the phone, Zelenak remarked that Robertson's strong words "did not help us in Venezuela."  The missionary added that other missionary groups were concerned about Robertson's comments and worried that the war of words might escalate.  New Tribes later condemned Robertson's statements on its website, but such efforts would not save the missionary group.  According to New Tribes, Venezuelan officials stepped up investigations of its activities in the wake of the controversy.  Retired general Alberto Müller Rojas, a military advisor to the Chavez government and former governor of Amazonas state, was not surprised by the increased pressure on New Tribes.  Within the missionary organization, he commented, "there are distinct [religious] denominations, principally those Protestant groups of the Baptist tendency which Pat Robertson belongs to."  According to Muller, Robertson and New Tribes were "tightly linked."  New Tribes and Robertson, he continued, were part of the same Protestant movement that so strongly supported President George Bush.

 

As it turns out, Zelenak's fears were not unfounded.  Amidst the escalating war of words between the Venezuelans and Robertson, Chavez expelled the Florida based New Tribes altogether.  The president announced that he would sign the official expulsion order as soon as he had received a definitive report from the Ministry of Interior, and that the decision was "irreversible."  In a further barb, he added "We don't want the New Tribes here.  Enough colonialism!  500 years is enough!"  Chavez said he had become aware of New Tribes' espionage through his own military intelligence, though officials have offered no concrete proof of the allegations.  Chavez confided that he had seen an "incredible" report and video concerning the matter.  The Venezuelan president did not set a fixed date for the expulsion.  However, he did say it would occur in an orderly fashion and that the missionaries would be allowed sufficient time to "gather their stuff."  Recently, Venezuelan military officials remarked that they were studying how to remove New Tribes' missionary bases.  However, according to New Tribes the Venezuelan military has already swung into action, occupying some of its facilities in areas inhabited by the Pume tribe.  The governor of Amazonas state, Liborio Guarulla, has sought to comply with the expulsion order.  Within Amazonas, Guarulla will request the withdrawal of missionaries operating in the Upper Orinoco, home to Yekuana and Yanomami Indians.  Guarulla added that he will comply with the law without resorting to force. 

 

New Tribes Responds

 

For its own part New Tribes offered a measured response on its website, remarking "We would welcome any opportunity to address the President's concerns and help him better understand our organization and the work of New Tribes Mission in Venezuela."  The missionary organization added, "We hope that President Chavez will reconsider his decision and allow us an opportunity to clarify misunderstandings and misinformation that exists regarding the work of New Tribes Mission in Venezuela.  New Tribes Mission is not and has never been connected in any way with any government agencies.  Our goal is to serve indigenous people." 

 

Meanwhile, New Tribes representatives took to Venezuelan TV and radio airwaves to present their point of view.  Additionally, the missionaries have declared that they will take their case to the country's Supreme Court of Justice.  A lawyer for New Tribes implied that Chavez was being dishonest and had no video or military report about missionary activities.  New Tribes has also appealed to the Venezuelan Evangelical Council for support.

 

The question remains though: why did Chavez decide to make this decision now?  It's not as if the charges against New Tribes are anything new.  On a certain level, it would seem that Chavez has simply been opportunistic.  Robertson's inflammatory comments made Chavez look like a persecuted martyr and allowed the Venezuelan president to place the issue of Protestant missionaries front and center.  In fact, Chavez may have calculated that he had nothing to lose and everything to gain by expelling the missionaries. 

 

Playing on Wounded Pride

 

The case allows the regime to play on nationalist sentiment.  Take for example the reaction of Jose Vicente Rangel, who has been gunning for New Tribes for twenty-five years.  Speaking with the press, Rangel remarked that the government's decision was designed to restore national sovereignty.  That kind of remark plays well in Venezuela, a small country that was pushed around by the European powers in the 19th century and the United States in the last century.  Playing to Venezuelans' sense of wounded pride, Chavez said that New Tribes had set up a state within a state, made unauthorized flights, and set up luxurious settlements in the midst of poverty.  "These violations of our national sovereignty have to stop," he thundered. 

 

Moving Ahead on Indigenous Policy

 

Chavez announced the expulsion order while handing over indigenous land titles, boat motors, vehicles and credits in the village of Barranco Yopal.  The settlement is located 500 kilometers south of Caracas within the remote plains state of Apure.  Chavez too is from the plains region and was born in the neighboring state of Barinas.  The president has never sought to distance himself from his ethnic heritage. "My Indian roots are from my father's side," he remarked. "He [my father] is mixed Indian and black, which makes me very proud."  What is more, Chávez has boasted of his grandmother, who he says was a Pumé Indian.

 

For the president, Barranco Yopal carries personal meaning.  In his youth, Chavez used to visit the town.  In an interview with Marta Harnecker, he explained, "I used to go to Barranco Yopal and bring cans and sticks to the Indians, because they made houses with those materials to spend the winter season there, but in the summer they used to go away.  They were nomads: hunters and gatherers, as they were 500 years ago.  I saw Indian women giving birth there…The majority of those babies died of malaria, tuberculosis, of any type of illness.  They [the Indians] used to spend the time drunk in town.  The Indian women used to prostitute themselves, many times they were raped.  They were ghosts, disrespected by the majority of the population.  They used to steal to eat.  They didn't have any conception of private property: for them it wasn't robbery to go into an area and grab a pig to eat it if they were hungry."

 

The announcement of New Tribes' expulsion was timed perfectly to coincide with Columbus Day, which Chavez has renamed Indigenous Resistance Day.  Alexander Luzardo, a sociologist and longtime New Tribes critic, remarked that Chavez's decision "complies with what is stipulated in the constitution of 1999, which establishes indigenous peoples' right to self-determination and to respect for their beliefs, values and customs."  Indeed, helping the nation's 300,000 indigenous peoples has been a great priority for Hugo Chavez.  Article 9 of the new constitution states that while Spanish is the official language of Venezuela, "Indigenous languages are also for official use for Indigenous peoples and must be respected throughout the Republic's territory for being part of the nation's and humanity's patrimonial culture." In chapter eight of the constitution, the state recognizes the social, political, and economic organization within indigenous communities, in addition to their cultures, languages, rights, and lands. What is more, in a critical provision the government recognizes land rights as collective, inalienable, and non-transferable.  Later articles declare the government's pledge not to engage in extraction of natural resources without prior consultation with indigenous groups. Three long time indigenous activists have been elected to the Venezuelan National Assembly, and prominent leaders hold positions in government.  In a novel move, Chávez has even had the constitution translated into all of Venezuela's languages.

 

While Chavez was in Barranco Yopal, he distributed 1.65 million acres to indigenous communities in the states of Apure, Anzoategui, Delta Amacuro, and Sucre.  The move forms part of the so-called Mission Guaicaipuro, which shall provide land titles to all of Venezuela's 28 indigenous peoples.  By the end of 2006, Chávez' Mission Guaicaipuro plans to award land titles to 15 more indigenous groups.  In Barranco Yopal, Chavez granted titles recognizing collective ownership of ancestral lands to the Cuiba, Yuaruro, Warao and Karina tribes.  It was in fact the second such land transfer, the first having been decreed in August.  Chavez awarded those communal lands during the 16th World Festival of Students and Youth in Caracas.  At the ceremony, Chavez handed out 313,824 acres to six Kariña indigenous communities living in the states of Monagas and Anzoategui.

 

Some Indians at Barranco Yopal felt that the government still needed to provide more assistance.  "We want the government to help us with hunger, with credit," remarked Pedro Mendez, a Yuaruro Indian.  He related that his community had requested an electrical generator and loans to help plant more crops.  On the other hand, some Indians clearly applaud the government's moves.  Present during Chavez's ceremony in Barranco Yopal was Librado Moraleda, a 52-year-old Warao Indian from a remote village in the Orinoco River Delta. "Previously," he declared, "the indigenous people of Venezuela were removed from our lands. This is historic. It is a joyful day."  Moraleda received a land title and government pledge of $27,000 to construct homes as well as plant cassava and plantains.

 

Attacking Protestants, Appeasing Catholics

 

By expelling New Tribes, Chavez also appeases prominent Catholics.  For years, church leaders have been a thorn in Chavez's side.  During the April 2002 coup, prominent Catholics such as Cardinal Ignacio Velasco sided with the opposition against Chavez.  Velasco even offered his residence as a meeting place for the coup plotters.  What is more, he, as well as top Catholic leaders and members of Opus Dei later signed a decree that swept away Venezuela's democratic institutions.  Senior Catholic bishops also attended the inauguration ceremony for Pedro Carmona, Venezuela's Dictator-For-a-Day.  Chavez has shot back against the church hierarchy, saying that the Church is a "tumor."  In a further jibe, he stated that "there are bishops from the Catholic Church who knew a coup was on the way, and they used church installations to bring coup plotters together ... those clerics are immoral and spokesmen for the opposition."

 

Chief amongst the president's critics on the right has been Monsignor Baltazar Porras, who has backed efforts to recall Chavez as president and helped draft anti-Chavez statements by the Venezuelan Catholic Church Episcopal Conference.  Another leading figure leading the charge has been Cardinal Rosalio Castillo Lara, who has called Chavez "a paranoid dictator" in need of an exorcism.  He has accused Chavez of encouraging "Cubanization" of the country and receiving direct orders from Cuban leader Fidel Castro. "Venezuela," he continued, "is the richest country in Latin America, but the impression that I have is that Chavez wants to end this…He wants, like Castro, to eliminate social distinctions so that we are all poor."  Chavez has shot back, calling Castillo Lara an "outlaw, bandit, immoral Pharisee, and a pantomime."

While Chavez's recent move expelling New Tribes is unlikely to totally appease these Catholic leaders, it may buy him a slight respite.  The Catholic Church has long viewed the growing Protestant presence in Latin America with concern; in Venezuela Catholics joined anthropologists and others who criticized New Tribes as far back as the 1970s.  Even some of Chavez's arch enemies such as Castillo Lara hailed the government's decision.  "We have the blessing of the Cardinal in this decision," Rangel announced proudly. 

 

And meanwhile, what of Protestants?  Though the Evangelical Council of Venezuela has defended New Tribes, Chavez has little to fear.  Protestants only number 2% of the population and have historically constituted a loyal working class Chavez constituency.  What is more, according to Samuel Olson, president of the Evangelical Council of Venezuela, Protestants have not bought into anti-Chavez propaganda.  Olson says that Protestants didn't give much credence to Pat Robertson and viewed the minister as "goofy." 

 

The Fall Out For U.S.-Venezuelan Relations

 

Speaking with the Venezuelan newspaper El Universal, U.S. ambassador William Brownfield noted that he would seek to facilitate negotiations between New Tribes and the Venezuelan government.  Brownfield categorically denied any link between the CIA and New Tribes.  The Department of State is apparently following the matter with concern, and holds out hope that the missionaries may be yet be allowed to stay as the Venezuelan government has not given any official expulsion order. 

 

What does this incident portend for the future of U.S.-Venezuelan relations?  Though Chavez's moves have proven destabilizing, the issue of New Tribes on its own is unlikely to produce an irrevocable breach.  On the other hand, the cumulative effect of Chavez's actions seems to be moving the two countries towards greater and greater confrontation.  In August, Chavez suspended cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency; the president said DEA agents were spying.  And just this month, Chavez sold off Venezuela's foreign currency reserves, held in U.S. treasury bonds, and deposited them in European banks.  "We have had to withdraw our international reserves from U.S. banks, due to the threats we have," Chavez remarked. 

 

These are only two incidents but they demonstrate the extent to which relations have soured in recent days.  Chavez might calculate that President Bush and the Republican party are too distracted with their own internal scandals and the mess in Iraq to focus much attention on Venezuela.  It's also true that the Venezuelan opposition is fractured and as a result the United States has precious little leverage in the country.  As Bush's popularity plummets, Chavez becomes more and more emboldened.  For the time being, he seems to be politically secure, but he is surely playing a dangerous game.

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A Real Racial Democracy? Hugo Chávez and the Politics of Race

While Chávez's strategy of appealing to racial minorities in the U.S. is certainly bold, it is hardly surprising given his and Venezuela's history. Chávez support for Venezuela's indigenous and afro-Venezuelan population has inspired not only oppressed minorities within his own country but also blacks living outside Venezuela.

 

As the war of words heats up between the Bush White House and Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, the firebrand South American leader has boldly sought to forge ties with poor communities of color in the United States. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Chávez provided relief assistance to the poverty stricken and largely African American victims of the disaster. The head of Citgo, the U.S. subsidiary of Venezuela's state owned oil company, set up disaster relief centers in Louisiana and Texas in the wake of the hurricane and provided humanitarian to thousands of victims. Volunteers based at Citgo refineries in Lake Charles, Louisiana and Corpus Christi, Texas, provided medical care, food and water to approximately 5,000 people. In Houston, volunteers from Citgo headquarters provided similar assistance to 40,000 victims. What is more, Venezuela has provided hundreds of thousands of barrels of oil in energy assistance to the United States. Chávez followed up his bold initiative by announcing that he would soon begin to ship heating and diesel oil at rock bottom prices to schools, nursing homes, hospitals and poor communities within the U.S. The Venezuelan president has also offered to provide free eye surgery for poor Americans suffering from certain eye conditions. The firebrand South American leader, who proclaimed the plan during a recent visit to New York, will begin his oil program through an October pilot project in Chicago. There, the Venezuelan government will target poor Mexican Americans for assistance.

 

In November, Chávez intends to expand the program to the South Bronx and Boston. Chávez has even offered to ship low cost gasoline to Native American tribal communities in the United States. "There is a lot of poverty in the U.S. and I don't believe that reflects the American Way of Life. Many people die of cold in the winter. Many die of heat in the summer," Chávez recently remarked during his weekly TV show. "We could have an impact on seven to eight million persons," he added. During his time in New York, Chávez toured the largely African American and Latino populated Bronx and was treated like a veritable rock star. Democratic Congress member Jose Serrano, who invited the Venezuelan president to the Bronx, remarked, "Chávez went to the poorest congressional district in the nation's richest city, and people on the street there just went crazy. A lot of people told me they were really mesmerized by him. He made quite an impression." Chávez's trip is reminiscent of similar moves by Cuban leader Fidel Castro, a figure who Chávez frankly admires. In a celebrated trip in 1960, Castro stayed at a cheap hotel in Harlem where he met with important political figures of the day such as Malcolm X.

 

Chávez's moves are sure to play well in the inner city. In light of the high price of oil this year, which has reached $70 a barrel, it is expected that the price of heating oil will skyrocket and become unaffordable to many poor people of color. By providing cheap oil to marginalized communities fed up with price gouging, Chávez shrewdly overshadows George Bush. The U.S. president, along with the Republican party, have long ignored the social needs of America's inner cities as evidenced by the botched hurricane relief operation in New Orleans. Unlike the U.S. government, which was hobbled by Hurricane Katrina and which had to redirect much of the winter's energy assistance program to hurricane victims, Chávez is ideally positioned to help poor communities of color. Venezuela owns 14,000 gas stations and eight refineries in the United States through Citgo, none of whose oil infrastructure was damaged by Hurricane Katrina. Chávez has stated he will reserve 10% of the 800,000 barrels of Citgo oil and ship the petroleum directly to poor communities. Unnamed Venezuelan officials claimed that their country would not lose money through the deal, as the idea was to "cut the middle man" out of the deal. Rafael Ramirez, Venezuela's Minister of Energy and Petroleum, says the move will relieve urban suffering as beneficiaries could see price reductions of up to 30%. Chávez's moves are sure to play well in the Bronx, but unlikely to be received with any sign of gratitude in Washington. "Cutting oil prices must seem like the worst sort of radicalism to the Big Oil companies and their buddies at the Bush-Cheney White House," writes Juan Gonzalez of the New York Daily News.

 

Forging Ties With Communities of Color: Chávez's Political Imperative

 

Chávez's moves seem to form part of a larger, long term strategy of building alliances with racial minorities such as African Americans. By aiding the poor, Chávez will certainly do much to reverse the negative media onslaught that has taken its cue from the White House and which has sought to portray him as "totalitarian" and a threat to this country (see for example my earlier Counterpunch piece, "Fair and Balanced or US Govt. Propaganda? Fox News vs. Hugo Chávez," April 30-May 1, 2005). Julia Buxton, a scholar at Bradford University who has written extensively on Venezuela, remarked that Chávez's gambit reflects ideological as well as pragmatic considerations. "He's been deeply, deeply frustrated by coverage in the U.S. media and the attitude of the U.S. government, and he's trying to counter a very Republican-directed vendetta," she said. That vendetta has included, most recently, calls by U.S. evangelist Pat Robertson for Chávez's assassination (see my earlier article, "Demeaner of the Faith, Rev. Pat Robertson and Gen. Rios Montt," September 17-18, 2005). "He clearly needed to build constructive alliances with more liberal sections of American society," Buxton added, "and open a way to insulate himself against his Washington enemies."

 

For Chávez, the task of recruiting domestic support within the United States has become a political imperative. The Venezuelan president has fallen afoul of the White House for his criticism of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. supported drug war in the Andean region, and the U.S. sponsored Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. What is more, Chávez has increased royalty taxes on U.S. oil companies doing business in Venezuela, and even shipped petroleum to the island nation of Cuba in exchange for Cuban medical assistance. With the added oil money Chávez has funded ambitious social programs in health and education. The Bush White House chose to confront Chávez: in April 2002 the U.S. government provided taxpayer funds to the Venezuelan opposition through the National Endowment For Democracy. Bush and the neo-conservatives nearly succeeded in removing Chávez from power when the opposition staged a short-lived coup d'etat. Since then however, Chávez has consolidated his position and emerged as the most charismatic leader in South America. Chávez's calls for greater regional unity, including the formation of Petrosur, a South American oil company, and Telesur, a South American satellite TV station, have further enraged the Bush White House. Not surprisingly, the U.S. has forged ahead in seeking to isolate Chávez, as evidenced by the recent strong statements coming from the likes of National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. In a meeting with the New York Times editorial board, Rice remarked that oil was "warping" international politics and "It [oil] gives certain power and leverage to certain countries and not to others. We're experiencing it with Venezuela, for instance, where the oil profits are being put to use across the region to, you know, push forward Chávez's particular view of the world." Chávez has struck back by threatening to cut off oil shipments to the United States if he is assassinated. Venezuela is the United States' fourth largest oil supplier currently accounting for 12% of imports. As such, a cut off of oil supplies could exert a significant impact on the U.S. energy supply (see my earlier Counterpunch column: "Chávez's Gambit 'Oil is a Geopolitical Weapon;" April 6, 2005). Chávez's recent oil for the poor idea, closely following on the heels of the hostile war of words, will most certainly fan the flames yet further and lead the Bush White House to continue its bellicose strategy in Venezuela.

 

"I was a farm kid from the plains of South Venezuela"

 

While Chávez's strategy of appealing to racial minorities is certainly bold, it is hardly surprising given the history. Chávez himself was born in the Venezuelan plain or llano, and has a provincial accent. A forbidding area with a harsh tropical climate, the area has had a long history of racial conflict going back centuries. During the Spanish colonial period, rebellious black slaves managed to escape from plantations and haciendas, fled to the llano and became a problem for the authorities. Slaves started to live in cumbes or escaped communities where collective forms of work were practiced. The blacks mixed with the Indian population and carried out daring raids on cattle ranches. The whites grew alarmed by inter-racial mixing: escaped slaves, they feared, might have a radicalizing effect on the Indian population. Accordingly, in 1785 the authorities drafted laws prohibiting blacks from living with Indians "because they only corrupt them with the bad customs which they generally acquire in their breedingand they sow discord among the same Indians."

 

Physically, Hugo Chávez is a pardo, a term used in the colonial period to denote someone of mixed racial roots. "Chávez's features," writes a magazine columnist, "are a dark-copper color and as thick as clay; he has protruding, sensuous lips and deep-set eyes under a heavy brow. His hair is black and kinky. He is a burly man of medium height, with a long, hatchet-shaped nose and a massive chin and jaw." In an interview, Chávez remarked that when he first applied to the military academy he had an Afro. From an ethno-racial standpoint, Chávez is similar to many of his fellow Venezuelans. Indeed, today 67 per cent of the population is mestizo, 10 per cent black and 23 per cent white. Chávez himself has not sought to distance himself from his ethnic heritage. "My Indian roots are from my father's side," he remarked. "He [my father] is mixed Indian and black, which makes me very proud." What is more, Chávez has boasted of his grandmother, who he says was a Pumé Indian. Like many other Venezuelans of mixed race, Chávez grew up in poverty. One of six children, Chávez was born in extremely humbling conditions in the llano. "I was a farm kid from the plains of South Venezuela," he remarked to Ted Koppel on ABC's Nightline. "I grew up in a palm tree house with an earthen floor," he added. Chávez entered the military, which historically has been one of the few paths towards social advancement for men of mixed race. While on duty with the military he toured the country and became aware of economic exploitation and racial discrimination.

 

Venezuela: A "Racial Democracy"?

 

Unlike the United States, Venezuela has not experienced poisonous anti black racism. But the idea of racial democracy does not stand up under scrutiny: the caste like divisions of the colonial period are still latent in society. "Venezuelan elites," one scholar has remarked, "judged people by their appearances. Accordingly, individuals with 'anxious hair' or 'hair like springs' lived in the shadow of their black slave ancestors. The elites considered respectable the whiter Venezuelans who had 'hair flat as rainwater, of an indefinite light brown color which is neither fair nor dark.'" Though some blacks were able to enter white society through marriage and miscegenation, "in the long run, such individuals provided the exceptions that proved the rule." Blacks who sought social acceptance had to adopt the clothing, education, and language of the white elite. In present day Venezuelan society, notes respected commentator Gregory Wilpert, "The correspondence between skin color and class membership is quite stunning at times. To confirm this observation, all one has to do is compare middle to upper class neighborhoods, where predominantly lighter colored folks live, with the barrios, which are clearly predominantly inhabited by darker skinned Venezuelans." Meanwhile, journalist Greg Palast noted that rich whites had "command of the oil wealth, the best jobs, the English-language lessons, the imported clothes, the vacations in Miami, the plantations."

 

Chávez and Indigenous Peoples

 

In 1998 while campaigning for president, Chávez made a commitment to champion the rights of Venezuela's half-million indigenous peoples. After he was elected, Chávez put the issue of indigenous rights front and center by addressing it on his weekly call-in program, Aló Presidente. But actions speak greater than words, and Chávez made good on his promises by working to codify the rights of indigenous people in the new 1999 constitution. Article 9 proclaims that while Spanish is the official language of Venezuela, "Indigenous languages are also for official use for Indigenous peoples and must be respected throughout the Republic's territory for being part of the nation's and humanity's patrimonial culture." In chapter eight of the constitution, the state recognizes the social, political, and economic organization within indigenous communities, in addition to their cultures, languages, rights, and lands. What is more, in a critical provision the government recognizes land rights as collective, inalienable, and non-transferable. Later articles declare the government's pledge not to engage in extraction of natural resources without prior consultation with indigenous groups. Three long time indigenous activists have been elected to the Venezuelan National Assembly, and prominent leaders hold positions in government. In a novel move, Chávez has even had the constitution translated into all of Venezuela's languages.

 

Chávez has lived up to the constitution by awarding communal land titles to six Kariña indigenous communities. The land titles will be handed out to 4,000 people and encompass 317,000 acres in the Venezuelan states of Monagas and Anzoategui. The land transfers form part of Mission Guaicaipuro, a plan to provide land titles to all of Venezuela's 28 indigenous peoples. Chávez awarded the communal titles to the Kariña in August during the 16th World Festival of Students and Youth. The conference, which was attended by 40,000 people, was held in Caracas. During the opening procession of nations Chávez gave a "thumbs up" to a banner which displayed the words "Leonard Peltier." An indigenous woman speaker at the conference, one of three indigenous representatives in the Venezuela Assembly, praised recent advances for indigenous people. One conference participant reported, "Chávez hugged all the indigenous leaders in front of the world and gave deeds of territory to the tribes." By the end of 2006, Chávez' Mission Guaicaipuro plans to award land titles to 15 more indigenous groups. Participants at the conference were also pleased by Chávez's moves to halt the celebration of Columbus Day, which he has replaced with "Indigenous Resistance Day."

 

Chávez and Afro-Venezuelans

 

On the other hand, while the new constitution recognizes indigenous rights, it mentions nothing about blacks in Venezuela, leading Bill Fletcher of the Washington-based TransAfrica Forum to comment, "I feel that black issues need to be injected into politics." On the other hand, there are signs that Chávez government is at least aware of the problem. From March to May 2004, Afro Venezuelan groups celebrated the 150th anniversary of the end of slavery in Caracas. At the end of the conference Chávez made an appearance and the audience heard a lecture from Afro-Venezuelan historian José Marcial Ramos Guedez. Some participants expressed optimism that racial progress would be made under the Chávez government.

 

"Representatives of Venezuela's Afro-descendants are so positive about the current reforms in government [under Chávez]," said Máryori Márquez, assistant to the director of culture in the city of Sucre, "that we are now also trying to have legislation drafted that will mandate the acceptance and the recognition of the traditional and current human rights of Black Venezuelans." Máryori added that Chávez was "completely open to this initiative, we just have to work to make this come true, we have to develop this. Because this won't just benefit a few people, it would be to everyone's benefit."

 

The White Elite Strikes Back

 

The white elite has not been amused by Chávez's recent moves. For them, the new president was an outsider. In contrast to previous leaders in Venezuela and throughout the region who identified with the outside European world, Chávez loudly proclaimed his indigenous and African roots. Chávez himself seems well aware of the race issue. According to the Venezuelan president, racial tensions have increased since his election. "There is racism here," Chávez remarked. "It used to be more hidden and now it is more open." Chávez's opponents, who argue that racism does not exist in the country, charged that the president exploits the race card for political gain. According to Fletcher, the Chávez opposition "has attacked him [Chávez] using racist language and imagery which would be totally unacceptable in public discourse in the USA." The Venezuelan elite has used racial slurs to taint Chávez, denouncing him as a black monkey. According to author Tariq Ali, "A puppet show to this effect with a monkey playing Chávez was even organized at the U.S. Embassy in Caracas. But Colin Powell was not amused and the Ambassador was compelled to issue an apology." The attacks continued when Venezuelan media commentators referred to the Minister of Education, Aristobulo Isturiz, who is black, as "a monkey" and "an ape." Meanwhile, analysts have remarked upon the racial undertones of political conflict in Chávez's Venezuela. "Class and skin color differences," remarks Wilpert, "clearly correlate very highly at demonstrations, such that the darker skinned (and presumably lower class) support the Chávez government and the lighter skinned (and presumably middle and upper class) oppose the Chávez government."

 

Race and the Venezuelan Media

 

This difference in skin color was clearly evident during the demonstrations both for and against Chávez in the days preceding the April 2002 coup, and during an oil lockout in December 2002-January 2003. What is more, the Venezuelan TV media, which is dominated by whites or light skinned individuals, and which relegates blacks or dark skinned people to play roles as criminals or servants in soap operas, played a significant role in the April 2002 coup. In the days leading up to Chávez's ouster, Venevisión, RCTV, Globovisión and Televen substituted their regular programming with non-stop vitriolic anti-Chávez propaganda, which some of their staff later acknowledged as unprofessional behavior. This relentless barrage was interrupted by commercials urging TV viewers to go into the streets. Inflammatory ads blaring, "Not one step backward. Out! Leave now!" were carried by the stations as public service announcements. Later on the day of the coup, Gustavo Cisneros allowed his television station Venevision to serve as the meeting place for anti-Chávez coup plotters. Reportedly, interim coup president Pedro Carmona was present.

 

Chávez has struck back against the established media through Vive TV, a state sponsored station. In contrast to TV stations like RCTV, which airs shows such as "Quien Quiere Ser Millionario" ("Who Wants To Be A Millionaire"), Vive TV shuns American-style consumerism. According to its website, Vive TV promotes "the common citizen, the millions of Venezuelans and Latin Americans who have been made invisible by imperialism and its cultural domination." Through Vive's programming, claim the station's managers, "it is possible to acquaint oneself with the reality, lives and struggle of people of African descent [and] indigenous peoples." As Blanca Eekhout, the former manager of Vive explains, people of color previously "have appeared in the media but in a stigmatized way; they are shown as marginal people, criminals. They are not shown building, constructing, which is part of the struggle for the development of the country. That's one thing we are trying to change." The result of that changed attitude was plain to see during Vive TV's extended coverage of the Social Forum of the Americas in Ecuador. According to Eekhout, Venezuelan Indians attended the event and "The [Venezuelan] indigenous movement was excited; they could see not only movements there, but also their own Venezuelan delegates." Chávez has also increased the visibility of Latin America's indigenous peoples through the launching of the government-sponsored Televisora del Sur (Telesur). The network, which offers news and opinion programming, has hired Ati Kiwa as a presenter, an indigenous Colombian woman who wears traditional dress. The station provides a stark contrast to Univisión celebrity anchor Jorge Ramos, who wears a jacket and tie.

 

Chávez, Glover, and Martin Luther King

 

Even as he forges ahead with his media initiatives, the indefatigable Chávez has also moved to increase his political ties with the African American community. In January, 2004 TransAfrica Forum sent a delegation of influential artists, actors, activists and scholars to Caracas to meet with government officials. The group included the likes of screen actor Danny Glover ("Lethal Weapon," "The Color Purple"), who expressed his excitement at the social changes taking place in Venezuela. Glover remarked that the U.S. media's portrayal of Venezuela "has nothing to do with reality." Glover stated that his presence in Venezuela was "to listen and learn, not only from government and opposition politicians, but to share with the people, those who are promoting the changes in this country and we want to be in contact with those who benefit from those changes." Glover and others later presided over the inauguration of a new "Martin Luther King., Jr." school in the coastal town of Naiguata. The area is home to large numbers of Afro-Venezuelans. The school inauguration was the first official Venezuelan recognition of the importance of the slain civil rights leader. What is more, the government launched a photo exposition to honor Dr. King. Speaking at the event, the Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States, Bernardo Alvarez, declared that "The visit by members of the TransAfrica Forum represents a struggle that goes beyond the figure of Martin Luther King; his struggle, his ideas and the African-American social movements inspired by him. This is a struggle aimed at defending people's rights, not only in the United States, but in the hemisphere and the world." Glover, clearly touched by the occasion, commented, ""This isn't Danny Glover the artist. I'm here as a citizen, not only of the US, but a citizen of the world. We understand fully the importance of this historical moment." Chávez later honored the late Dr. King during his radio and TV show Alo Presidente; Glover and others were invited on air to participate.

 

Predictably, the TransAfrica Forum delegates came under heavy attack from the Venezuelan opposition. "In the Opposition-oriented media, racist language and imagery wereused to characterize, if not caricaturize, our visit," Fletcher remarked. According to him, the delegation received racist e mail, and newspaper editorials and cartoons depicted the delegation in a racist manner. During a press conference, however, TransAfrica participants held their own against the media. James Early, Director of Cultural Studies and Communication at the Center for Folklife Programs and Cultural Studies at the Smithsonian Institution, expressed dismay with Venezuelan journalists. Early said he was surprised that none of the journalist's questions had to do with issues of cultural or racial diversity. "What are you journalists doing to educate the Venezuelan people about racial and cultural diversity? Democracy in the hemisphere relies heavily on the social responsibility of journalists, and asking questions only about the government or the opposition isn't going to help reach that goal. Democracy is not the government or the opposition, it is the people, being the people of Venezuela or the people of the United States," he said. Sitting in the audience was Education and Sports Minister Aristobulo Isturiz, the same black man who had been described by opposition reporters as "a monkey" in the past. Reportedly, Isturiz couldn't hide his satisfaction at the way the delegation handled the combative journalists.

 

Jackson, Glover, Belafonte: Chávez's New Friends

 

Chávez has maintained his close relationships with prominent black entertainers in the United States. In July 2005, Danny Glover and singer Harry Belafonte were invited to the ceremonial launching of Chávez's new TV station Telesur. Glover was impressed with the new media initiative, but criticized the station for not having any people of African or indigenous descent on its advisory board. Chávez himself called in to the inauguration shortly after and said to Glover, in English, "Danny, I am with you."

 

Meanwhile, Chávez has cultivated ties with civil rights leader Jesse Jackson. During a visit to Caracas, the veteran African American activist condemned Pat Robertson's call for Chávez's assassination. Coinciding with Jackson's stay in the country, the Venezuelan National Assembly declared a special session to commemorate Dr. King's "I Have A Dream" speech. National Assembly member Nohelí Pocaterra, an indigenous woman of Wayuú descent, addressed parliament in her native language and later in Spanish. Pocaterra compared Chávez's struggle for equality in Venezuela with Dr. King's civil rights work. Speaking later at the National Assembly, Jackson discussed the role of Martin Luther King Jr. during the civil rights struggle. Jackson praised Venezuela for making slavery illegal prior to the United States. "You in Venezuela ended the system of slavery in 1854," he remarked. At the end of his speech Jackson was cheered with thunderous applause from Venezuelan lawmakers.

 

The Future of Hemispheric Racial Politics

 

Chávez's international diplomacy and his warm ties with prominent African Americans will surely enrage the Bush White House yet further. Just at the time when Bush's popularity is flagging over the war in Iraq and botched relief efforts at home, Chávez has emerged as the most charismatic South American leader in recent times. For Bush, who tried and failed to dislodge Chávez in 2002, it is hardly a promising picture. Meanwhile, Chávez has inspired not only oppressed minorities within his own country but also blacks living outside Venezuela. "Advanced by individuals such as President Chávez," Fletcher remarks, "the recognition of the on-going reality of racism, and the struggles against it by the African descendant and Indigenous populations, could have a momentous impact on the politics and future of Latin America, let alone the entire Western Hemisphere."

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Bird Flu and Bush

As recent events have clearly shown, nature can have a devastating political impact for political leaders. According to a Wall Street Journal poll, just prior to Hurricane Katrina Bush's disapproval rating stood at 55%, with 40% approving of the president and 5% unsure. In the aftermath however, his numbers, according to CBS, slipped yet further: only 38% approved of his overall job performance. While it's unclear what the long term political impact of Hurricane Katrina may be, Americans lost confidence in their political leadership. According to CBS polling data taken after Hurricane Katrina, 34% said they didn't have much confidence in government to respond to natural disasters, and a full 15% said they had no confidence at all. Only 19% said they had a great deal of confidence in the authorities, a truly staggering statistic.

 

Hurricane Katrina may be just the tip of the iceberg, however. If a severe outbreak of Asian bird flu hits the U.S., Bush's presidency could be severely damaged or even ruined. What is the disease and how is it spread? Avian influenza, also known as bird flu, is caused by the H5N1 virus native to wild water birds. Migratory ducks, geese and herons carry the influenza, and as they migrate they may pass the virus on to domesticated birds such as chickens. H5N1 virus has already devastated bird flocks throughout Asia. What is more, in the last six years the virus has mutated and can now infect and kill humans; as of September 58 people have died. According to the PBS show Wide Angle, there is already some evidence that the virus has spread via human-to-human contact. The antiviral drug Tamiflu has been proven effective against H5N1 in lab testing. Tamiflu, and another drug, Relenza, could be effective against avian influenza if they are taken within two days of symptoms becoming apparent. But, no one really knows if they will work. Indeed, most people that have been hospitalized with bird fly have died. Some had already been treated with anti viral drugs. According to the World Health Organization, a pandemic is imminent but no one knows when it might occur.

 

A Dire Forecast

 

In the last major avian flu epidemic in 1918, 50 million people died around the world within 18 months. An outbreak of H5N1 could prove equally if not more devastating: worldwide, the World Health Organization is warning that the virus could result in between 50 and 100 million deaths. The Centers For Disease Control report that even a "medium-level epidemic" could result in the deaths of up to 207,000 Americans, hospitalize 734,000, and sicken approximately one third of the U.S. population. Writing in Foreign Affairs however, Laurie Garrett estimates that such a figure is quite conservative. She writes that in the worse case scenario, in which the authorities are unable to produce an effective vaccine fast enough and the virus withstands anti-flu drugs, avian flu could kill up to 16 million people. In the event of an outbreak, some countries might seek to impose ineffectual quarantines or close borders and airports. In that event, trade and travel would be disrupted; stock markets would be dealt a severe blow. With record high levels of worker absenteeism, economic productivity would be dealt a severe blow. What is more, direct medical costs could top $166 billion in the U.S, not including the costs of vaccination.

 

America's Lack of Preparedness

 

Given the potential magnitude of such a disaster, why haven't the authorities taken more precautions? The first Asian outbreak of the influenza occurred as far back as 1997, so it's not as if bird flu is some kind of new or unheard of threat. Consumer advocate Ralph Nader has warned that "The level of response and resources amount the world's nations is nowhere near the needs for prevention, early surveillance, testing, diagnosis, treatment and the application of modern epidemiological sciences." However, the mainstream media has shirked its responsibility, failing to follow up on Nader's call. Micah Fink, a producer on the recent PBS Wide Angle documentary, "H5N1: Killer Flu," complained that "terrorism and the war in Iraq have dominated much of our foreign coverage and the news hole, never large for international affairs." Though CNN and the likes of weepy reporter Anderson Cooper have devoted a full month of coverage to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the network failed to warn the public in advance of an imminent disaster.

 

As a result of this media blackout, high public officials have not felt much pressure to address the threat of Asian bird flu. Though Bush recognized the threat of a bio-terrorist attack after the anthrax scare of 2001, federal resources to deal with the threat have been meager. Following the anthrax scare, Congress approved $3.7 billion to strengthen America's public health infrastructure. Two years later, Bush increased funding to the Center For Disease Control's flu program by a whopping 242 percent. Even so, however, such an increase was miniscule: by 2004, the program only amounted to $41.6 million. Bush has also increased flu funding to the National Institute of Health and the Food and Drug Administration, but in total spending has amounted to just $67 million. Bush has spent $80 million stockpiling Tamiflu and other influenza drugs, but currently we only have about 2 million vaccine doses.

 

Public health officials are worried. In an interview on the PBS show Wide Angle, Anthony Fauci, director of the Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases at the National Institutes of Health, warned, "what we in the federal government need to do, is we need to work with the pharmaceutical companies and help to incentivize them to turn their attention and their resources to being able to have the capability of what we call a surge capacity. Of being able to make 100 or more million doses if we need it within a period of a few months." Fauci admitted, however, that to produce hundreds of millions of doses this would cost a couple billion dollars. That might sound like a lot of money, but consider that the United States spends $5 billion per month on the war in Iraq and the Department of Homeland Security's budget in 2005 amounted to a full $29 billion. This is a pressing and important issue," says Fink, "and I think we should be doing much more than we are doing now." Fink adds,"most of the federal money in the US these days seems be getting spent on terrorism related issues — which may be very short sighted." Though Bush has taken some superficial measures such as ordering the mandatory quarantine of travelers infected with the virus, fundamentally Asian bird flu has not been a serious political priority for George W. Bush. As with Hurricane Katrina, the president seems to be dealing with the crisis on an ad hoc basis. Having failed to address the problem, he recently declared that the army should be deployed in case of an outbreak of Asian flu.

 

Political Ramifications

 

The World Health Organization (WHO) is an agency of the United Nations which is absolutely vital in combating global diseases like bird flu. Since 1947 the WHO has retained a worldwide network that monitors the spread of influenza. Based on the evaluation of WHO scientists, the organization tries to predict which flu strains are likely to spread globally. What is more, the WHO coordinates with pharmaceutical companies so as to speed up vaccine production; oversees laboratories at the global level and arbitrates negotiations over vaccine production. The WHO also plays an important role in that it pushes for greater transparency concerning human and avian flu cases. The WHO isn't the only important UN agency that would help coordinate efforts in the case of an outbreak. The Food and Agriculture Organization or FAO, which collaborates closely with the World Organization for Animal Health, keeps track of flu outbreaks in animals and gives advice to government about culling flocks and herds.

 

In the event of an actual outbreak, there would no doubt be a rush to point fingers and assign blame. In the high stakes game of Asian bird flu, the Republicans stand to lose. For years, the GOP has clashed with the WHO over such issues as the use of abortion in impoverished areas of the Third World. As the home to the world's larges tobacco company, Philip Morris, the United States has consistently stood in the way of the WHO on the fight against tobacco use. What is more, the U.S. has opposed the movement to make economic anti-HIV drugs available to Third World nations, and rejects findings by the WHO and FAO demonstrating the clear links between chronic disease and diets that are rich in fat and sugar.

 

More recently, the Republican controlled Congress has been involved in an acrimonious war with the United Nations. In June, the House voted 221 to 184 on H.R. 2745 to cut dues by half to that body if certain reforms are not undertaken. The bill states that the U.S. shall cut off the funds by 2008 unless the Secretary of State certifies that the UN is carrying out operational changes, including stringent budget controls, detailed financial disclosures and creation of an independent oversight office. Finally, the legislation seeks to create a new UN Chief Operating Office. A similar bill is now pending in the Senate. Currently, the United States supplies 22% of the United Nations' annual $2 billion budget. As such, a U.S. cut off could prove devastating. The legislation, coupled with President Bush's appointment of right wing hawk John Bolton as UN envoy seems to signal the Republican desire to kill off the world body.

 

In the event of an outbreak of Asian bird flu, however, the U.S. will have to coordinate with the United Nations and the WHO. One may easily imagine the calls of public indignation, excoriating the Republicans for their vendetta against the UN and previous unwillingness to collaborate with international bodies concerning important health issues. Certainly, Hurricane Katrina has given the Democrats an opening if they are willing to take shrewd advantage of it. They might claim that the Republicans have no better prepared us for an outbreak of Asian bird flu than the arrival of hurricanes in the Gulf. If there is enough noise on the Hill, perhaps the media too will see the urgency in drawing attention to this vital threat before it strikes.

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Demeaner of The Faith: Rev. Pat Robertson and Gen. Ríos Montt

While Pat Robertson’s recent remarks on the Christian Broadcast Network’s The 700 Club that the United States should “take out” Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez certainly caught the media spotlight, the statement by the evangelical minister was only the latest episode in a long and troubled story. Since the 1970s Robertson has loyally served hawkish U.S. foreign policy objectives in Latin America and played a particularly pernicious role in the region. Christian organizations nation wide would do well to heed the history and to rigorously challenge Robertson on his record.

As a young man, Robertson dreamed about profitable business deals in Latin America. After graduating from college, he briefly worked for the W.R. Grace & Co. in New York. Robertson was specifically assigned to Grace’s Foreign Service School to analyze South American economic conditions in South America. There, Robertson collaborated with the company’s chief executives of the company. According to one of Robertson’s biographers, “during the months he worked with the Grace company he viewed Latin America as the ‘land of opportunity’ where he would find some way to enrich himself. Though Robertson left the company after only about nine months, he later achieved his dream by extending Christian televangelism to Central America. By the 1980s, Pat Robertson’s program “The 700 Club,” reached 3.1 million viewers in Guatemala. Robertson took a personal interest in the strife torn Central American nation, developing warm ties to General Efrain Rios Montt, a born again evangelical Christian. When Rios Montt took power in a military coup d’etat in March of 1982, Robertson immediately flew to Guatemala, meeting with the incoming president a scant five days after he came to power. Later, Robertson aired an interview with Rios Montt on “The 700 Club” and extolled the new military government.

Robertson’s visit came at a particularly sensitive time. Guatemala’s dirt poor indigenous peoples, who made up half the country’s population, were suffering greatly at the hands of the U.S. funded military. The armed forces had taken over Indian lands that seemed fertile for cattle exporting or a promising site to drill for oil. Those Indians who dared to resist were massacred. Rios Montt, a staunch anti-Communist supported by U.S. president Reagan, was determined to wipe out the Marxist URNG, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union rebels. However, according to Amnesty International, thousands of people with no connection to the armed struggle were killed by the regime. Not surprisingly, many Indians turned to armed resistance. To deal with the ever worsening situation, Rios Montt proposed a so called “guns and beans” campaign. Rios Montt explained the plan very succinctly: “If you are with us, we’ll feed you, if not, we’ll kill you.” For Robertson, however, Rios Montt’s extermination policy was of little account. Astonishingly, the televangelist wrote “I found [Rios Montt] to be a man of humilityimpeccable personal integrity, and a deep faith in Jesus Christ.”

One reason that Rios Montt may have appealed to Robertson was the dictator’s dislike of Catholic priests. In the 1980s, they had become an obstacle to the expansion of evangelical Protestantism. Working within indigenous communities, Catholic priests had been driven out or murdered. Protestant sects, on the other hand, allied to the Guatemalan military. They preached individual conversion, the importance of obedience to military and political authority, the merits of capitalism, and the value of inequality. Rios Montt’s own Church of the Word went so far as to define priests and nuns as the enemy. According to Walter LaFeber, a historian of Central America, three priests were killed within a thirty-six month period in just one province. With the Catholic Church out of the way, Rios Montt conducted a scorched earth policy. His forces massacred as many as 15,000 Indians. Whole villages were leveled and the army set up “Civilian Self-Defense Patrols” which forced 900,000 villagers to “voluntarily” aid police in tracking down suspects. Rios Montt created “model” villages, similar to concentration camps, which housed Indian refugees. However, when 40,000 survivors sought safety in Mexico, Guatemalan helicopters machine gunned the camps. Rios Montt justified the genocidal policy by claiming that the Indians were suspected of cooperating with the URNG, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union, or “might” cooperate in future. Amnesty International noted that extra judicial killings carried out the by the military “were done in terrible ways: people of all ages were not only shot to death, they were burned alive, hacked to death, disemboweled, drowned, beheaded. Small children were smashed against rocks or bayoneted to death.”

Far from denouncing such practices, Robertson rushed to defend Rios Montt. “Little by little the miracle began to unfold,” he wrote of the regime. “The country was stabilized. Democratic processes, never a reality in Guatemala, began to be put into place.” Robertson also praised Rios Montt for eliminating death squads, despite recent estimates that tens of thousands were killed by death squads in the second half of 1982 and throughout 1983. Most damning of all, even as Rios Montt was carrying out the extermination of the Mayan population, Robertson held a fundraising telethon for the Guatemalan military. The televangelist urged donations for International Love Lift, Rios Montt’s relief program linked to Gospel Outreach, the dictator’s U.S. church. Meanwhile, Robertson’s Christian Broadcasting Network reportedly sponsored a campaign to provide money as well as agricultural and medical technicians to aid in the design of Rios Montt’s first model villages. Rios Montt was ultimately overthrown in another military coup d’etat in August 1983.

Unfortunately, Robertson’s involvement in Guatemalan politics did not discredit his career. He also led efforts to back the Nicaraguan contras in the 1980s, who sought to overthrow the Sandinista regime. More recently, he has been an important backer of President Bush and currently commands a captive audience of one million U.S. television viewers. Judging from his recent remarks, Robertson has not chosen to re-evaluate his hawkish views. The latest target drawing Robertson’s fire is Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Unlike General Rios Montt, who came to power in a military coup, Chavez enjoys significant popular support. He has won two presidential elections, in 1998 and 2000, defeated an opposition led recall referendum in August 2004 and according to recent polls, has an approval rating of 70%. Not surprisingly, he is favored to win re-election in 2006. But to Robertson, the will of the Venezuelan people is of no account. Chavez, unlike Rios Montt, has not been compliant with U.S. interests. Not only has Chavez had the audaciousness to criticize the U.S. war in Iraq, but he also questions the fairness of Bush initiatives like the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. The world’s fifth largest oil producer, Venezuela has significant political and economic clout in the region, and Chavez has poured oil proceeds into health and education programs. To the ire of Robertson, Chavez has pursued an independent course by providing oil to Cuba. In exchange, the island nation has sent thousands of doctors who have assisted the Venezuelan poor. Unfortunately for Bush and the Christian right, Chavez has not been easily dislodged from power. Though the U.S. provided material assistance to Venezuelan opposition figures seeking to topple Chavez, a coup d’etat in April of 2002 proved a miserable failure when popular protest led to Chavez’s reinstatement. Since that time, Chavez has consolidated power and has become a hemispheric leader. Robertson’s attack surely will not alter the political equation in Venezuela. Though the televangelist has a presence in Venezuela, broadcasting in Spanish over Venezuelan station Televen, Venezuelan Protestants only number 2% of the population and are by and large a working class Chavez constituency. Nevertheless, Robertson’s remark has cast a pall over U.S.-Venezuelan relations, which had in recent months already hit a record low.

Though some Protestant ministers have criticized Robertson, arguing that the televangelist has demeaned the faith, this trickle needs to turn into a torrent. By all reckoning, Robertson’s career should have been destroyed as a result of his support for genocidal dictator Rios Montt. Now, Protestants nation-wide have the opportunity to voice their dissent over Robertson’s most recent outburst. Hopefully, they will act soon or Robertson will continue to make un-Christian statements that contribute to ill will between the United States and its neighbors.

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Fox News Venezuela Coverage: ‘Fair and Balanced’ Or Quasi-Official U.S. Government Propaganda?

Given recent friction between Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and the White House it inevitably was only a matter of time before Rupert Murdoch's Fox News would start to ratchet up its shrill ideological pressure. Since taking office in 1998, Chávez has had a stormy relationship with his powerful northern neighbor. Chávez, who established close ties with Washington's anathema, Cuban President Fidel Castro, criticized U.S.-led efforts for a free trade zone in the Americas, which he insisted would primarily benefit the U.S., while opposing the war in Iraq, resulting in no mystery as to why he has long been so reviled by the Bush administration. Tensions have been bristling between the two nations particularly since April 2002 when Chávez, the democratically elected president, was briefly removed from power in a coup which involved U.S. funding.

 

A maverick politician and former paratrooper, Chávez accused (not without merit) Washington of sponsoring his attempted overthrow as well as supporting a devastating oil lockout in 2002-3. Not one to easily soften his language, Chávez bluntly referred to the United States as "an imperialist power." What is more, according to the Venezuelan leader, Bush had plans to have him assassinated. In a further rhetorical sortie, Chávez warned that if he were killed the United States would have to "forget Venezuelan oil."

 

In a series of recent television reports Fox News has derided the firebrand leftist leader, presenting the current Venezuelan political habitat entirely from the perspective of the country's conservative middle-class opposition as well as the Bush administration.

In siding with the opposition, Fox News joins the ranks of almost all of the Venezuelan television stations including Radio Caracas TV and Venevision which have launched a vitriolic and highly personalized savaging of Chávez over the past few years. In his reports, Fox reporter Steve Harrigan speaks solely with members of the Venezuelan opposition and shows Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice critical of Chávez. Of course, Fox News has the right to present the news as distortedly as it sees fit. However, its exclusive adherence to anti-Chávez sources completely caricatures the station's claim to be "fair and balanced." In fact, when it comes to Venezuela, it strives to be a propaganda mill.


Fox Source #1: Leopoldo Lopez


In short bits scarcely lasting longer than a television commercial, Harrigan, a former CNN Moscow correspondent, intones that Chávez is "moving towards totalitarian rule." To support this view he turns to such redoubtable Venezuelan political figures as Leopoldo Lopez. "The danger we are facing as Venezuelans," says Lopez, "is the possibility of one day waking up and all of the sudden not having any of our liberties." What Harrigan failed to disclose however is that Lopez, as the municipal mayor of the Caracas district of Chacao, has worked closely with the Primero Justicia party. According to Venezuelan human rights lawyer Eva Golinger, Primero Justicia is the "most extreme opposition party to Chávez." What is more, Golinger has written that after the April 2002 coup against Chávez, Lopez signed the "Carmona Decree" which dissolved all democratic institutions including the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, the Attorney General and Public Defender. Additionally, the Carmona Decree did away with "an overwhelming number of laws and constitutional rights implemented during the Chávez administration." At the time, this action was denounced by almost all of Latin America's leaders.

 

Lopez's colleague at Primero Justicia, Leopoldo Martinez, was promoted to Minister of Finance under the Carmona coup regime. Even more revealing, Golinger reports that Primero Justicia received training and support from the International Republican Institute, a nonprofit U.S. organization which receives millions of dollars in laundered funding from the U.S. taxpayer funded National Endowment for Democracy and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). This piece further corroded Harrigan's fast disappearing reputation as a professional by failing to disclose vital information to Fox viewers about the political biases and special interests of his sources.

 

Fox Fails to Disclose Lopez' Record


What is more, Fox viewers were left woefully uninformed about Lopez's track record during the April 2002 coup. The day after Chávez was removed from power on April 12, Lopez and Baruta Mayor Henrique Capriles Radonski (see below) placed Chávez's Interior and Justice Minister Ramon Rodriguez Chacin under arrest. Chacin later claimed that as he was being escorted out of his residence into a police car, he was physically attacked by a mob. Lopez responded by saying that he was innocent and was ordered to carry out the order by the Public Ministry, now under the control of the leader of coup regime, Pedro Carmona. However, after Chávez was restored to power, Chacin asked the country's attorney general to open an investigation of the incident. In late 2004 Lopez was indicted by the Caracas metropolitan attorney for his involvement in the raid on Chacin's home and the subsequent arrest of the minister.

 

Fox Source #2: Capriles Radonski


Harrigan continued his assault against accuracy by once again indulging in over simplification when he interviewed the mayor of the Caracas municipality of Baruta (bordering Leopoldo Lopez's Chacao district), Henrique Capriles Radonski. Capriles remarks, "I spent 20 days without looking at the sun, without looking at the sky, without having open air." While it is true that Capriles was imprisoned in a highly controversial, politically-charged case, Harrigan omits important information that would help American viewers to better comprehend Venezuela's volatile politics and give some rare perspective to the course of events there. For example, in his report, Harrigan doesn't mention that Capriles was head of the U.S.-partly funded Primero Justicia party. This is not an insignificant point. Indeed, one can only imagine the reaction from Fox were the Democratic Party to accept money from a foreign government which was interested in getting rid of the Bush administration.

 

Radonski and the April 2002 Coup


What is the controversy swirling around Capriles and what did Fox neglect to tell its viewers? During the April 2002 coup against Chávez, hundreds of angry middle-class opposition demonstrators destroyed cars parked outside the Cuban embassy in Baruta. Not stopping there, the mob cut off water and electricity to the building and threatened to forcibly enter the facility and do harm to the frightened occupants inside. Later, Chávez officials charged that Capriles, as the leading authority in Baruta, did not enforce the law and allowed the demonstrators to run amok. Irate staff at the Cuban embassy later issued a statement reading, "The immediate responsibility of Mr. Capriles Radonsky and other Venezuelan state authorities was demonstrated when they failed to act diligently in order to prevent an increase in the aggression to which our embassy was subjected, causing serious damage and endangering the lives of officials and their families in clear violation of national and international law."

 

Meanwhile, the Baruta mayor insisted that he was merely trying to defuse a volatile situation. Later, the Cuban embassy denied assertions made by Primero Justicia deputy Julio Borges that the Cubans had asked for Capriles's mediation at the scene. In an official statement issued by the embassy, the Cubans claimed that "these actions (the mob-incited acts of vandalism) occurred with impunity in the presence of the Baruta police who had instructions not to impede these actions." Capriles claims that he notified authorities and asked for assistance. ``I talked with the people outside," he has stated. "I said, 'This is an embassy, you cannot go inside.'"

 

During the incident Capriles was videotaped at the scene asking Cuban officials for permission to inspect the embassy on behalf of the angry mob. Though the tape supports his claim that he tried to calm the crowd, it also shows him speaking with the Cuban ambassador. In fact, what he is shown asking is for the Cuban ambassador to supply him with proof that there are no members of the government hiding inside the embassy (in another court case, the tape was used as evidence by both prosecutors and defense). For their part, Chávez officials charged that Capriles was demanding the right to inspect the embassy, which was a violation of international norms.

 

Capriles Radonski Arrested


In March 2004, a warrant was issued for Capriles's arrest. On May 11 he turned himself in. Prosecutor Danilo Anderson, who had apparently developed a convincing case which linked US agencies to the coup, charged Capriles with property damage, intimidation, violating international principles and trespassing. Meanwhile, Leopoldo Lopez led a march of Chacao residents to the town hall to support Capriles. In an ironic twist, Lopez, who himself signed the Carmona Decree in 2002, remarked that the government was "kidnapping" the country's institutions in order to engage in "political persecutions." Lopez rejected the charges against Capriles and argued that Venezuelans should be outraged about "undemocratic maneuvers." Capriles was held for four months and was released conditionally in September. In October, an appeals court dismissed the case against him.

 

In a dramatic development however, Anderson was the victim of a car bomb assassination when his SUV blew up in Caracas. Anderson was in charge of prosecuting several Chávez opponents involved in the April 2002 coup, including Capriles. Though no arrests were made, early suspicions focused on the Chávez opposition. Capriles remarked, "The government and the judicial system must find those responsible and do justice." He added, "I had many differences with Danilo Anderson, but these were fought out in the public prosecutor's office." Since late last year, Venezuelan authorities have taken into custody a number of suspects who they accuse of playing a role in Anderson's assassination. Despite the irretrievable loss of Anderson, the state has chosen to go on appealing the Capriles case.

 

Capriles Radonski: Democratic defender or menace to democracy?  Once again, Fox fails to report


In his report on Venezuela, Harrigan again interviews Capriles who remarks, "If you don't have a rule or somebody who respects the rules, they can do whatever they want. They can be Fidel Castro second part." Clearly the young and somewhat flashily charismatic Capriles has become a symbol of popular resistance to the Chávez government. His supporters claim that he has been unfairly railroaded by the regime and that attacks against him have been politically motivated. But, does Capriles himself have any regard for the democratic process and "the rules?" Recent developments have cast some doubt on Capriles' legitimacy. In early 2004, the Chávez opposition, frustrated by the failed coup attempt of 2002 and by an unsuccessful lock out in 2002-3, initiated the "Guarimba Plan." As Venezuela analyst Steve Ellner has written, under this urban sabotage plan "small groups blocked traffic and burned trash on key avenues in Caracas and other cities. Street damage in Caracas alone, according to Infrastructure Ministry estimates, reached $1 million in the first week. In addition, armed bands of opposition organizations, including the ex-leftist guerrilla group Red Flag, hurled Molotov cocktails and attacked the National Guard—violence that police in areas controlled by opposition parties refused to stop." As Ellner reports, as mayor of Baruta, Capriles "said police were right not to interfere because protestors were doing 'nothing less than exercising their legal right to protest.'"

 

Fox's Over-Simplifications


Though recent developments have cast doubt on Lopez's and Capriles' self-serving claims to be militants in the cause of good government, Fox oversimplifies the bitter political fracturing of the country by ignoring its complex history. It would seem that it is far easier to lop Capriles and Lopez amongst the forces of good than to actually investigate, from the perspective of both sides, a far more complex picture that would better conform to reality. But this would not hold true to tabloid tendencies that Fox's Washington bureau, under Brit Hume, is universally seen as incorporating. If the network started to question Capriles's and Lopez's democratic credentials too closely, this might interfere with the underlying narrative with which Fox is very comfortable. In this scenario, Condoleezza Rice and the State Department fight for democracy and economic modernization and Hugo Chávez is a "totalitarian" who needs to be controlled, if not eliminated.

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Bush Rebuffed in Venezuela (again)

For George Bush the news could not have been worse. Having failed, according to credible accounts, to dislodge firebrand Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez by force in an April 2002 coup d’etat, Bush now must come to terms with the fact that Venezuela has cultivated strong European ties. That point was underscored this week when Spanish prime minister Jorge Luis Rodriguez Zapatero agreed to sell ten C-295 military transport planes, two CN-235 naval patrol planes and eight coastal patrol vessels worth 1.3bn euros ($1.7bn) to Venezuela. Though both Zapatero and Chavez stated that the military equipment would be used to peacefully patrol land and sea borders and to prevent drug smuggling, and Zapatero also announced that he would donate three troop transport planes to Colombia, a close U.S. ally, the developments could not have pleased the Bush administration. The Spanish sale follows close on the heels of Venezuela’s plans to purchase 100,000 AK-47 assault rifles and 22 helicopters from Russia. The US state department has accused Venezuela of sparking an arms race. The rifles, claim U.S. diplomats, could wind up in the hands of the FARC, Colombia’s left-wing rebels. Now, the Spanish sale is adding fuel to the fire. The Spanish sale surely did not come as a surprise to the U.S. As early as January the Spanish minister of Defense, José Bono, made what Zapatero termed a “discreet” visit to Caracas where the Spanish official discussed the arms sales with Chavez. Currently, the U.S. is trying its best to deal with the diplomatic fall out from the sales. American diplomats in Spain stated the U.S. “was worried” but had not “complained” to the Spanish government about the arms transfers. When asked to clarify the U.S. position on Spanish arms sales to Venezuela, Robert Zimmerman of the State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs commented delicately, “our concerns about arms sales to Venezuela are known to all the relevant parties.”

Chavez: a Thorn in The Side of the U.S.

Chavez has long been a thorn in the side of the Bush administration. A frequent critic of the White House, Chavez has lambasted U.S. led efforts for a free trade zone in the Americas. What is more he has criticized the U.S. war in Iraq and furthered ties to traditional U.S. enemies such as Cuba. For the United States, Venezuela is a nation of key geopolitical importance. The world’s fifth largest oil producer, Venezuela is also the fourth largest supplier of oil to the United States after Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia. Last year, Venezuela’s state owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela (Pdvsa) accounted for 11.8% (1.52-million barrels a day) of U.S. imports. However, Chavez has used oil as a geopolitical weapon. In a provocative move he has shipped oil to the communist island nation of Cuba. In a further threat to U.S. interests, Chavez has sought to form a regional oil cartel with other left-leaning South American countries. For taking such unpopular positions, Chavez stated, the United States has sought to have him killed. If he were assassinated, Chavez remarked, the U.S. could “forget Venezuelan oil.”

Though the U.S. has tried to diplomatically isolate Chavez, with State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher accusing Venezuela of playing a “destabilizing role” in regional affairs, these efforts have not yielded tangible result. To the contrary U.S. efforts to pressure Venezuela through third parties such as Spain seem to have backfired. How did things go amiss for the Bush administration in Venezuela?


The Ties That Bind: Aznar and Bush

During Bush’s first term it seemed that the United States enjoyed a willing foreign partner in Spain. José María Aznar, who had reorganized Spanish conservatives into the People’s Party (Partido Popular or PP) had been Prime Minister of Spain since 1996. Aznar, whose grandfather served as Franco’s ambassador to Morocco and the United Nations and whose father was a pro-Franco journalist, was re-elected with an absolute majority in the 2000 general election. The Spanish prime minister, who had narrowly escaped a 1995 assassination attempt by the Basque terrorist group ETA, made fighting terrorism one of the hallmarks of his administration. Aznar’s emphasis on combating terrorism fit well with the Bush agenda after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. What is more, despite robust public opposition (with polls indicating 90% of the Spanish public opposed to the war) and street protests, Aznar supported Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq. In August 2003 Aznar sent 1,300 Spanish peace keeping troops to Iraq as part of the government’s support for the U.S. invasion.

Bush and Aznar: Anti-Chavista Allies

Simultaneously Aznar was Washington’s willing ally in opposing Chavez. In 2002 the maverick Venezuelan president was looking increasingly vulnerable. Faced with a growing wave of protests supported by the United States, Chavez was briefly removed from power by the military in a coup d’etat. In his place, Pedro Carmona, previously the head of Venezuela’s largest business association, Fedecamaras, became interim president. However, after poor and marginalized residents of Caracas massed at the presidential palace Chavez was able to return to power and defeat the coup plotters.

Prior to the April 12 2002 coup Venezuelan businessman Carmona visited high level government officials in Madrid as well as prominent Spanish businessmen. Once the coup had been carried out Carmona called Aznar and met with the Spanish ambassador in Caracas, Manuel Viturro de la Torre. The Spanish ambassador was accompanied at the meeting by the U.S. Ambassador, Charles Shapiro. As Chavez languished in a military barracks, PP parliamentary spokesman Gustavo de Arístegui wrote an article in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo supporting the coup. According to anonymous diplomatic sources who spoke with Inter Press Service, the Spanish foreign ministry holds documents which reveal the Spanish role. The documents reportedly prove that de la Torre had written instructions from the Aznar government to recognize Carmona as the new president of Venezuela.

The diplomatic tit-for-tat continued. After the coup Chavez detained the president of Fedecámaras, Carlos Fernández, who was accused of helping to foment a lock out which reduced oil output in 2002-03. Fernández was charged with inciting unrest and sedition. In February 2003 Ana Palacio, the Spanish Minister of External Affairs, criticized the detention. During his Sunday radio and TV show, Chavez angrily shot back that Spain should not interfere in Venezuela’s internal affairs. “We must respect each other,” said Chavez. “Don’t get involved in our things and we won’t involve ourselves in your things. Is it necessary to remember that the Spanish ambassador was here applauding the April coup?” Chavez added, “Aznar, please, each one in his own place.” The diplomatic chill continued late into 2003 when Aznar criticized Chavez for adopting “failed models” like those of Cuba’s Fidel Castro. Chavez retorted that Aznar’s statements were “unacceptable” and added that “perhaps Aznar thinks he is Fernando VII and we are still a colony. No, Carabobo [a battle of independence] already happened. Aznar, Ayacucho [another battle during the wars of independence] already occurred. The Spanish empire was already thrown out of here almost 200 years ago Aznar. Let those whostick their noses in Venezuela take note that we will not accept it.” In a further snub Chavez stated that Aznar should respond to the Spanish public which protested PP support for the invasion of Iraq. “He should definitely take responsibility for that,” Chavez concluded.


The Tide Starts To Turn

In March 2004 the tide turned. Despite the unpopularity of the war in Iraq, Jorge Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, the leader of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, or Spanish Socialists’ Workers Party) trailed in the polls. With general elections called Aznar’s hand picked successor in the PP, Mariano Rajoy, looked likely to win. In part the PP owed its popularity due to its tough stand on Basque terrorism and ETA. Then, three days prior to the election the Madrid commuter train bombings killed 201 people and injured 1,500. The PP hastily blamed ETA for the bombings but as suspicions grew of al Qaeda involvement Aznar’s party suffered. Some analysts argued that the PP held some responsibility for the Madrid bombings because it sent troops to Iraq and acquiesced in U.S. foreign policy. Thousands poured out on to the streets to protest the PP. Zapatero was thrust to an upset victory in the election. The socialists quickly shifted away from the strongly pro-U.S. focus of the PP, allying closer to the nations of “Old Europe” such as France and Germany. Zapatero described Spain’s participation in the Iraq war as “a total error.” In May, two months after his electoral victory, he withdrew Spain’s 1,430 troops.

Chavez Receives A “Rock Star” Welcome

Needless to say Chavez was ecstatic about the socialist win and made no effort to conceal his high spirits. Shortly after Zapatero’s victory Chavez praised the Spanish government for withdrawing its troops from Iraq. The firebrand Venezuelan politician was further emboldened after an August 2004 recall referendum failed to force him from office. The final result showed that 59.25% of voters approved of Chavez and opposed his recall. Having then survived a coup attempt, a lock out in 2002-3 and a recall effort Chavez looked increasingly secure [what is more, in the October 2004 regional elections governing coalition candidates garnered 90% of the state governments and more than 70% of city governments]. Despite U.S. political pressure Chavez was now becoming a hemispheric leader with real clout. With Zapatero now in power Chavez traveled to Spain in November 2004. Chavez expressed his satisfaction with the change of government in Spain, commenting “How happy the Spain of today, and how sad the Spain that was subordinate to Washington’s mandate.” According to Reuters, Chavez received a “rock star welcome” in Madrid. Once in the Spanish capitol Chavez paid homage to the victims of “M-11.” At the Atocha train station where scores of Spanish had perished in the attack, Chavez was mobbed by the media and hundreds of supporters. Many waved Venezuelan flags and chanted, “Chavez, friend, the people are with you.” The indefatigable Chavez buoyed his supporters by criticizing the war in Iraq, the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba and U.S. threats against Iran. During a joint news conference Chavez advocated “a new progressive, transforming and liberating way of thinking,” that should confront the negative effects of the free market neo-liberal economic model. That model, he maintained, “is only useful for a world at war.” During the press conference, Zapatero agreed with the Venezuelan’s comments.

The Moratinos Bombshell

Just as Chavez was touring the Spanish capitol, however, a scandal erupted which turned the government inside out. Miguel Angel Moratinos, the Spanish Foreign Minister, accused the previous PP administration of supporting the failed coup d’etat against Chavez in April 2002. Speaking on the Spanish TV program “59 segundos,” Moratinos remarked that Aznar’s policy in Venezuela “was something unheard of in Spanish diplomacy, the Spanish ambassador received instructions to support the coup.” Before the cameras Moratinos declared, “that won’t happen in the future, because we respect the popular will.” Adding fuel to the fire Chavez remarked “I have no doubt that it [the Spanish involvement] happened. It was a very serious error on the part of the former government.” Chavez declared that Venezuela had no problem with the PP nor with Spain, and that for a brief moment the two countries enjoyed good relations. But later Aznar’s political as well as personal views changed. “With Aznar,” Chavez stated, “there was neither chemistry, nor physics, nor math.”

Arms Only Tip of The Iceberg

With political upset in Spain the path was now clear for greater economic and political coordination. In fact, the recent Spanish arms sales were only the tip of the iceberg. Of key importance was the Spanish oil company Repsol. As of December, Repsol produced 100,000 barrels of oil per day in Venezuela. But under a recent deal that figure will go up to 160,000 barrels per day as Repsol expands its operations. Under the deal Repsol will double its reserves, raise production 60% and become a joint partner with Pdvsa in a gas liquefaction plant and an 80-megawatt electricity generating plant. Furthermore, under another deal Chavez will buy three ships from Spain including an oil tanker.

The Boomerang Effect

Arguably the United States itself has brought about this political realignment. Analysts have suggested that voters held Aznar responsible for the M-11 attacks, a result of Spain’s close alliance with the U.S. Now Zapatero has punished Bush, first by withdrawing Spain’s forces from Iraq and allying more closely with “Old Europe,” and secondly by pursuing a more independent policy in South America. In this sense Zapatero seems to agree with Chavez’s desire to create a more “multipolar” world in which smaller nations unite and deal with the U.S. on more equal terms. Now that Chavez has consolidated power and is extending economic and political ties not only with neighboring South American countries but also with Europe, the United States looks increasingly bereft.

What a difference three years can make.

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Venezuela’s Chávez: Oil is a Geopolitical Weapon

Over the past few weeks there have been some signs that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez has backed down from his earlier confrontational posture towards Washington. According to the Venezuelan foreign minister, Chavez has no intention of reducing oil exports to the United States. The economic importance of oil in terms of Venezuelan-U.S. relations cannot be overstated. Venezuela is the fifth largest oil exporter in the world and the fourth largest supplier of oil to the United States after Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia. Last year, Venezuela's state owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela (Pdvsa) accounted for 11.8% (1.52-million barrels a day) of U.S. imports.

 

Tensions have been bristling between the two nations ever since April 2002 when Chavez, the democratically elected president, was briefly removed from power in a coup. Chavez, a firebrand politician and former paratrooper, accused (not without merit) Washington of sponsoring the attempted overthrow as well as supporting a devastating oil lockout in 2002-3. Never one to soften his language, Chavez bluntly referred to U.S. president George Bush with an expletive and the United States as "an imperialist power." What is more, according to Chavez, Bush had plans to see him assassinated. In a further barb, Chavez declared that if he were killed the United States could "forget Venezuelan oil."

 

For a time it seemed that their bilateral relations could sink no lower. Though there are many reasons for the deterioration in relations (including Chavez's ties with Washington's anathema, Cuban President Fidel Castro, the Venezuelan president's criticism of U.S.-led efforts for a free trade zone in the Americas and Chavez's opposition to the war in Iraq) oil was surely of paramount importance. When he took office in 1998 Chavez launched a reform of Venezuela's oil policy, seeking to reestablish a predominant role for the presidency in the design and implementation of an oil strategy through the Ministry of Energy and Mining. This move challenged vested interests in Pdvsa, a powerful, almost autonomous, company with total assets estimated at $100 billion. The company's executives, who earned between $100,000 and $4,000,000 a year, had grown accustomed to taking the lead in defining the oil policy of their virtual fiefdom. While Chavez did not deny the role of the private sector in the oil industry, his reform process aimed at curbing the trend toward the privatization of Pdvsa. On the international front, Chavez worked to achieve a higher price for oil through OPEC, the oil cartel of which Venezuela was a founding member. He also worked to increase the profile and power of OPEC world wide. Chavez additionally sought to guarantee that the state collected a greater share of oil revenues. He imposed royalties on oil output which was applied on foreign producers operating in the country, chief among them U.S. giant Exxon-Mobil. Last year, Venezuela raised royalty taxes on heavy crude projects in the Orinoco oil belt from 1% to 16.6%. Irate Exxon-Mobil representatives say that the company is paying the new rate "under protest."

 

PDVSA Serves the Nation


Keeping Pdvsa under firm government control was politically important. In recent years, Chavez has sought to utilize oil revenue to carry out an ambitious social agenda. In a recent study it was estimated that over 60 percent of Venezuela's 24-million people live in poverty and make less than $2 a day. Accordingly, as a result of record high oil revenues, Chavez has been able to carry out an impressive array of programs promoting literacy, job training, land reform, subsidized food, and small loans. Perhaps most ambitiously, Chavez has used the nation's oil wealth to extend health care and import Cuban doctors.

 

As Chavez began to export cheap subsidized oil to Cuba, Fidel Castro sent over 13,000 doctors to Venezuela. Today, the doctors are spread throughout the Andean nation and have access to over half the population, a first in Venezuela's history. Chavez's move to bring in Cuban doctors was one of many factors regarding his rule that provoked Washington. In May 2004, the U.S. State Department's Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba—the administration's propaganda office on Cuban issues—issued a report stating that Venezuelan oil shipments to Cuba needed to be halted if political change on the island was to occur – which was tantamount to calling for a de facto embargo against the Castro regime.

Are there any signs that the confrontation between the two antagonist nations will soon abate? Recently, Chavez has publicly stated that he wanted to mend relations with the United States. "We want to continue to send 1.5 million barrels of oil to the United States on a daily basis and to continue doing business," he said. What is more, Chavez added that although "we have said things, sometimes, very harsh things, it has been in response to aggressions." Chavez explained that, "what I have said is that if it occurs to the United States, or to someone there, to invade us, that they can forget about Venezuelan oil." He clarified that this is just "a theory that we of course do not want, and I hope that the United States does not want it either."

 

Chavez turns on the Charm


Chavez's recent conciliatory statements have brought little slack from Washington as the Bush administration's harsh anti-Chavez rhetoric continues to boil over whether its splenetic utterances coming from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld or routinely from the White House and State Department press offices. On one level, Venezuelan imbroglio seems to be heading towards deeper water. Chavez has repeatedly stated his determination to reduce his country's dependency on oil sales to the United States. Accordingly, he has begun exploring the sale of parts of Citgo, Pdvsa's marketing and refining affiliate in the U.S. Citgo owns eight refineries and almost 14,000 gas stations located primarily in the eastern part of the country. Chavez has complained that Citgo, whose refineries are especially adapted to process heavy crude oil from Venezuela, sells oil to the U.S at a discount of two dollars a barrel. "We are subsidizing the U.S. budget," griped Chavez, who says Citgo contracts were signed before he assumed office in 1999. According to Citgo's 2004 financial reports, the company paid $400 million in dividends to Venezuela but paid almost as much in U.S. taxes. Energy Minister Rafael Ramírez, who also serves as Pdvsa's president, has announced a freeze on plans to expand Citgo. Meanwhile, though Citgo CEO Félix Rodríguez notes that "the government does not plan to sell off the company's assets," specialists suggest that Chavez may very well consider such a move after evaluating the profitability of each refinery. Alberto Quirós, a former executive at Royal/Dutch Shell in Venezuela, commented that selling the refineries would not be a bad idea right now. Chavez, he says, could get a decent price for the refineries because oil prices and demand are high. Were such facilities to be sold, however, the process would probably take at least a few years to be finalized.

 

Caracas Looks to Asia


In order to diversify the Venezuelan market for oil, Chavez made plans to begin shipping Venezuelan crude to China, the world's second-largest energy consumer after the United States. "Reaching China is a strategic question," says Ramirez. "It would be a mistake not to have a presence there. They are switching over from coal to more efficient fuels." In Beijing last December, Chavez remarked "We have reached agreements with China to begin to exploit 15 mature oilfields in eastern Venezuela that have more than one billion barrels in reserves, and a large part of that oil will come to China." What is more, Chavez stated that Venezuela wanted to become a "secure, long-term" petroleum supplier to India and this month the two countries concluded an energy cooperation agreement. Transporting oil to Asia, however, could prove logistically difficult. Pdvsa has expressed interest in moving oil across Panama to the Pacific Ocean via pipeline. The company is also exploring the idea of building such a facility across Venezuela's northern border with Colombia, extending to that country's Pacific coast. Shipping oil to Asia carries other logistical and infrastructural problems. China presently has an insufficient deep conversion refining capacity and transporting petroleum to the Asian giant would be costly due to the long distances involved. Moreover, the Panama pipeline eyed by Chavez already transports 100,000 barrels a day of Ecuadorian crude from the Pacific to the Atlantic. According to analysts, there is no way that the pipeline can be converted into being able to simultaneously ship Venezuelan oil to China in the opposite direction. Finally, China may be only interested in Venezuela in the short run, as Beijing is busy exploring for oil and gas closer to its shores in the South China Sea.

 

Despite these practical problems, Chavez's rhetoric suggests the Venezuelan leader earnestly seeks to challenge U.S. regional hegemony by putting together a formidable coalition of like-minded nations. In a recent interview on al-Jazeera, Chavez cited Venezuela's energy alliance with Cuba as an example of how "we use oil in our war against neoliberalism." What is more, when he was recently in Buenos Aires, Chavez launched the first gas station run by a joint venture between Pdvsa and the Argentine company Enarsa. The venture involves production, refining and distribution of petroleum by-products and natural gas. Chavez has also concluded oil agreements with Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. His desire to create a South American energy company called Petrosur, which would integrate regional oil and gas industries, is already bearing fruit.

 

Any interruption in Venezuelan oil exports to the U.S. would bring significant disruption to both countries and Washington is beginning to plan for such a contingency. Oil accounts for half of Caracas' revenue and 75 percent of its exports. Currently the U.S. purchases 60 percent of Venezuela's oil exports and according to analysts, finding new markets could prove daunting to Venezuelan authorities. The fact is, exporting to the U.S. market is convenient due to close proximity and low transportation costs. Additionally, U.S. refineries are particularly equipped to process Venezuela's sulphur-rich crude.

 

U.S. analysts doubt that Chavez can afford to drastically cut shipments to the United States. And if Chavez cut off oil supplies, argue government officials, the United States would quickly make up for the loss by seeking other sources. But a potential cut off would represent no small economic loss to the U.S., as oil imported from elsewhere would likely be more expensive. The reality is that for the U.S., purchasing Venezuelan crude is economically advantageous because the South American nation is geographically close to U.S. ports. In Washington, politicians are now hedging their bets. In a clear sign of concern, Republican Senator Richard G. Lugar has asked the Government Accountability Office to study how a sharp decrease in Venezuelan oil imports could affect the U.S. economy. Additionally, the Senate recently called for a review of the government's plans "to make sure that all contingencies are in place to mitigate the effects of a significant shortfall of Venezuelan oil production, as this could have serious consequences for our nation's security and for the consumer at the pump."

 

Even before Chavez was first elected he was explicit in describing his views about petroleum. "Oil is a geopolitical weapon," he declared, "and these imbeciles who govern us don't realize the power they have, as an oil-producing country." The evidence suggests that Chavez is now trying his best to follow through on this rhetoric.

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Antillanos and the Venezuelan State: Caribbean Blacks in the Maracaibo Oil Boom During the Juan Vicente Gomez Period, 1908-1935

(An unpublished historical essay)

 

Between 1914 and 1922 subsidiaries of the British oil company Shell entered Venezuela, transforming the small agricultural nation and giving rise to oil boom towns.  Following a massive oil blow out in 1922, American oil companies, subsidiaries of the giant Standard Oil of New Jersey, joined their British counterparts and a veritable oil boom commenced in the provincial state of Zulia, in the western party of the country.  In addition to contracting Venezuelans, oil companies also imported foreign laborers who joined their co-workers in sprawling settlements.  According to Lieuwen, the companies brought in West Indian blacks due to labor shortages;[1] other evidence suggests that Caribbean workers were brought in because they were considered more disciplined and servile than Venezuelans.[2]  Like Venezuelan workers, antillanos, as they were called, faced racist American and British oil managers.  Much like the Venezuelans, antillanos too were subject to work related abuses and substandard public health conditions.  As skilled laborers, however, antillanos could acquire property and even achieve a measured degree of prosperity.  Despite this prosperity the position of the antillanos was tenuous as they faced resentment at the hands of local residents.  Such a divisive situation was potentially explosive and threatened to derail community relations in the oil zone.  However, the shrewd Juan Vicente Gomez, who ruled in dictatorial fashion from 1908-1935, tactfully turned this situation to his advantage by enforcing racist legislation limiting antillano immigration.  By discriminating against the antillanos the Gomez authorities cynically manipulated public opinion by dividing the West Indian and Venezuelan workforce.  In the process, Gomez sought to create a sense of national identity which would shore up his mission of building up the central state in Venezuela.

 

Background to Gomez Rule

 

By the early twentieth century, that state building project had become a political imperative.  Indeed, during the 19th century Venezuela was hardly what one might call a modern nation state.  Divided along regional lines, the country was prone to divisive civil and political conflict.[3]  Within such a fractured environment, the possibility of a strong central state taking root was hardly promising.  For Gomez, who came to power in a coup d'etat in 1908, the central challenge was how to build a modern nation state.  Of central concern to Gomez was gaining control over the western state of Zulia which had long sought greater autonomy from Caracas.[4]  In an effort to consolidate central control Gomez constructed a national army[5] and built up an impressive network of state presidents who in many cases were sympathetic military officers.[6]  Gomez could keep further abreast of news in outlying states through a network of jefes civiles or district governors, direct and immediate government representatives at the local level almost always chosen by the president himself.[7]  What is more, Gomez could also count on his extensive family network to ensure control.[8] 

 

State of Zulia

 

For the moment Gomez had consolidated his position.  However, he could ill afford political problems in the west.  Measuring 63,100 square kilometers,[9] with 178,388 inhabitants in 1908,[10] Zulia was not only large in terms of sheer land mass, but also economically important.  When Gomez took power, Zulia had the most substantial budget of any Venezuelan state.[11]  For Gomez a crucial question was how to exert control over such a distant region as Zulia.  Transportation from Maracaibo to the interior was arduous and time consuming.[12]  Because of the logistical difficulties involved with travel, merchants frequently resorted to travel along the state's many rivers, such as the Zulia, Catatumbo, and Escalante.  These rivers constituted important means of communication with the Andes and Colombia.[13]  Merchants could in turn follow Zulia rivers by boat into Lake Maracaibo.  The largest lake in South America, it measured 200 km north to south, with a width of 120 km at the lower end and in the middle 85 km, and with a full circumference of 600 km.[14]  Historically the country's lack of transportation infrastructure had encouraged regionalism and caudillismo, and the last thing the regime desired was a powerful caudillo takeover in the economically and politically important state of Zulia.  Not only was internal transport problematic but the region was largely cut off from the rest of the country.  Travelers wishing to head from Maracaibo to Caracas had to endure a long, five day trek to reach the capitol.[15]  Faced with such obstacles Gomez sought to tighten his grip on Zulia.  Relinquishing the earlier policy of appointing "sons of the soil" to state government, he began to rely more and more on andinos and family relatives.[16] 

 

British Oil Companies in Zulia

 

With the arrival of powerful British oil companies in Zulia Gomez was presented with a unique challenge.  Nearly all the concessions awarded by Gómez in the initial years were sold to the British oil company Shell in 1913;[17] the company began commercial production later in 1919.[18]  On the one hand oil revenue stood to bolster state finances and Gomez's ability to centralize the Venezuelan state.  If large deposits of oil were found Gomez could siphon money to his military, expand the administrative bureaucracy and continue his project of national integration through road building projects.  Furthermore, with the money from oil proceeds Gomez could deploy more troops and administrators to Zulia.  With an efficient, centralizing administration in place at the state level, Gomez could head off any secessionist moves in Zulia and preempt any aggressive moves by would be caudillos.  What is more, in the event that oil investment really took off in the state, the companies would contribute to economic development along the eastern coast of Lake Maracaibo, where much of the initial oil exploration took place. 

 

On the other hand, monitoring the oil companies would prove difficult in such an isolated region.  If the oil companies abused the local population Venezuelan nationalism might be incited and cause political problems.  By permitting large and powerful British, and later U.S oil companies to operate in a far-flung region which had only recently tried to shake off government control, Gomez assumed a certain political risk.  In Maracaibo the growing oil presence was a concern for Zulia state president Santos Gomez.  In 1923 he personally wrote Gomez, warning his chief that oil workers could be subverted by enemies of the regime.[19]  Despite the many political risks associated with increased oil development, Gomez avidly embraced the industry's expansion.  One underlying reason for this was sheer greed.  The Gómez family was one of the largest landowners on the east bank of Lake Maracaibo, and stood to benefit from land sales to the oil companies.[20]        

 

Maracaibo Oil Metropolis

 

While certainly spectacular, the growth of the oil industry posed significant social problems for the Gomez regime.  The city of Maracaibo, "a sleepy coffee-exporting port of forty thousand in 1920," experienced the greatest transformation.  Maracaibo became Venezuela's oil metropolis, the country's most congested port, the second city of importance after Caracas.  The city's population more than doubled during the 1920s.[21]  In 1926 contemporary observers estimated that the Zulia state capitol's population could not have numbered less than 120,000.[22]  Meanwhile, the state of Zulia's population skyrocketed, from 117,457 inhabitants in 1920 to 204,075 in 1926, a 73.74% increase.[23]  Though the oil boom brought unprecedented new wealth, the authorities were ill prepared to deal with the vast influx of new migrants in search of work.  The arrival of foreigners, who occupied a privileged position, threatened to give rise to resentment in Maracaibo and the oil zone.  For the authorities the challenge was how to keep the local population satisfied while keeping a lid on social discontent.  The arrival of so many foreigners caused rental costs to skyrocket.  According to Lieuwen, living costs doubled and real estate values tripled in Maracaibo during the oil boom.[24]  While real estate prices affected the oil companies, which owned office buildings, mess and staff houses on the east side of Lake Maracaibo, skyrocketing prices affected the poor to an even greater extent.  Spartan in appearance, rooms in the Bolivar district in the heart of the oil zone displayed no comforts of any kind.  Even more serious from the point of view of poor residents was the high cost of food.[25]  By late 1924, British authorities reported, the situation had become so bad, that "the cost of living in Maracaibo…seemed…over 50% higher than in Caracas."[26]  Clearly, the Zulia state capitol was fast becoming a metropolis and it would take serious political commitment to meet rising social needs.

 

Social problems must be seen against the deteriorating political backdrop in Zulia.  Though U.S. diplomats reported that authorities in Caracas were not overly concerned about rumors that Maracaibo would break free of central control,[27] the U.S. consul in Maracaibo alerted his superiors to widespread disaffection in the city.  He argued that Zulia natives as well as Maracaibo residents "do not now and have not for years felt any great affection for the central government."   Local residents were also incensed "that although there are many quite capable Maracaiberos not one has ever been placed in a position of power in the state of Zulia."[28]  There was also the danger that prominent maracuchos might unite with oil residents.  In March 1926, L. Perez Bustamante, a member of the Maracaibo Institucion Boliviana, wrote Gomez to complain of the "avaricious" companies who had abused workers and Venezuelans.[29]

 

Labor Situation

 

These underlying tensions were underscored when oil workers at the Caribbean Oil Company's Mene Grande camp went on strike.[30]  Not only did workers demand an eight hour day but also a 2 bolivar advance for workers who made between 5 and 10 bolivars a day.[31]  For Zulia state president Febres Cordero the challenge was how to appease workers while simultaneously steering unrest in such a way so that oil companies did not turn against the regime.   At Mene Grande, all operations were paralyzed., casting uncertainty over production and profits.  Even worse from the point of view of the companies, the strike was tightly organized under Antonio Malavet,[32] a charismatic fireman who worked for Pan American Petroleum and Transport Co, subsidiary of Caribbean.[33]  Febres Cordero opted to pursue a more diplomatic solution, traveling personally to Mene Grande[34] to mediate between workers and the oil companies.[35]  Once Febres Cordero arrived at Mene Grande, he held a conference with Caribbean officials.  Startlingly, in a solid rebuke to the oil managers, Febres Cordero "urged that the demands of the strikers be met in some degree."  Febres Cordero's position upset oil managers, who feared that taking a conciliatory approach towards workers "might establish a precedent which would lead to further labor troubles."  Moreover, in a further snub to the companies, Febres Cordero met personally with Malavet and other strike leaders.[36]  Though the companies lobbied the authorities to send in troops, the government dragged its feet by not sending in enough soldiers.  In a revealing personal note to Gomez, Febres Cordero reported that oil company managers wanted him to send more troops to Mene Grande, but he replied that none were available.[37]  Gomez himself communicated with Malavet.  "Apparently," writes Flores, "Malavet wrote to Gomez under no pressure to do so.  He might have felt obligated to write, as Gomez had made clear that he intended to keep in touch with everything that happened in the country."  In his note to the dictator, Malavet passionately sought to convey the plight of oil workers. "Plagued by infinite incommodities and misery," Malavet explained, "we declared a strike against the tyrannical company, the Caribbean Petroleum Company.  Following your honorable Union, Peace and Labor, we implore your moral protection so that the honest and passive worker can obtain what he justly deserves under the wise constitution of Venezuela."[38]  Though Malavet was obsequious towards authority, nevertheless he seemed determined to lead the strike and obtain concessions for his followers.  Malavet never asked Gomez if he could declare a strike.  Rather, he proclaimed that oil workers had started a strike against a powerful British oil company.  What is striking, given this audacious display of independence from Malavet, is that Gomez deigned to personally answer the labor leader.  Though Gomez did not explicitly offer his support, he did not call for an end to Malavet's movement.  In an echo of future exchanges between local residents and Gomez, the dictator instructed Malavet to communicate with Febres Cordero so as to come to an amicable solution.[39]  Shrewdly, then, "Gomez offered some support to Malavet and the strikers by simply not condemning the movement.  But, by not providing an ostensible support, he also allowed the government to back out in case of disruption."  In keeping with the regime's long-term desire to place the companies under pressure without disrupting the industry, Gomez recommended that Malavet respect the law.[40]

 

Gomez and Labor

 

Taking his cue from Gomez, Febres Cordero was diplomatic at Mene Grande.  Meeting personally with both oil company officials and strike leaders, he obliged managers to agree to an eight hour shift for all employees, and an increase of 1 bolivar a day for all workers whose wages ranged from 5 to 10 bolivars daily.  Unfortunately, Malavet had become an inspirational symbol to workers, and the strike had a psychological effect on morale.  In the wake of the strike, foreigners grew alarmed as the laborers had grown restless "and state that they want electric light, sheets on their beds and all conveniences which the company furnishes their drillers, assistant drillers and other foreign labor."[41]  The increasingly militant work force posed problems not only for foreign managers but also for Gomez and his subordinates.  As Flores has written, "the government realized that foreign working methods had deeply altered the traditional minds and aspirations of native workers."  Though oil workers represented only a small fraction of Venezuelan workers (from 1925 to 1936, an average of about 11,500 people worked for the oil companies, just 1.3% of the workforce),[42] the government was concerned about their influence and felt a need to speak to their specific problems.[43]  Industrial unrest outside of government control was unacceptable given the growing economic importance of oil.  By 1928, in fact, Venezuela would become the second largest oil producer in the world and the leading world exporter.[44] 

 

Gomez and Oil Companies

 

Gomez then would have to impose civil order, which in this case meant getting the upper hand over both civil society and the companies.  The oil companies provided much needed revenue for the Gomez state; however the prospect of such powerful corporations operating in a remote area of the country which had longed for greater autonomy was politically sensitive.  The andino, along with his associates in Zulia, watched the political milieu carefully, using a carrot and stick approach to deal with the political exigencies of the moment.  At times Gomez employed repression, but more often than not state officials appeased rising social groups.  Sometimes Gomez even used workers as apparent bargaining chips to exert political pressure upon the companies. 

 

Simultaneously Gomez officials collaborated with the companies in a bid to halt subversion and revolution.  Gomez then was shrewd at playing both sides against the middle.  Still, rumors of oil companies sponsoring Zulia secession concerned Gomez and convinced the dictator of the need to appoint a stronger man as state president.[45]  A key figure who helped Gomez to consolidate the central state was Vincencio Perez Soto, "a strong, active and progressive man, but arbitrary,"[46] in June 1926.[47]  Physically attractive and 43 years old, Perez Soto was active and energetic in manner and prompt in the dispatch of business."[48]  Febres Cordero was transferred to Merida where he took up as state president there.[49] 

 

Arrival of Antillanos

 

One of the vexing social questions confronting Perez Soto was the arrival of the antillanos on the oil fields.  According to Urdaneta, antillanos arrived shortly after the blow-out at Los Barrosos.  In 1924, 1658 whites came into the state of Zulia and 695 blacks.[50] According to a local historian entire families from the Dutch and British West Indies migrated to the oil zone and by 1924 there was a British West Indies colony in the oil town of Cabimas.  The new arrivals worked as electricians, mechanics, carpenters, tractor drivers, and office workers.  They also served as interpreters between Americans and Venezuelan peons, who were often illiterate.[51]  By 1926 there were about 3,000 colored British subjects from Trinidad or other islands of the British West Indies.  This figure dwarfed the number of white British subjects and Canadians, totaling some 800 individuals.[52]  Migrants came not only from Trinidad but also from other British, French, and Dutch Caribbean possessions.[53]  According to Lieuwen, West Indians represented approximately 10 per cent of the unskilled labor force on the oil fields.[54]

 

For Caribbean migrants, Maracaibo must have seemed at least somewhat promising in the 1920s and 30s.  Certainly, conditions on many Caribbean islands were far from hopeful.  As Harrison has written, "during the first few decades of the twentieth century, the sugar industry of the British colonies was a hopelessly inadequate opponent of its American rivals…the situation for the mass of the rural people in the West Indian colonies was one of utter deprivation: they struggled to survive through their own agriculture and whatever work they could get on the estates."

 

Conditions on the sugar estates, adds Harrison, reflected the harsh realities of colonialism: workers were malnourished and underweight, short and inadequately housed, and furthermore suffered from diseases such as malaria, hookworm and tuberculosis.  Many could only obtain temporary work, and employers adopted a policy of 'rotational employment,' where workers were taken on for a fortnight and then discharged to make way for others.  Meanwhile, the landless faced destitution or were forced to migrate.  The Great Depression after 1929 added to the hardship, since the price of sugar fell lower than at any time since the 1890s.  As a result, wages were reduced even further and jobs terminated throughout the Caribbean region.  Faced with such conditions, campaigning individuals such as Marcus Garvey joined the voices of protest as the West Indies witnessed strikes, demonstrations and riots.  Strikes on the sugar plantations spread throughout the islands and agricultural workers were joined by dock workers and industrial laborers pressing for better jobs and higher wages.[55]  Not surprisingly, then, in 1926 there were about 3,000 colored British subjects from Trinidad or other islands of the West Indies living in the Maracaibo oil zone.[56] 

 

Other Groups

 

Once ensconced in oil boom towns antillanos were joined by Chinese migrants.  While it is clear that at least some of the Chinese were from Canton, it is unknown whether they came directly from China or via other stopovers such as Los Angeles or other Caribbean destinations.  There is no mention of Chinese women entering the country.  The Chinese quickly established themselves in the laundry business, or opened dry goods stores, and seem to have achieved some degree of material success.[57]  Other migrants hailed from other British, French, and Dutch Caribbean possessions.  On government reports these migrants are referred to as "colored race"[58].  In 1933, for example, the Venezuelan Minister of Interior gave permission to Esther Ysmay Johnson to land in Maracaibo.  Johnson was of English nationality and "colored race," and was the wife of V.C. Johnson, an employee of the British oil company Caribbean Oil Company.  According to the Ministry of Interior, Esther Johnson hailed from Demerara (British Guyana), and had been on vacation in her native country.[59]  Lawrence Sainsbury, Clothilde Helouise Sainsbury and Frances Brumell, all colored British subjects, were given permission to return to Maracaibo following a trip to Curacao.[60]  Another French subject and woman of color, Alice Pinche, was granted permission to return to Maracaibo from Martinique in 1934.  Pinche had been resident in Venezuela since 1926 and was employed in the Bellavista hospital of the Caribbean Oil Company.[61]  It would appear that the Bellavista hospital was quite a multicultural institution.  Another French subject and person of color, Baptiste Homere Rodriguez, also worked there and had been resident in Venezuela since 1928.  In 1934, Rodriguez was granted permission to return to Maracaibo from Martinique along with his wife, Maville Brune Eleonore.[62]  Lastly, oil boom towns attracted Arabs from the Middle East, mostly British Palestine, Lebanon and Syria.  These immigrants were ubiquitously referred to as "Turcos," and some seem to have worked as moneylenders.  One local Cabimas historian claimed that many of the first arrivals in the oil boomtown were Lebanese Druze.[63]  Government documents suggest that 'Turcos' were businessmen and merchants.  By the early 1930s, at least one Middle Eastern businessman worked in Cabimas,[64] and in 1934 the authorities recorded the death of Mahmud Salami, 65 years of age, single, street vendor, and Syrian by origin.  Salami, from the British protectorate of Palestine, did not leave any goods and had no family members in Cabimas.  Salami, according to the authorities, had been in Cabimas since 1924.[65]

 

Antillano Daily Life

 

Antillano migrants did their best to carve out new lives for themselves in the oil zone.  In Cabimas, antillanos built wood houses elevated on poles.  This type of house was quickly copied throughout the entire oil zone, as it was cooler, cheaper and more comfortable.[66]  Between 1925 and 1927, during the time when the so-called "English Colony" of Trinidadians, Dutch, French and others was established in Cabimas, a Methodist pastor was active in the community while a Protestant church serviced the new residents.[67]  Venezuelans soon developed an entire lexicon designed to distinguish recent immigrants.  Black wives of Trinidadian workers, for example, were referred to as "Madama."[68] According to Brown, supposed conformist Trinidadians were sarcastically named "Mayfrenes," in reference to the English words "my friend."[69]   Despite the disparaging lexicon, "Mayfrenes" and "Madamas" were well received in the houses of Cabimas local residents and Trinidadians were the first to introduce soccer in the area.[70]  West Indian men frequently brought their wives and in some cases even their entire families.  Franklin Philip, a native of Grenada, worked in Lagunillas for the Venezuela Oil Concession's transportation department.  Philip notified the authorities that he would bring his wife from Grenada, Urma L. Philip.[71]  Another West Indian woman, Ida Scott from Trinidad, found employment as a laundress with the Venezuela Oil Concessions in Maracaibo.[72]  Pedro Isaac, a Grenadian, worked for the same company in Lagunillas as a mechanic.  Isaac sought to bring his sister from Grenada and the company attested to Isaac's financial solvency before the authorities.[73]  A Trinidadian woman, May Durant, found employment with the Venezuelan Atlantic Refining Company and according to her employers was a good worker and well-mannered.  Sam Johnson, another Trinidadian, also worked for Atlantic and was employed as master cook for the company.[74]  Paul Robert, a Grenadian, worked with the Caribbean Petroleum Company in Cabimas, and sought permission to bring his wife with him to Venezuela.[75]  In La Rosa, "Stephano" a native of St Lucia, lived with Hortencia Delay, a native of Guadeloupe, until his death in 1926.[76] 

 

Antillanos on the Oilfields

 

Many Caribbean workers prospered on the oilfields.  In 1935, Pedro Gomez de Willet, the government oil field inspector in Mene Grande, reported that antillanos and Chinese were markedly more preferred for office work.  At Mene Grande, the number of Chinese and Antillanos in office work was double the number of Venezuelans.  In particular, within the Production Department all office workers were antillanos and Chinese.  On various occasions, noted de Willet, Venezuelans had been employed as office workers in the Production Dept as well, but all, without exception, had been displaced as the result of "intrigues" encouraged by Europeans and Americans.  Foreigners, claimed de Willet, were intent on keeping Venezuelans in an inferior position within the oil companies.[77]  Statistics provided by the oil companies the relatively privileged position of the West Indians.  In 1936, for example, there were four West Indian employees at the San Lorenzo refinery belonging to Caribbean Petroleum Company.  All were men, and all were in their late 20's or early 30's.  In contrast to other Venezuelan workers in the company, the West Indians were literate and could write.  All earned much more than the average Venezuelan peon working for the company, whose salary averaged about 7 Bolivares daily.  The antillanos, by contrast, made 12, 14, 18 and 11 Bolivares and worked as engineers, accountants, and dispatchers.[78]  At Lago's La Salina refinery West Indians worked in skilled professions, laboring as electricians, mechanics, carpenters and office assistants.  West Indians earned much better on average than Venezuelans, most of whom were classified generically as "workers" and earned a salary of about 7 bolivares.  The average daily salary of West Indians at Lago was 13 Bolivares, with the lowest salary being 7 Bolivares and the highest salary 32 Bolivares.  All West Indian workers at La Salina were men except for Irene Thomas, a nurse from Trinidad.  Thomas was single, literate, 31 years of age, and earned a salary of 10 Bolivares.  She was the only woman on Lago's payroll.[79] 

 

Migrating Antillanos

 

What is more, antillanos commonly made trips to the Caribbean islands during the 1920s and 30s and some West Indian migrants had enough money to periodically return to their families.[80]  It would appear that in some cases, even women were able to make some money in the oilfields;[81] moreover West Indian men brought their wives with them and sometimes their offspring.  For example, in 1935 Cecilia Joseph, a British subject of colored race, was permitted to enter Venezuela along with her five children and their tutor.  Joseph and her children were returning from a trip to Trinidad.  Joseph was married to another British subject, Arnoff Joseph, who lived in the oil boom town of Casigua near the Colombian border.  The couple had two children, born in Venezuela.[82]  What is more, the colored foreigners Rupert Dyer and Iris Simpson, British subjects, son and niece of Alfred Dyer, respectively, were given permission to enter Maracaibo via Curacao.  Both Rupert and Iris were minors and sought to reunite with Alfred Dyer, who worked as a mechanic with British Controlled Oilfields.[83]  In another case, Vivian Cedric Johnson, a colored British subject, and Esther Ismay Johnson, also a colored British subject, were permitted to return from Trinidad to Maracaibo accompanied by their six children.  Vivian was employed by the Caribbean Petroleum Company.[84]  Similarly, Edith Acharbar, a colored British subject, was allowed to enter Maracaibo in 1935 following a trip to Trinidad.  Acharbar had been resident in the oil boom town of Cabimas since 1929, and her three children had been born in Venezuela.  Acharbar was accompanied by her youngest daughter, Rona Irene, also born in Venezuela.[85]

 

Antillano Women

 

Some British West Indian women made it to the oil areas and built lives for themselves.  In April 1934 word reached the Ministry in Caracas that a woman was illegally working as a midwife in the Las Delicias oil camp in Lagunillas.  The authorities asked state officials to look into the matter, as there were already "competent doctors" working within the area.[86]  On 17 April 1934, the local jefe civil in Lagunillas municipality investigated the matter and established that indeed Frances Trinningham, a native of Trinidad, was working as a midwife at Las Delicias. The official added that Trinningham worked in a Venezuela Oil Concessions hospital and was known to the hospital staff there.  Trinningham, added the jefe civil, held a medical certificates from the Medical Board of Trinidad and the Colonial Hospital of Trinidad.  In light of Trinningham's credentials, there were no grounds for taking action against her.[87]  In other government documents, officials pointed out that Francis Trinningham, referred to as Trimingham, had had done well for herself.  In 1934 she could afford to make a trip back to Trinidad and from there return to Maracaibo.[88]  Trinningham was not the only success case.  Daisy Assang, a colored native of Trinidad made a trip to Trinidad, was allowed back into Maracaibo in April of 1933.  A long time resident of Santa Rita,  Assang had goods and property in the town.[89]  Moreover, Mrs Cecilia Victoria Chandler, a British subject and person of color, was given permission to return to Maracaibo from Trinidad in 1934.  She had been living in Cabimas since 1926, and possessed property in that town.[90] 

 

Living Conditions

 

Despite this prosperity new migrants lacked potable drinking water and suffered from some of the same ailments as Venezuelans such as malaria, hookworm, and malnutrition.[91]  Documentary evidence from the period is sobering.  For example, William Goneda, a native of Barbados, married and a painter, died of dysentery on an oilfield belonging to Lago in the oil boom town of Lagunillas.  The oil company provided medical assistance, but to no avail.[92]  Charles Joseph, a four-month old Trinidadian infant, died in Lagunillas in 1928.  The cause of death was unclear.[93]  Celestina Freeman, a Trinidadian infant, died in Lagunillas, also at the age of only four months.[94]  Rodolhus Rose, single, carpenter, and native of Grenada, died young at the age of 34 in a hospital belonging to the Venezuela Oil Concessions in 1928.  No cause of death was listed.[95]  Nevertheless it may be that West Indian workers had more resistance to p. falciparum malaria, although this is controversial.  Scientists note that currently, 10% of the black Caribbean population has sickle cell trait and "there appears to be good evidence that the sickle cell trait confers some protection against malaria during childhood."  Data from Western Kenya indicates sickle cell trait may protect against falciparum malaria at later ages.  However, data on the resistance of subjects with the sickle cell trait to other forms of malaria such as p.vivax are "sparse and conflicting."[96] 

 

Antillanos and Gomecista Authorities

 

In addition to public health challenges, West Indians had to contend with unsympathetic authorities.  Oil companies frequently laid-off workers, and some Trinidadians were unlucky in attaining stable employment.  For example, Samuel Balfourd, a 35 year old single and unemployed Trinidadian, was detained by the police in Bolivar District for drunken behavior and for throwing stones at a policeman.[97]  Another single and unemployed Trinidadian man, Tiffin Hoope, was detained by the Lagunillas police for passing a bad check.[98]  Yet another unemployed and married Trinidadian, Daniel Marujo, was detained after he tried to escape from prison.  He had been languishing in jail for drunken disorderliness and "threatening danger" in a public road.[99]  An interesting case was provided by Andrew Butt, a native of the island of St Vincent, who gave a sworn statement at the Crown Solicitor's office in Port of Spain.  Butt had been employed by various oil companies in Maracaibo for eight years during the 1920's but was subsequently laid off.  In December, 1932 Butt went to the town of Bobures, obtaining employment in a sugar factory.  A year later, Butt left the company with three others.  After leaving his job, he was stopped by the authorities at Barinitas and taken to the police station.  He and his companions were questioned by the Chief of Police.  Butt and the others explained they were British subjects, and the Police Chief asked them to produce their passports.  "I explained to the Chief of Police," Butt remarked, "that we were on our way to Quebrada Seca (sic) in search of employment and that I did not have any passport with me but had left it at Bobures (sic)."  When he failed to produce his passport, Butt was detained at Barinitas for eight days and then sent under police guard to Barinas where he was placed in jail.  According to Butt, he remained in jail for an astounding 14 months.  While Butt and the others were kept prisoner, they were made to work on the road as convicted prisoners.  Butt remarked, "I worked as a laborer repairing and making roads and pulling down old buildings.  I was very poorly and insufficiently fed."  This unpleasant stay was put to an end in June of 1935, when Butt was finally placed on board a ship, fittingly named the 'Presidente Gomez,' and sent back to Trinidad.[100]  Why, or how, the British authorities could have let Butt languish in jail for more than a year without any charge is unclear.

 

Racism and the Antillanos

 

Despite the growing multinational character of life on the Maracaibo oil fields, by the late 1920s the political winds were shifting against the antillanos.  Soon enough West Indians experienced harassment and discrimination not just at the hands of individual policemen but by the larger government bureaucracy.  In Venezuela, as in other Latin American countries, non-whites were looked upon as inherently inferior.[101]  Racist notions were widely accepted by the Venezuelan elite, which took great pride in its European roots.  There are no definite statistics on the racial composition of Venezuela in the early 20th century, but observers agree that approximately 10% of the Venezuelan population was "pure black" and some 80% was a mixture of African, American Indian and European.  During the first years of the 20th century, some members of the Venezuelan white elite blamed the 'racially inferior' population for Venezuela's lack of development.  In 1912 Venezuela passed an immigration law limiting immigration to the "European race."[102]  A subsequent Foreigners' Law of 1918 contained a clause which permitted the entry of racial minorities as long as immigrants did not intend to settle permanently in the country.  This clause, which was preserved in subsequent immigration law, allowed the oil companies to bring in thousands of blacks from the Antilles.[103] 

 

However, pressure was growing by the 1920's to limit black immigration.  In 1926, Alberto Adriani, a Venezuelan statesman, economist and writer of Italian descent,[104] authored an article in the Boletin de La Camara de Comercio de Caracas warning of the dire consequences of lax immigration policy.  "The danger is not imagined," explained Adriani, and "the infiltration of black antillanos has been active in Venezuela in recent years." What is more, Adriani was concerned with Chinese and Indian immigration, however these two groups did not represent as serious a danger as blacks.  Already in 1926, continued Adriani, Venezuela had a sizable black population, which was not "convenient" for the country.  Antillean blacks would not help to improve Venezuela, as their way of life was inferior to Venezuelan nationals.  Even though antillanos might contribute to Venezuela economically, they represented a step back for the country in the intellectual, social, and political realm (interestingly, Antillean blacks frequently displayed a much higher educational level than Venezuelan workers, in contrast to Adriani's statement). What concerned Adriani was racial miscegenation in Venezuela, a "factor of deterioration."  Furthermore, an increase in the black population would menace Venezuela's "democratic institutions" and compromise the country's morale.[105]  It is not clear what institutions Adriani was referring to.  The Gomez Congress, in fact, was a rubber stamp body.

 

Race Relations on the Oilfields

 

Prior to the arrival of the antillanos, observers remarked that Maracaibo residents were more tolerant towards intermarriage between whites with Indians and blacks than Venezuelans from the interior.  Indeed, noted the U.S. consul, "there is hardly a single prominent native family in Maracaibo which has not a streak of Negro or Indian blood.  Prominent natives like A Duluc and J.E. Paris, who are pure whites, have wives with at least a small degree of Negro blood."[106]  Other accounts point to the segregated life in Maracaibo.  The U.S. consul, for example, pointed out that there were trams in the city, "but these are mostly patronized by Negroes, and it is considered a degrading thing for a white man to ride in them, and more so for a white woman."[107]  Whatever the case, once Caribbean blacks came into Zulia to work on the oil fields racial friction increased.  Though it's unclear how much Venezuelan racism existed against the antillanos, according to the British Consul "The colored British subjects are the cause of some trouble in this district…They are very assertive of their rights, and as they are not liked by the natives, are constantly getting into difficulties."[108]  Zulia state president Perez Soto was concerned about the growing antillano presence in the area.  Like Adriani, Perez Soto feared black immigration as a "prejudicial element" for Venezuelan society.  In 1926, he wrote the Minister of the Interior that since 1921 or 1922, about half the foreign immigration into his state had been black.  These immigrants headed to the oil fields and to sugar refineries in search of employment.  According to Perez Soto, the oil companies originally sought to import blacks because they considered Antillanos more disciplined and servile than Venezuelan workers.  However, much to the chagrin of the oil executives, these same blacks promptly lost this servility after about 6 months and became "unbearable."  At this point, the companies sought to rid themselves of these workers and this in turn created a social problem for the state of Zulia as the workers had no where to go and would wing up wandering the streets and stirring up trouble.[109]  Perez Soto was so concerned about the growth of black immigration that he had state officials keep track of colored arrivals in Maracaibo.  Perez Soto's figures were broken down by nationality (i.e., British Subjects, Chinese, North Americans, etc) and by race (yellow, white, black, etc).[110] 

 

Other Discrimination

 

Like Caribbean blacks, Chinese were subject to harassment and discrimination.  In August 1933, for example, local merchants in Cabimas wrote to the local jefe civil, Mario Maya, to complain about the Chinese presence in the area.  The Chinese, the petitioners contended, were "a vagrant race…without law and without nationality, that teems in all parts of the world…and it is a threat for humanity."  The merchants were unhappy as the Chinese were undercutting basic staples.  This was harming their businesses, and local residents hoped the authorities would put an end to the practice.[111]   Though it's unclear what became of the complaints, the authorities, through their actions, certainly exploited racist feeling.  In September 1929, the Minister of Interior wrote to Pérez Soto in Maracaibo, explaining that the Chinese were increasingly monopolizing certain kinds of businesses, including general stores, liquor stores and restaurants.  As this trend constituted a threat, not only to business but also to society as a whole, the Minister urged Pérez Soto to prevent the arrival of Chinese in Maracaibo.[112]  Pérez Soto agreed to comply.   In fact, Pérez Soto proudly announced, he had been restricting Chinese immigration for some time.  He had for example denied applications submitted by Chinese already resident in the area to bring their families into Zulia.[113] 

 

Racial Hierarchies

 

What is interesting to note is that even as the Venezuelan authorities, many of whom undoubtedly prided themselves on their lighter complexions (Gomez was from the Andean state of Tachira, and in photographs looked white in complexion, Perez Soto, the Governor of Zulia state, looked physically more mestizo) took punitive measures against blacks and inferior races, the Americans in Maracaibo and the oil zone discriminated against all Venezuelans regardless of skin color.  According to Luis Calvani, a government inspector of mines, in the early 1920's Maracaibo oil companies had segregated facilities, and a sign over one company bathroom read, "toilet solely for Americans." On another occasion, Calvani went to visit an acquaintance working for British Controlled Oilfields in the state of Falcon adjacent to the state of Zulia.  Calvani's friend later confessed that Venezuelans were prohibited entry into foreign workers' living quarters.  Calvani was allowed to stay in such quarters, however this was only permitted because he was a government employee.  Under other circumstances, he would have been segregated just like other Venezuelan workers.[114]  The episode is reminiscent of the worst type of segregation from the U.S. South, and in fact many of the American oilmen hailed from Texas and Oklahoma.  Racist attitudes towards Venezuelans permeated all the way up the corporate ladder.  William Wallace, an executive with Gulf, blamed the Venezuelan people for their economic backwardness: "When one has lived in the tropics and among, or in contact with, the average natives, and has lived for months and possibly years, one cannot help but wonder why it is they [Venezuelans] are so indolent, so lacking in progressiveness, why it is that the ordinary comforts and conveniences of what we call civilization seem to make no appeal to them whatsoever, and why it is that our so-called Anglo-Saxon sense of justice and fair play and straightforward dealing seems to find no lodgment in their mental makeup."

 

Revealingly, Wallace admitted that "after all is said and done, the best of our people have a secret feeling of their superiority, and while they may refrain from an open manifestation of it, or attempt to do so, nevertheless the sensitive Latin temperament detects the thing whose concealment is attempted."  Wallace went on to say that relations with lower class peons were particularly strained.  Wallace concluded, "it is my observation that the Anglo-Saxon mind and the Latin mind will never completely harmonize…The differences are essentially racial, consequently basic."  Though Wallace conceded that many lower American workers, including drillers, were "roughnecks," and prone to drinking, yet he reserved most of his criticism for the Venezuelans.  The problem, as Wallace described it, was that Americans were accustomed to working with machinery, while Venezuelan peons were unfamiliar with new technology.  Consequently, on frequent occasions, field workers would display resentment of their co-workers' "dumbness," and "to meet this situation we have tried to impress on all concerned that we are dealing largely with people whose mental horizon is that of a child."[115] 

 

Venezuelan Nationalism

 

Such racial hostility threatened to inflame Venezuelan pride and nationalism.  Inciting the populace against the racial injustice of Anglo foremen, however, would have carried certain political risk for Gomez.  Instead, Gomez channeled Venezuelan resentment against black foreigners.  In 1927 there were no less than 3000 British West Indians in the Maracaibo area.[116]  However, Perez Soto, in accordance with the law, had been restricting the "undesirable" immigration of people of color.[117]  In a crackdown on antillanos, the authorities ruled that antillanos on vacation could only return to Maracaibo after they had proven their residency in Zulia. Antillanos who wished to bring family members to Maracaibo would have to apply to the government.  What is more, oil companies which sought to bring black domestic servants into the country would have to acquire permission from the authorities.  As a result of these measures, Perez Soto was proudly able to announce that, "the immigration of people of color, which constitutes a threat, if not a certain danger, for the racial future of Venezuela, has been successfully contained."  Unfortunately, Perez Soto continued, some Antillean blacks were now disembarking in other ports such as La Guaira, Puerto Cabello or Carupano, and would then proceed over land to Maracaibo.  Others entered via the states of Falcon or Trujillo, and since state borders and roads were porous, it was impossible to control the flow of blacks into Zulia.  Perez Soto suggested that black and yellow races resident in Caracas, Valencia, or other cities should be required to obtain a permit from the local jefe civil demonstrating their residency in those areas.  With this documentation, Chinese and antillanos could then travel by sea.  The ship owners could then issue a transportation cedula or identification card to these aliens.[118]  It is not clear why Perez Soto supported the immigration policy.  Clearly, he had fallen under the sway of racist arguments of the day, pushed by Alberto Adriani and others.  Could he have hoped to shore up public opinion, by appealing to more nationalistic workers?  If that was Perez Soto's idea, it was a shrewd move.  By pushing for the legislation, he could gain popularity and divide Venezuelan workers from antillanos.

 

Restrictive Immigration Policy

 

Meanwhile, conflicts between Antillean and Venezuelan workers moved Gomez to issue a circular in 1929.  People of color could not enter as immigrants and all antillanos resident within the country would have to carry papers indicating their legal right to move from one place to place.  This measure was held to be just because "the primordial element to be considered for those who come to settle in Venezuela is race; a race which raises the physical, intellectual and moral level of Venezuelans."[119]  Under the new guidelines, antillanos freedom of movement would be greatly restricted.  When they sought to travel, antillanos would be obliged to provide authorities with a residency certificate.  This certificate would stipulate the time which the alien had spent at a given address, as well as their current job status.[120]  The new law led some white foreign residents to prove their racial status in order to avoid confusion.  For example, in November 1930, the Caribbean Petroleum Company wrote a statement confirming that company employee Robert George Bloomfield was English and white race.  The same company attested to the white race of Jacques Jean Louis van Schaijk, another employee.[121]  As late as 1933, the Caribbean Petroleum Corporation was still sending certificates to the local authorities, attesting to the whiteness of some of its British and Dutch employees.[122]   

 

The new immigration law gave rise to serious complaints from antillanos.  In November 1929, the British Consul, Raymond Kirwin, wrote the Federal authorities in Caracas that "various complaints have been presented recently before this Consulate by British colored subjects, antillanos, owing from the fact that their wives have been denied visas to return to Venezuela after spending some time in the British Antilles visiting with family."[123]  The Minister of Internal Relations sought to clarify, explaining that foreigners of "that class" who resided in Venezuela could travel, as long as they presented the certificate of residence, a job description, plus a note attesting to good conduct.[124]  However, in Trinidad the new law caused confusion.  The Venezuelan Consul on the island wrote the Minister of External Relations that some black people had certificates to go to Maracaibo.  The certificated had been issued by the Zulia state president but had been issued after the Circular went into effect.  The Consul expressed his confusion and asked his superiors what he should do.[125]  The Minister of Interior Relations replied that antillanos could return, as long as they complied with new conditions in the immigration law.[126]  In light of this pressure, employers sent word to the authorities attesting to good conduct of colored British subjects.  Henrietta James, a cook at the oil camp of San Lorenzo, and a likely British West Indian subject, was recommended by her employer at the Caribbean Petroleum Corporation as a woman in good labor standing.[127]  Maria Ryan, a native of the island of Montserrat, and employee of the Caribbean Petroleum Corporation in Maracaibo, sought to leave for Montserrat due to reasons of health.  Her employer wrote a note of good conduct on her behalf to the authorities, in order that she should subsequently be allowed to return to Maracaibo accompanied by her sister.[128]  The Caribbean Petroleum Corporation certified that Edith Connell had been working at the company's hospital for some time, and sought to bring her brother to Maracaibo from Trinidad.[129]  For some West Indian residents, the new guidelines made life more complicated.  A case in point was Joseph Stewart, a black British subject who was a carpenter and resident of the oil boom town of Cabimas.  Stewart had been a Venezuelan resident since 1926.  In 1931, he married a black Trinidadian woman.  His wife left Venezuela for Trinidad to be with her family in the same year.  Unfortunately, as Stewart explained, he was not knowledgeable about the "liberal and humane" Venezuelan laws, and had neglected to fulfill the necessary paperwork for his wife's return to Maracaibo.  When his wife attempted to return to Maracaibo, the Venezuelan Consul in Port of Spain refused to supply her with a visa.  Stewart wrote state president Perez Soto personally, begging the latter to change this policy so that his wife could return home after a one year stay in Trinidad.[130]

 

Oil Tankers

 

Perez Soto's efforts to halt antillano arrivals complicated matters not only for Caribbean blacks resident in Venezuela, but also for antillano seamen serving on board foreign oil tankers. According to the German Consul in Maracaibo, many deserters and sailors entered the country by jumping ship.[131]  The authorities were concerned about monitoring these antillano seamen but the question was how to keep track of them.  In 1928 a Gulf repetitive expressed puzzlement concerning state policy towards antillanos.  Under the Perez Soto regime, the British Consul normally deported sailors with "black blood" arriving from England on tankers flying the British flag.  However, the British Vice Consul was not prepared for assuming responsibility for these seamen in port.[132]  One day prior to the arrival of the Gulf tanker Caroni, a Gulf representative wrote: "As our oil tanker CARONI is shortly to arrive in Maracaibo, today, and as the tanker carries colored Antillean crew, in view of the fact that we shall change the registry of the ship to Venezuelan as soon as possible; this letter requests permission for the crew to disembark in Maracaibo while we can acquire passage and arrange for the deportation of the crew.  Naturally the company shall assume responsibility for the seamen while they are on Venezuelan soil."[133] 

 

It is unclear what finally became of the CARONI crew, however it is likely that Gulf concluded that it would have to assume responsibility for the colored crews.  Later that month, the same company representative wrote Perez Soto that Gulf would assume responsibility for deporting colored crews, and not passing on the added responsibility to the British Consul.[134]  Thus, Gomez and his associates had created considerable logistical difficulties for the companies.  The regime might have reckoned, however, that taking such a stand on antillanos would not have wrecked its political relationship with company managers who also held racist views towards Caribbean blacks.  Therefore, the regime only stood to benefit, since it could appeal to more racist Venezuelans who disliked vulnerable antillanos who had no political power.

 

British Consul

 

Facing hostility from the authorities and, it seems, from much of the public, antillanos held few options.  It was unlikely that the companies, dominated by racist managers, would come to their assistance.  In desperation the antillanos turned to the British Consul, Robert Cameron, who "has had a great deal of trouble since General Soto assumed the duties of his office here…This has in the main been caused by the methods used in handling colored British subjects from Trinidad."  The problem according to the U.S. consul, was that "these men, being as a rule more intelligent and better workers than the native laborers, get better pay from the oil companies." 

 

Unfortunately, "this has aroused the ire of the native labor and has in turn reacted against the Trinidadian in official circles."  In a personal aside, the U.S. consul remarked, "moreover the Trinidadian is an individual who is not easy to get along with.  He is insolent and overbearing when he thinks he can afford to be so and he looks upon the Venezuelan as his social inferior."  Nevertheless, Sloan, the U.S. consul, admitted candidly that "this attitude has led to what appears to be discrimination and numerous cases of seeming unjustified arrest and cruel treatment of prisoners in the jail have been reported to the British Vice Consul."  Sloan reported that this situation was made more complicated by the fact that the British Vice Consul, Cameron, was an employee of the Caribbean Petroleum Company and could not devote all his time to consular duties.  Cameron, confided the U.S. consul, "has not handled these cases in a diplomatic manner, because he has often listened to the complaint and without further investigation has assumed it to be the truth and has demanded redress.  A feeling of mutual dislike exists between the British Vice Consul and the officials of the Government stationed in Maracaibo."[135]  Sloan did not outline the individual cases, so it is difficult to assess the veracity of the American Consul's comments.

 

Word of Cameron's actions in Maracaibo reached high British authorities.  Far from expressing any concern about the plight of antillanos, they were troubled that Cameron was jeopardizing British-Venezuelan relations.  In July 1927, the British Charge d'Affaires in Venezuela notified British authorities that the Zulia state government had recently complained to Caracas about Cameron.  "This gentleman," stated the report, "is reported as interceding on behalf of the British West Indian subjects living there every time one of them is fined or arrested by the Police because of misdemeanors (drunkenness, insulting behavior, fighting, etc) and it is pointed out that Mr. Cameron gives always more credit to the guilty men than to the authorities."  The British Charge further charged that in one instance Cameron took the side of a West Indian subject "who became very dangerous on account of a fit of madness, and was confined to a madhouse after proper medical examination.  Mr. Cameron did insist on urging his release, although even the friends and countrymen of the man were convinced of his madness."[136]  The author of the report concluded that, "I may be allowed to remark that although there are in Maracaibo quite many Dutch and French West Indian subjects, their Consuls do not place any unusual claims upon the Authorities.  This no doubt co-operates in making such subjects more obedient to the Police regulations than the British West Indians, who almost always find support in their Consular Representative."

 

In addition to these transgressions, the Charge d'Affaires also accused Cameron of using abrupt and discourteous language when dealing with Maracaibo authorities.[137] 
While it is entirely possible that antillanos were disorderly and sought trouble, this was hardly unique behavior in the oil zone.  Unruly American rough necks had been a constant eyesore in the Maracaibo oil zone.  Additionally, according to reports, British subjects, who were not referred to by race, were constantly drinking aguardiente, "about as potent as a mixture of sulphuric acid and methylated spirits."  The British hobos and roughnecks, and "various other undesirable gentry," became down and out and unemployable, and had to be repatriated by the Maracaibo Vice Consulate.[138]  Furthermore, though drunken disorderliness was a feature of oil field life, Venezuelan police methods were arbitrary and consular intervention with the authorities was a frequent occurrence.[139]  Interestingly, Cameron fell under scrutiny not only by his diplomatic superiors but also by oil company managers.  Doyle, the manager of Caribbean Petroleum Company where Cameron worked as an accountant, complained to the British Legation in Caracas that his subordinate was "inclined to be too credulous in espousing the complaints of coloured British subjects and too zealous in pressing them on the local authorities who, Mr Doyle thought, had shown some forbearance in their desire to avoid trouble with the Vice Consulate."  Doyle had spoken to Cameron and thought the latter would be more prudent in future.  In this case, intervention by British corporate interests was decisive in influencing official government policy.  Instead of investigating the matter of the West Indians, the Caracas Legation took Doyle's side and replaced Cameron with one Colonel Seagrim.[140]  Seagrim was an agent for a number of commercial firms in Maracaibo.  Following his appointment, one British diplomat remarked "in attempting to gauge the situation in Maracaibo, I have discomfited the unfavorable reports which I heard about Colonel Seagrim---that he took the Vice-Consulate merely in order to obtain Lloyd's agency and other agencies, and that he has neglected the Consular work.  The heads of the oil companies do not respect him…"[141]  Thus, despite their reservations about Seagrim, British authorities were so anxious to rid themselves of Cameron, a loose cannon, that they were willing to put up with Seagrim and his shady business dealings. 

 

Triangulating Gomez Dictatorship

 

Thus, by discriminating against the antillanos the Gomez state had shrewdly appealed to racist public opinion and not suffered any political damage whatsoever.  Gomez's policy had not endangered his relationship with the companies or the British government, both of which wanted to rid themselves of the antillanos.  With the departure of Cameron West Indian workers lost a valuable ally.  By 1933 the colored West Indian population was on a steady decrease and might not again increase, "as the Venezuelan government now prohibits the entry of members of the coloured races…"[142]  Nevertheless, those West Indians that did make it to Maracaibo, according to Venezuelan government officials, became a kind of privileged caste.  One government oil inspector remarked "the Companies do not care anything about the Venezuelan worker, the housing, the jobs and all the best is reserved for black antillanos.  It is a crime that the Companies continue to employ blacks and dismiss Venezuelan workers." One oil inspector remarked that Lago Petroleum Corporation employed 140 Black West Indians, which meant 140 Venezuelans without work.  Every day, the inspector continued, trucks full of Venezuelans were leaving for the states of Falcon and Lara, not to mention ships full of workers headed out of the Maracaibo area.  The inspector concluded, "the Companies should dismiss those blacks and protect the sons of the nation, who are generally good peons, workers, docile and honorable."[143]  What is interesting to note is the inspector's language, for example when he referred to the "crime" of employing blacks instead of Venezuelans, many of whom were likely black or meztizo themselves, or hailing from Margarita Island. 

 

The inspector's complaints about West Indian labor and the underprivileged position of Venezuelan workers was not new.  In fact, as early as 1927, there is evidence of friction between Venezuelan workers and West Indians.  For example, in January of that year, a group of workers employed by British Controlled Oilfields working on the Mene de Mauroa field approached Perez Soto, complaining of a West Indian "antillano," who ran the local supply store.  According to the workers, the antillano was a drunk and "treated Venezuelans very poorly."  The workers demanded that the West Indian be fired from his post.[144]  In other instances, natives and foreigners competed for jobs.  At one point, Gomez even became involved in labor disputes in the oil zone, ordering Perez Soto to investigate the case of some Venezuelan workers who complained of having been fired unjustly.[145]  Perez Soto promptly swung into action, requesting that the Venezuela Oil Concessions explain its labor policies.  G. Witteveen, a company manager, explained to Perez Soto that the company had indeed let go of 21 workers, however "amongst cooks, kitchen assistants, dish boys and waiters, not all of the dismissed workers were Venezuelan, as Joseph Newfield is a colored Trinidadian antillano, and others are also colored foreigners."[146]  Interestingly then, the company representative seemed defensive, justifying the firings by saying that not just Venezuelans had been fired, but also at least one Trinidadian.

 

What is more, the oil companies, because they felt increasing pressure from the authorities, sought to get rid of their black West Indian labor force.  On 12 October 1927, Perez Soto proudly wrote Gomez that an administrator at Venezuela Gulf, Mr. K Winship, would shortly fire all black workers in the company's exploration and exploitation departments, and replace these workers with Venezuelans.  A contented Perez Soto reported to Gomez, "one clearly sees the hand of God helping you for the greater good of the Nation."[147]  However, the new policy, pushed for by local officials, was not met with universal acceptance by oil men.  According to Gulf's Pablo Polakis, the company's General Superintendent of Drilling, Mr. Newton, was unhappy about the new instructions.  Apparently, Winship had made it known verbally, without explaining any concrete reason, that Newton should promptly start to fire all Antillean or other foreign blacks, and to replace these workers by the end of the year with Venezuelans.  Newton did not protest the measures on moral grounds, arguing instead that Winship's reform would be prejudicial to Gulf's operations from an economic standpoint.  The blacks, stated Newton, were already trained and it would require some work to train new Venezuelans.  For his own part, Polakis was nervous about public exposure.  In a confidential note, the company man remarked that, "these instructions have been given verbally to avoid evidence (in case the English Consul would learn about this officially---and in such case without written evidence he will not be able to complain nor present official complaints to his government."  Polakis felt sure that the recent decision would not be popular and would be opposed by drilling chiefs, however Polakis was confident that the instructions would ultimately be carried out.  While arguing that he was not a racist, Polakis stated that he simply wanted a better future for Venezuelan workers.  On the other hand, Polakis was not opposed to white immigration, and commented that "if arms are missing----let this be filled at least by the White Race and above all by Latin Race---the only way of advancing the country in moral as well as material terms."[148]  Thus, Gomez's racist moves to expel the antillanos from the oil companies met with a mixed response from oil men.  Lower level foremen, who worked with antillanos, were reluctant to part with their colleagues and may have even developed social bonds with the Caribbean workforce.  However, foremen did not make company policy and Gulf oil managers showed indications that they would comply with government directives.  Thus, for all intensive purposes Gomez's draconian policy on antillanos had not harmed relations with the companies.

 

It is not clear whether Gulf ultimately followed through on its promises to dismiss West Indian workers.  However, there is some evidence to suggest ongoing West Indian presence in the Gulf workforce.  In 1933, for example, the British subject and man of color Cuthbert Robertson, a longtime resident in Venezuela returned to Grenada and was granted permission to return to Maracaibo.  Robertson was a Gulf employee at the time.[149]  Perhaps, the government backed off or the companies reached some type of compromise with the regime.  In the 1930s oil inspectors reported that there were 70 Antillean women working as domestics in employ of foreign oil workers in Cabimas. Gulf was one of the primary companies operating in the Cabimas area.[150]  In any case, if Gulf did make moves to get rid of its West Indian workforce, there is no evidence that other companies followed suit.  In the case of Lago Petroleum Corporation, which operated in the Cabimas area along with Gulf, documentation is readily available for later years and it is clear that West Indians were kept on the payroll.  In 1933 there were 35 Antillanos working for Lago in Lagunillas and the company also had West Indian employees in Cabimas.[151]  Clearly, at least some oil companies had reservations about getting rid of the West Indian workforce.  West Indians were more highly skilled than Venezuelan peons, and many Trinidadians were surely familiar with the Spanish language, making excellent interpreters or office workers.

 

Curious Case of Percy Creaves

 

Nevertheless, growing pressure on West Indians from local officials and some company officials would lead antillano workers to complain to the British government.  A case in point was Percy Creaves, who worked on the Mene Grande field with the Caribbean Petroleum Company.  Creaves suffered an attack of "temporary insanity" in May 1930.  He noted that he had left his duties as fireman, running  in the direction of the hospital.  Creaves arrived at hospital, only to find the premises filled to capacity.  As his "torture of head was unbearable," he went to his room and used a mixture he had prepared himself.  Creaves went to bed and after some sleep felt refreshed but still suffered from intense headache.  Creaves complained that "no medical aid or Company official came near me."  Creaves claimed that he "saw strokes of fire coming down to me from the air representing fork lightning.  I got up speedily to see if rain was coming in my wildness of mind.  I noticed it was a flash light used up and down in the adjacent room by the occupants," and the light hit him in the head.  About 7 o'clock that night Creaves went to the adjacent room with a wood cutting axe and asked the occupants why they were flashing the flashlight.  Creaves claimed that before he could get an answer, he was pushed back.  Creaves was then held by three other workmen of the company at Mene Grande.  Creaves claimed that he was beaten and unable to defend himself.  After Creaves arrived in his room, "bottles upon bottles showered on the door luckily for me it was closed."  Creaves claimed that the police then came and arrested him without saying word.  He was taken to the police station where he stayed for three or four days, and the company never inquired as to his health.  Creaves said that his attackers were not arrested, and that he went without food for some time. 

 

Creaves' odyssey was far from over.  Following his ordeal, he was conveyed to San Lorenzo, and from there to the San Timoteo Police Station where he was confined for another three days.  Creaves claimed that he was shackled and then placed on a launch headed for Lagunillas.  His clothing and house furniture were confiscated and never seen again.  At Lagunillas, Creaves was again imprisoned for three days without food, and on the fourth day the antillano was released and "told to go to hell."  "I could not find hell on earth," remarked Creaves, "so I went back to Mene Grande."  As soon as Creaves arrived at the oil field, he was again arrested, confined, and kept in prison for four days.  He was then released, placed on a 4 wheeled truck, and driven to the Central Railway Station of the Caribbean Petroleum Company.  In arguing his case before British officials, Creaves argued that he had never done his company superiors any harm, and that he had worked at the firm for six consecutive years.  Creaves finally found his way to Maracaibo, and paid a visit to the British Vice Consul.  Creaves explained his story and asked if he could claim some kind of gratuity.  Eight days later the Vice Consul replied that Creaves was not a British West Indian.  Creaves, however, countered that "as far as I know I was born in the Island of Barbados in the 1881 July 3rd."   Creaves then became an invalid and a beggar on the streets of Maracaibo and "I can firmly state that my livelihood was ruined by the command of the Caribbean M.G. Petroleum Company during the year 1930."  In concluding, Creaves remarked "I am now informing my High Court officials of England my Mother Government that my life is still a wreck…I am asking my Government to take my case into consideration, and find out for me, by the Law-Courts of England, if my ruined life; by the command of the C.P.C. [Caribbean Petroleum Corporation] worth me anything.  Since the beating I received from 5 persons in number and the continuous locking up of the company police I am still unable to earn my daily bread."[152]

 

The British Legation was not sympathetic.  In a terse dispatch, A.B. Hutchinson wrote, "…his [Creaves'] behavior at the time of the incidents referred to appears to have been such that the authorities and other people with whom he came in contact believed him to be insane and even dangerously so, and it is not altogether surprising that they took the measures they did against him…It is not seen how any claim can be made on the man's behalf and the only way of helping him that I can suggest would be to have him repatriated on the ground of destitution.  There appears to be no doubt as to his nationality, as he holds a British passport, which describes him as a native of Barbados."[153] 

 

Not all British officials took the same view, however.  In a note, Colonel Seagrim disparaged West Indians overall as a troublesome lot.  However, in the specific case of Creaves, Seagrim took an understanding view.  "I had quite a long conversation with Creaves [sic]," wrote Seagrim, "and as a result of this, I consider that he appears perfectly sane, but liable to work himself up into a passion when discussing the matter of his grievance.  He is an elderly man, far more likeable than the average West Indian, and, from what I gathered, he is going through a rough time, having no means, sleeping out in the streets, begging food, etc.  He seems very respectable, his face and manner show no signs of dissipation or vices, and I consider that his is a case that deserves sympathetic treatment." 

 

Furthermore, Seagrim remarked that "he has been a fireman for the last six years, he says, and attributes his illness to the excess of heat when on his job and also to domestic troubles, his wife having deserted him in 1928."[154]  Seagrim's more upbeat appraisal had little impact upon the British authorities in Caracas, however, and there is no record that they spoke to the Caribbean Petroleum Company regarding his dismissal. 

 

Plight of Antillano Workers

 

Creaves' case was not isolated.  Other West Indians, who were unfortunate in obtaining work, wound up in hospitals.  An interesting case was Samuel Agard, who like Creaves seems to have suffered some kind of psychological disorder, referred to by the British Consul as "infantile imbecility."  The British Consul wrote Perez Soto, requesting that Agard be deported to Trinidad so as to avoid additional hospital expenses accruing to the British government.  Already, Agard had spent six months under observation and treatment.[155]  The Zulia Secretary General responded that Agard would be declared an "undesirable immigrant" and presumably deported back to Trinidad.[156]  While it is unclear why Agard and Creaves suffered psychological trauma, it seems at least possible that the everyday stresses of life in the oil zone hastened, rather than slowed down, mental breakdown.  Far from expressing interest for West Indian workers, British officials did not seem to express much sympathy for West Indians in Maracaibo, nor did they intercede on their behalf.  The lack of encouragement or support from higher officials must have come as a blow to West Indians, who faced an unclear and uncertain future.  Nor did the fall of the Gomez dictatorship in 1935 help to improve the lot of West Indian laborers.  According to a local Cabimas historian, an increasingly more nationalistic and militant oil work force pressured to have a 1936 Work Law enforced which sought to place tighter controls over the number of foreign workers laboring on the oil fields. These provisions were applied to the Trinidadians, "the majority of whom returned to their islands." To see fellow oil workers turning against them surely was distressing for the antillanos, who had been living in the oil zone for more than ten years and had built a life for themselves.  While it is unclear just how massive this outflow of labor was, many Trinidadians were successfully able to stay in the country as they had children born in the country or they had married Venezuelan women.[157]  According to British observers, the British West Indian community was still considerable after World War II, though diminishing, and there were antillanos living in Cabimas and Lagunillas.[158]  The British West Indians represented a floating population, their jobs of insecure tenure, "in the sense that they are liable to transfer constantly, not only overseas, but up country to the camps or anywhere in this vast territory."[159]

 

Conclusion

 

The arrival then of antillanos in Zulia provided authorities with the opportunity of promoting national identity and xenophobic racism.  However, the Venezuelan case is hardly unique.  In Cuba, for example, Haitians, Jamaicans, and others played an important role in the U.S. dominated sugar industry, and by the early 1930s there were between 150,000 and 200,000 Caribbean immigrants in Cuba,[160] a much more substantial community than the antillanos in Maracaibo.  As in Zulia, the Cuban authorities, in this case the regime of Gerardo Machado y Morales (1925-1933) appeased Cuban nationalist sentiment by initiating the repatriation of Haitian and British West Indian workers at the end of the 1920s.[161]  However, "large scale unemployment and the sudden appearance on town and city streets of tens of thousands of sugar workers, many of them native-born blacks and Caribbean braceros, increased the elite's apprehension of the risk of social unrest." Cuban fears about unemployed Caribbean blacks roaming the streets are, again, similar to moves by Zulia authorities to clamp down on antillanos.   Anti-antillano discourse, predicated on fears of unfair competition and "a general dilution of Cubanidad," were promoted not only by intellectuals but also by workers,[162] similar to what occurred in Zulia.  Furthermore, in a clear parallel to the Zulia case, "Cuban anti-imperialist discourse was also deeply influenced by fears of Antillean immigrants, whose movements to and from Cuba were attributed to foreign domination of the sugar industry."[163]  As in the case of the Zulia antillanos, Jamaicans had a higher literacy rate than many Cuban workers, which earned the antillanos promotion to higher paying jobs.   Just as antillanos requested the assistance of Robert Cameron in Maracaibo, Jamaicans and other antillanos in Cuba enlisted British consular support to uphold their rights when dealing with employers or local authorities.[164]  In Costa Rica, antillano workers competed with local workers in a depressed labor market on United Fruit company banana plantations,[165]  however "racially charged jingoism served to divide the labor force along lines of nationality."[166]  In Dominican Republic, antillanos were recruited as seasonal cane workers from the late 19th century onwards, however legislation became increasingly hostile to Afro-Caribbean immigration[167] and both the elite and workers organized to oppose West Indian immigration.[168] 

 

Zulia Antillanos found themselves in a paradoxical situation: on the one hand they were often skilled laborers who received higher pay than many Venezuelans.  However, within the racial hierarchy, antillanos were at the bottom of the ladder.  As a result, they had to be constantly wary of the Venezuelan workforce, which complained to higher authorities about the West Indian presence.  There is some evidence to suggest that antillanos were accepted to a degree in local oil boom towns, however West Indians had to be careful.  As skilled laborers, the antillanos could acquire property and even achieve a measured degree of prosperity, but that material success was in constant danger of being taken away.  There is no evidence that West Indians participated in labor disputes during the Gomez era, for example during the 1925 oil strike.  Could it have been that antillanos, having acquired some goods and prosperity in the oil towns, were upwardly mobile and did not wish to associate with Venezuelan workers?  Such a conclusion is possible.  However, an equally suggestive possibility is that West Indians were leery of participating in such actions due to their precarious status in Venezuela.  In backing racist and xenophobic legislation, Gomez exploited racist sentiment latent in Venezuelan society.  It was a shrewd move.  Appealing to workers on the basis of race stood to undermine class solidarity and ensured that the workers would have difficulty launching a serious political challenge to the regime.  By getting workers to think of themselves as Venezuelans and not part of a wider class struggle including antillanos, Gomez was probably able to benefit somewhat and diffuse political and social discontent directed at the regime.  What is more, in picking on the antillanos Gomez did not jeopardize his relationship with the companies.  Wary of Caribbean blacks, oil managers rarely defended their migrant workers and in some cases even acceded to racist government directives.  Thus, while the arrival of the antillanos was potentially worrisome in that it threatened to destabilize social relations Gomez turned this unfavorable situation to his advantage.  By playing the race card Gomez was able to shore up his state building project and foster  Venezuelan nationalism.

 

Notes:

[1]  Lieuwen, "Petroleum in Venezuela, A History" 49
[2]  Ministerio de Fomento, Memoria del estado zulia 1927 (Caracas: Editorial Sur America, 1928), "Inmigracion," Perez Soto to Ministro Relaciones Interiores, Presidencia No 26, 8 July 1926, 67
[3]   Angel Ziems, El gomecismo y la formacion del ejercito nacional (Caracas: Editorial Ateneo, 1979) 21
[4]  See BAHM, "El Zulia en 1926 and 1929," No 90 April 1976, Ano XVII, Hector Garcia Chuecos to Gomez, Maracaibo 21 April 1926, 61
[5]   Ewell, Venezuela and The United States,  115
[6]   Tomas Polanco Alcantara, Juan Vicente Gomez, aproximacion a una biografia (Caracas: Grijalbo, 1990) 439
[7]   Polanco, Juan Vicente Gomez, 440
[8]   Bautista Urbaneja, "El sistema politico gomecista," in Caballero, et. al., Juan Vicente Gomez y su epoca, 56
[9]   Ministerio de Fomento, Anuario estadistico 1938 (Caracas: direccion general de estadistica, imprenta  nacional 1939), 5
[10]   Ministerio de Fomento, Anuario estadistico 1908 (Caracas: direccion general de estadistica, imprenta nacional 1910), 11
[11]   Ministerio de Fomento, Anuario estadistico 1908, 414
[12]   Carmen Amanda Perez, Maracaibo y la region andina, encrucijada historica (Maracaibo: Corpozulia, Centro de Estudios Historicos Universidad del Zulia, 1988), 36
[13]   Amanda, Maracaibo y la region andina, 33
[14]   Venezuela Up To Date, Vol 1 1927 (Caracas 1927) 575
[15]   Amanda, Maracaibo y la region andina, 33
[16]   Linder, "'Con Un Panuelo de Seda:' 6
[17]    Edwin Lieuwen, "The Politics of Energy in Venezuela," in John D. Wirth (ed.), Latin American Oil Companies and the Politics of Energy (Lincoln: University Nebraska Press, 1985), 194
[18]   George Philip, Oil and Politics in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19
[19]     Sandra Flores, "The Gomez Administration and The Oil Workers" (Venezuela, 1908-1935), MA, UT Austin, 2001, 22
[20]     AHZ, Tomo III 1922, Registro Público, Actos Registrados en la Oficina Subalterna de Registro Durante El Mes de Mayo Proximo Pasado."
[21]     Edwin Lieuwen, Petroleum in Venezuela (Berkeley, University California Publications in History Vol 47, 1954) 53
[22]     PRO, FO 369/1924, K 5360/4288/247, Foreign Office Minutes, 26 April 1926, 473
[23]     Gonzalez, La revolucion de los barrosos, 104
[24]    Lieuwen, Petroleum in Venezuela, 53
[25]    NA, 831.5017/1, Alexander Sloan to Secretary of State, Maracaibo April 30, 1926
[26]    PRO, FO 369/1924, K 11187, T.D. Dunlop, 20/9/26
[27]    NA, 831.00/1290, Wainwright Abbott to Secretary of State, Caracas April 3, 1926
[28]    NA, 831.1292, Alexander Sloan to Secretary of State, Maracaibo March 31, 1926
[29]  BAHM, "El Zulia en 1926 y 1929," L. Perez Bustamante to Juan Vicente Gomez, Maracaibo 25 March 1926
[30]   NA, 831.504/9, Alexander Sloan to Secretary of State, Maracaibo July 30, 1925
[31]    Flores, "The Gomez Administration and The Oil Workers," 14.  According to Lieuwen, a five bolivar daily wage in 1925 was worth $1 U.S.  See Lieuwen, Petroleum in Venezuela, 50
[32]   NA, 831.504/9, Alexander Sloan to Secretary of State, Maracaibo July 30, 1925
[33]    Julio Quintero, "Los campamentos petroleros de la costa oriental del lago de maracaibo: el sindicato como factor de integracion comunitaria, caso maraven" (Maracaibo, Magister Universidad del Zulia, 1991), 247
[34]    NA, 831.504/9, Alexander Sloan to Secretary of State, Maracaibo July 30, 1925
[35]    Flores, "The Gomez Administration and The Oil Workers," 16
[36]    NA, 831.504/9, Alexander Sloan to Secretary of State, Maracaibo July 30, 1925
[37]    Flores, "The Gomez Administration and The Oil Workers," 16
[38]    Flores, "The Gomez Administration and The Oil Workers," 29, 30
[39]   Flores, "The Gomez Administration and The Oil Workers," 31, 32
[40]   Flores, "The Gomez Administration and The Oil Workers," 32
[41]    NA, 831.504/9, Alexander Sloan to Secretary of State, Maracaibo July 30, 1925
[42]    Flores, "The Gomez Administration and The Oil Workers," 24
[43]    Flores, "The Gomez Administration and The Oil Workers," 25
[44]     Ewell, Venezuela and The United States,  135
[45]     McBeth, Juan Vicente Gómez, 143
[46]    NA, 831.00/1298, Willis Cook to Secretary of State, Caracas June 7, 1926
[47]    NA, 831.00/1315, Alexander Sloan to Secretary of State, Maracaibo November 26, 1926
[48]    PRO, FO 371/14300, A 7369, Mr O'Reilly, Leading Personalities in Venezuela, 17 October 1930
[49]    NA, 831.00/1298, Willis Cook to Secretary of State, Caracas June 7, 1926
[50]   NA, RG 59, 831.122, Feb 27, 1925. American Foreign Service Report from Maracaibo Consulate.
[51]   Humberto Ochoa Urdaneta, Estampas de cabimas (Maracaibo: Centro Histórico de Cabimas, 1993), 44-5.  It is perfectly understandable that Trinidadian workers would have knowledge of Spanish, as Trinidad was a former Spanish colonial possession.  Even under English rule, Spanish continued to be spoken and by the late 19th century English speaking teachers were frustrated by their child pupils, many of whom only spoke Spanish or an 'unintelligible' patois.  See Donald Wood, Trinidad in Transition, The Years After Slavery (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 34, 229
[52]  NA, RG 59, Internal Affairs Venezuela, 831.00/1304, Alexander Sloan to Secretary of State, August 5 1926 
[53]   AHZ, unmarked folder 1933, Caracas 27 December 1933, Pedro Tinoco, Minister of Interior, to President, Estado Zulia.
[54]   Lieuwen, "Petroleum in Venezuela," 52
[55]   Michelle Harrison, King Sugar, Jamaica, The Caribbean, and the World Sugar Industry (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 120-27
[56]    NA, RG 59, Internal Affairs Venezuela, 831.00/1304, Alexander Sloan to Secretary of State, Aug 5 1926. 
[57]   AHZ, unmarked folder 1935,"Novedades Policiales del Municipio Cabimas, 25-5-35, and 24-5-35."
[58]  AHZ, unmarked folder 1935, Notas Ministro Relaciones Interiores Agosto 1935, Pedro Tinoco to Presidente Edo Zulia, Caracas 29 August.
[59]  AHZ, unmarked folder year 1933, Caracas 27 December 1933, Pedro Tinoco, Minister of Interior, to President, Estado Zulia.
[60]  AHZ, unmarked folder year 1933, Caracas 24 June 1933, Pedro Tinoco to President State of Zulia.
[61]  AHZ, unmarked folder 1934, Notas Ministerio Interior Mayo 1934, Caracas 29 May 1934, Pedro Tinoco to Presidente Edo Zulia.
[62]    AHZ, unmarked folder 1934, Notas Ministerio Interior Mayo 1934, Caracas 29 May 1934, Pedro Tinoco to Presidente Edo Zulia.
[63]   Ochoa, Estampas de cabimas, 76-7
[64]   AHZ, unmarked folder 1933, section correspondencia personal 1933 dirigida al Gral Vincencio Pérez Soto, L Pinto Salvatierra, "Memorandum para el Gral Vincencio Pérez Soto en relación con la oposición a embargo habida en el juicio seguido por Benzecry & Benmergui contral Nasib Salomon I Chemel Halim."
[65]   AHZ, unmarked folder 1934, Legajo, Telegramas Jefes Civiles Distritos Foráneos Julio 1934.  La Rita, 18 July 1934, Mario Maya to Secretario General Estado.
[66]    Ochoa, Estampas de cabimas, 44-5
[67]    Natanael Maria Pinero, "Penetracion del Evangelio en Cabimas," in Primer congreso de la historia de cabimas (Maracaibo: Produccion Editorial Edinson Castro, Ediciones del Centro Historico de Cabimas, 1993), 130
[68]   Ochoa, Estampas de cabimas, 45
[69]   Brown, "British Petroleum Pioneers in Mexico and South America" 24
[70]   Ochoa, Estampas de cabimas, 45
[71]    AHZ, Vol 16 1929 "Inmigracion, Certificados de Buena Conducta Para Obtener Permisos Para Entrar a Venezuela"  Statement, VOC Inter-Office, Shore Lagunillas, 15 July 1929.
[72]    AHZ, Vol 16 1929 "Inmigracion, Certificados de Buena Conducta Para Obtener Permisos Para Entrar a Venezuela" Statement, signature illegible, Maracaibo VOC 17 June 1929
[73]    AHZ, Vol 16 1929 "Inmigracion, Certificados de Buena Conducta Para Obtener Permisos Para Entrar a Venezuela" Inter-Office VOC, East Lagunillas, Departamento de Construccion, 20 June 1929
[74]    AHZ, Vol 16 1929 "Inmigracion, Certificados de Buena Conducta Para Obtener Permisos Para Entrar a Venezuela" JF Emanuel A to Presidente Estado Zulia, Maracaibo 27 June 1929
[75]    AHZ, Vol 16 1929, "Companias Petroleras."  Statement James Williams, Jefe Taller Caribbean, Cabimas 25 July 1929
[76]    RP, Defunciones 1926 Municipio Cabimas, 12 July 1926.
[77]    AHMEM, Ministerio Energia y Minas, Ministerio de Fomento, Inspectoria Tecnica de Hidrocarburos, Maracaibo, Informe Mensual 1935-36, Pedro Gomez Willet to Inspector Tecnico de Hidrocarburos, 9 September 1935
[78] AHMEM, Ministerio de Fomento, Inspectoria Tecnica de Hidrocarburos, Maracaibo, Censo de Empleados y Obreros de las Diferentes Companias del Estado Zulia.  Occidente del Pais, 1936, The Caribbean Petroleum Corporation, San Lorenzo---Installation, Censo del Pay Roll diario del campo de San Lorenzo para el dia 30 Junio 1936
[79]    AHMEM, Ministerio de Fomento, Inspectoria Tecnica de Hidrocarburos, Maracaibo, Censo de Empleados y Obreros de las Diferentes Companias del Estado Zulia.  Occidente del Pais, 1936, Lago Petroleum Corporation, La Salina refinery, empleados mensuales, Lago Petroleum Corporation La Salina, lista de empleados (Diarios) 15 Mayo 1936
[80]   AHZ, unmarked folder 1933, section, "Entradas de Extranjeros."  Pedro Tinoco to Presidente Edo Zulia, Caracas 10 March 1933
[81]   AHZ, unmarked folder 1934, section, Legago No 2, Notas Ministerio Interior, Mayo 1934, Caracas 24 May 1934, Pedro Tinoco to Presidente Edo Zulia.
[82]  AHZ, unmarked folder 1935, section, "Notas Ministerio Relaciones Interiores, Oct 1935" Caracas 15 Oct 1935, Pedro Tinoco to Presidente Edo Zulia
[83]  AHZ, unmarked folder 1935, Notas Ministerio Relaciones Interiores, October 1935, Caracas 25 October 1935, Pedro Tinoco to Presidente Edo Zulia
[84]  AHZ, unmarked folder 1935, telegramas copiadores 1935, Pedro Tinoco to Presidente Edo Zulia, Caracas 19 November 1935.
[85]  AHZ, unmarked folder 1935,telegramas copiadores 1935, Pedro Tinoco to Presidente Edo Zulia, Caracas 14 November 1935.
[86]    Ministerio de Salubridad y de Agricultura y Cria, Direccion de Salubridad Publica, Memoria presentada a las camaras legislativas de los estados unidos de venezuela, Tomo I (Caracas: Lit y Tip Vargas, 1935), No 956, Caracas 4 April 1934, H Toledo Trujillo to Medico Sanidad, Maracaibo
[87]    Ministerio de Salubridad y de Agricultura y Cria, Memoria, 1935, oficina subalterna de Sanidad Nacional, No 2242, Maracaibo 22 Abril 1934, A Castillo Plaza, to Ciudadano Ministro de Salubridad y de Agricultura y Cria, Caracas. 
[88]    AHZ, unmarked folder 1934, "Notas Ministerio de Relaciones Interiores Junio 1934." Pedro Tinoco to Presidente Edo Zulia, Caracas 6 June 1934.
[89]    AHZ, unmarked folder year 1933, "Entradas de Extranjeros, Abril 1933" Caracas 5 April 1933, Pedro Tinoco to President State of Zulia.
[90]    AHZ, unmarked folder 1934, Legajo No 2, Notas Ministerio Interior, Mayo 1934, Caracas 24 May 1934, Pedro Tinoco to Presidente Edo Zulia.
[91]   Siro Vázquez, "The Conquest of Maracaibo," United Nations World, July 1951, 61
[92]    Registro Principal (Maracaibo) [hereafter referred to as RP] Defunciones Lagunillas 1927, Lagunillas 17 Marzo 1927
[93]    RP, Defunciones Lagunillas 1928, Lagunillas 20 Apil 1928
[94]    RP, Defunciones Lagunillas 1928, Lagunillas 16 July 1928
[95]    RP, Defunciones Lagunillas 1928, Lagunillas 24 May 1928
[96] Graham R. Serjeant, Beryl E. Serjeant, Sickle Cell Disease, Third Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 21, 28
[97]    AHZ, unmarked folder 1934, Novedades occurridas en el Cuartel del Policia durante el dia de ayer, 20-5-34"
[98]    AHZ, unmarked section 1935, Novedades policiales municipio Lagunillas Nov 1935. "Novedades policiales durante el dia 19 Noviembre."
[99]    AHZ, unmarked folder 1935, Novedades Policiales del Municipio Cabimas Nov 1935." Novedades policiales durante el dia 24-11-35.
[100]   PRO, FO 369/2441, K8362, 22 July 1935. 
[101]     Susan B Thompson, "The Musiues in Venezuela, Immigration Goals and Reality" (PhD. diss, Cornell University, 1981), 22
[102]     Thompson, "The Musiues in Venezuela," 23
[103]    Thompson, "The Musiues in Venezuela," 24
[104]   Alberto, Juan Vicente Gomez y Eustoquio Gomez, 215
[105]    Alberto Adriani, "Venezuela y los problemas de la inmigracion," Boletin de la Camara de Comercio de Caracas, 1 November 1926, No 156,  3485
[106]    NA, 831.00/870, Emil Sauer to Secretary of State, Maracaibo November 14, 1918
[107]  PRO, FO 369/1924, K 5360 Memorandum for Mr Hobson, 26 April 1926
[108]   NA, RG 59, Internal Affairs Venezuela, 831.00/1304, Alexander Sloan to Secretary of State, August 5 1926. 
[109]   Ministerio de Fomento, Memoria del estado zulia 1927 (Caracas: Editorial Sur America, 1928), "Inmigracion," Perez Soto to Ministro Relaciones Interiores, Presidencia No 26, 8 July 1926, 67
[110]    Memoria estado zulia 1927, "Inmigracion," Segundo Trimestre 1926, "Movimiento Inmigracion Maracaibo," 68
[111]   AHZ, unmarked folder 1933, Eliseo Villareal, Hernan Arias, Claudio Silva, etc. to Mario Maya, 26 August 1933
[112]   Ministerio de Relaciones Interiores, Memoria ministerio de relaciones interiores 1930, "Inmigracion,"  88, Rubén González to Presidente Estado Zulia, Caracas 5 September 1929
[113]   Ochoa, Estampas de cabimas, 76-7
[114]    Calvani, Reminiscencias, 24-5
[115]    NA, RG 59, 831.504/28, Wallace to FA Leovy, New York Oct 27, 1926.
[116]    PRO, FO 369/2003, Hobson Feb 8 1927, Consul Hobson's Tour of Inspection to Willemstad, Aruba, and Maracaibo, in File No K 3689, 48, 50. 
[117]    Ministerio de Fomento, Memoria del estado zulia 1928 (Caracas: Editorial Sur America, 1929), "Inmigracion,"  Perez Soto to Ministro Relaciones Interiores, Maracaibo 5 May 1927, 72
[118]    Ministerio de Fomento, Memoria del estado zulia 1928 (Caracas: Editorial Sur America, 1929), "Inmigracion,"  Perez Soto to Ministro Relaciones Interiores, Maracaibo 5 May 1927, 72
[119]   Thompson, "The Musiues in Venezuela," 24
[120]   Ministerio de Relaciones Interiores, Memoria ministerio de relaciones interiores1930, "Circular Sobre Entrada Al Pais de Individuos de Raza de Color," Document No 111, Caracas 5 October 1929, Ministro Relaciones Interiores to Ruben Gonzalez
[121]    AHZ, Vol 1 1930, "Companias Petroleras."  Statement, Caribbean Petroleum Company, 17 Nov 1930
[122]    AHZ, unsorted folder 1934, statement Caribbean Petroleum Company 20 November 1933, November 20 1933, Maracaibo.
[123]    Memoria ministerio de relaciones interiores 1930, "Circular Sobre Entrada Al Pais de Individuos de Raza de Color," Doc No 124, JM Garcia to Ministro Relaciones Interiores, Caracas 16 November 1929, 137
[124]    Memoria ministerio de relaciones interiores 1930, "Circular Sobre Entrada Al Pais de Individuos de Raza de Color," Doc No 125, Ministro Relaciones Interiores to Gobernador Distrito Federal, Caracas 19 November 1929, 138
[125]    Memoria ministerio de relaciones interiores 1930, "Circular Sobre Entrada Al Pais de Individuos de Raza de Color," Doc No 126, Ministro Relaciones Exteriores to Ministro Relaciones Interiores, Caracas 16 November 1929, 139
[126]    Memoria ministerio de relaciones interiores 1930, "Circular Sobre Entrada Al Pais de Individuos de Raza de Color," Doc No 127, Ministro de Relaciones Interiores to Ministro Relaciones Exteriores, Caracas 19 November 1929, 139
[127]    AHZ, Vol 7 1928, Companias Petroleras.  Statement Senor E Redden, San Lorenzo, 22 October 1928
[128]    AHZ, Vol 7 1928, Companias Petroleras.  Statement signature illegible, Maracaibo 9 July 1929
[129]    AHZ, Vol 16 1929, Companias Petroleras, Caribbean Petroleum Company, Maracaibo 17 June 1929
[130]    AHZ, Documentos Particulares y Sin Lugar de Origen 1932, Maracaibo 12 November 1932, Joseph Stewart to Gral Presidente Edo Zulia
[131]    Memoria estado zulia 1928, Leonte Olivo to Jefe Civil Distrito Maracaibo, "Inmigracion," Maracaibo 3 March 1927
[132]    AHZ, Vol 10 1928, Companias Petroleras, Wm Clark to Vincencio Perez Soto, Maracaibo 4 June 1928
[133]    AHZ, Vol 10 1928, Companias Petroleras.  Wm Clark to Vincencio Perez Soto, Maracaibo 11 June 1928.
[134]    AHZ, Vol 10 1928, Companias Petroleras.  Wm Clark to Vincencio Perez Soto, Maracaibo 28 June 1928.
[135]   NA, RG 59, 831.00/1318, Sloan to Sec State, December 16, 1926
[136]    PRO, FO 199/241, K 9988/9988/247, Extract from note No. 147 from the Venezuela Charge d'Affaires, 20 July 1927.  It is unclear here whether the Charge d'Affaires was referring to the Creaves case, mentioned later and originally reported in 1930, or to another case altogether.
[137]    PRO, FO 199/241, K 9988/9988/247, Extract from note No. 147 from the Venezuela Charge d'Affaires, 20 July 1927
[138]    PRO, FO 369/2117, K 3748 20 March 1929, letter dated February 22 1929
[139]    PRO, FO 369/2003, Hobson, Feb 8 1927, in file No K3689, Consul Hobson's Tour of Inspection to Willemstad, Aruba and Maracaibo, 52
[140]    PRO, FO 199/271, British Legation, Caracas, September 1927, O'Reilly (?) to Chamberlain 
[141]    PRO, FO 369/2117 K 8221 5 July 1929, TD Dunlop, Inspector of Consular Establishments, 10  
[142]    PRO, FO 369/2382, K 2067, Feb 1934.  John MacGregor, memorandum on the status of the Maracaibo Consulate, 23 Nov 1933. 
[143]    AHMEM, Ministerio de Fomento, Inspectoria Tecnica de Hidrocarburos.  Informes.  Maracaibo 1931, C.A. Velutini to Oficina Tecnica de Hidrocarburos, Cabimas 8 June 1931
[144]    AHZ, Vol 4 1927, Companias Petroleras.  Vincencio Perez Soto to Gerente, British Controlled Oilfields, Maracaibo 7 January 1927
[145]    AHZ, Vol 4 1927, Companias Petroleras.  Vincencio Perez Soto to Juan Vicente Gomez, Maracaibo 5 May 1927
[146]    AHZ, Vol 4 1927, Companias Petroleras.  G. Witteveen to Secretario General del Estado Zulia, Maracaibo 3 May 1927
[147]    AHM, 607 C, Oct 1-15, 1927, Perez Soto to Juan Vicente Gomez, Maracaibo 12 October 1927
[148]    AHM, 607 C, Oct 1-15, 1927, Pablo Polakis to Manuel Belisario, Maracaibo 11 October 1927
[149]    AHZ, unmarked folder 1933, Caracas 2 June 1933, Pedro Tinoco to President State of Zulia.
[150]    AHMEM, 1932-33, Inspectoria Tecnica de Hidrocarburos, asunto: Correspondencia e Informes, CA Velutini to Inspectoria Tecnica de Hidrocarburos, Cabimas 8 March 1933
[151]    AHMEM, 1932-33, Inspectoria Tecnica de Hidrocarburos, asunto: Correspondencia e Informes, G Gabaldon P to Inspectoria Tecnica de Hidrocarburos, Lagunillas 12 March 1933, 1932-33, Inspectoria Tecnica de Hidrocarburos, asunto: Correspondencia e Informes, Carlos Perez de la Cova to Inspectoria Tecnica de Hidrocarburos, Mene Grande 8 March 1933
[152]    PRO, FO 369/2297, K 10795 13 September 1932. 
[153]    PRO, FO 369/2297, K14447, 14 December 1932
[154]    PRO, FO 369/2297, K14447, 14 Dec 1932.
[155]    AHZ, Vol 10 1928, Consulados, Seagrim to Perez Soto, 14 June 1928.
[156]    AHZ, Vol 10 1928, Consulados, Secretary General, to Seagrim?
[157]    Ochoa, Estampas de cabimas, 45
[158]    PRO, FO 924/441, LC 1196, 20 February 1946, "Report by Mr AD Francis on visit to Maracaibo and Western Venezuela".
[159]    PRO, FO 924/441, LC 2759,  "Memorandum, Visit to Maracaibo Regarding Formation of a New Anglo-Venezuelan Association". 
[160]   Barry Carr, "Identity, Class, and Nation: Black Immigrant Workers, Cuban Communism, and the Sugar Insurgency, 1925-1934," HAHR, Vol 78 Issue 1 (Feb 1998), 83
[161]   Carr, "Identity, Class, and Nation," 84
[162]   Carr, "Identity, Class, and Nation," 86
[163]   Carr, "Identity, Class, and Nation," 87
[164]   Carr, "Identity, Class, and Nation," 90
[165]   Carr, "Identity, Class, and Nation," 114
[166]   Carr, "Identity, Class, and Nation," 115
[167]   Samuel Martinez, "From Hidden Hand to Heavy Hand: the State, and Migrant Labor in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, LARR, Volume 34 Issue 1 (1999), 62
[168]   Martinez, "From Hidden Hand to Heavy Hand," 64

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